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Ideology and the State: an Analysis of the Connection between
Fairness, Altruism, and Redistribution
Noemi Mantovan
The aim of this thesis is to overcome the simplistic idea of homo economicus, by
exploring the voting behaviour of heterogeneous agents whose actions are also inu-
enced by their view of social justice and altruism. The thesis consists of four essays
which explore the role of non-economic variables in dening individuals preferences.
The rst essay develops the path-breaking approach initiated by Alesina and
Angeletos (2005). It takes in consideration citizens demand for fairness, and
analyses their political choices in a multidimensional scenario. We show how
including fairness explains various observed correlations between inequality, redis-
tribution and growth.
The second essay analyses the connection between ideology and public schooling.
It presents a model in which individuals care about their personal wealth, as well
as about the public expenditure, which is allocated by the government between
education and the public good.
The third essay deepens the analysis of the connection between the ideas of
fairness and redistribution and how these evolve over time, and considers a society
in which two instruments are available: an income tax and a wealth tax. To avoid
double taxation of income, a tax di¤erential is computed, which means that the
income tax is subtracted from the wealth tax.
The fourth essay analyses the current British Governments "Big Society" plan,
which is based on the idea that granting more freedom to local communities and
volunteers will compensate for a withdrawal of public agencies and spending.
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The main conclusion that can be drawn from this thesis is that ideology and
altruism deeply inuence individualspreferences and behaviour and can a¤ect polit-
ical elections and economic fundamentals.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Empirical evidence1 suggests that individuals do not base their voting deci-
sions only on the advantage they can get from redistribution, but that altruism
and ideology might strongly inuence their decisions. However, this relation has
not been fully explored theoretically, nor numerically. This thesis aims providing a
solid analysis of the connections, interactions, and transmission mechanism between
ideology, altruism and redistribution.
Two main relations need to be analyzed: on the one hand, how ideology inu-
ences preferences and redistribution, through the determination of preferences, and
on the other hand how redistribution inuences ideology itself, as well as altruism. In
models à la Meltzer and Richard (1980), in fact, individuals vote according to their
position in the wealth ladder compared to the mean voter. However, this has been
proven to be a partial approach, showing the need for a more comprehensive analysis
of preferences, which has to be able to take into account also ideology (Alesina and
Glaeser, 2004). Moreover, ideology itself cannot be considered as a static parameter
(Alesina and Angeletos 2005a). These two concepts are fully internalized in this
work, which focuses on ideology and considers it as an evolving force, which builds
both on past experiences and present signals. In this way, individuals are partially
inuenced by the ideology they inherit from their parents, and are partially inu-
enced by the series of signals they receive from the outside world.
1See for example Fong (2001), Alesina and Gleaser (2004), Alesina and Angeletos
(2005a,b).
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The introduction of concerns for fairness reconciles several empirical observations
which would be inconsistent with models based upon individual income (and position
in the income ladder) as the only determinant of the votersviews about taxes and
transfers. Moreover, we explore the topical issue of the e¤ects of redistribution
on altruism and volunteering, which is in the centre of a timely and strong debate
regarding the Big Society program in UK, for which we provide empirical, theoretical,
and narrative analysis results.
This works relies strongly on the path breaking work by Alesina and Angeletos
(2005a), which provides, for the rst time to our knowledge, a model in which
ideas of social justice, and more in particular fairness, enters the preferences for
redistribution and shape voting behavior. A remarkable and yet unexplored feature
of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) economy is that, given an initial vector of actual
and "fair" wealth distributions, the model not only entails the whole sequence of
wealth distributions, economic growth, and political winners, but also determines
the evolution of cultural variables such as ideas of fair wealth distribution shared
by each family. Hence, it implicitly contains a very special dynamical system that
incorporates the whole socio-cultural-political dynamics of the economy.
Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) study the restrictions that the steady state condi-
tions imply on the winning redistributive policies of their model. However, we deem
it important to fully observe the whole dynamics of the system, with special refer-
ence to the actual and fair wealth distributions. This is important in order to test
the robustness of their main predictions and, more importantly, to learn additional
useful lessons for interpreting the actual historical time series of country develop-
ment over a long span of generations. Given the complex structure of the model,
it is hard to fully characterize the dynamic transition of this model analytically. In
this thesis we develop and use general algorithms that allow simulating numerically
the dynamic versions of ideology models: starting from any distribution of actual
2
and fair wealth of the initial generation we can reiterate the model for several gener-
ations. This enables us to compute the whole dynamic transition, with the sequence
of redistributive policies that win the electoral game and the associated actual and
fair wealth distribution of every generation. Moreover, throughout the thesis we
introduce a probabilistic voting framework which allows for multidimensional, and
which does not need to rely on the single-peakedness of preferences.
The main aim of this thesis is therefore to analyze the link between ide-
ology, altruism, and redistribution. This is here studied from several perspectives,
expanding the investigation on new frontiers and introducing unexplored paths.
First, we focus on a general model that allows us to fully determine the evolution
of ideology, fairness, and redistribution. Second, we di¤erentiate between forms
of redistribution, introducing indirect redistribution such as public schooling and
public goods, and investigate their interactions with ideology and inequality. Third,
we di¤erentiate between various forms of taxation, providing analyses for the intro-
duction of wealth tax, and income tax. Finally, we move the focus from ideology to
altruism, and study what are the e¤ects of the welfare state on volunteering.
In chapter 3 we provide a politico economic model that can trace over time
the evolution of policies (income taxes and bequest taxes and transfer schemes),
the evolution of inequality, and of the political preferences for redistribution, as
a function of the changes in what individuals perceive as fair and unfair wealth
di¤erences.
We specically focus on the evolution of ideology and how this happens together
with the evolution of inequality and redistribution. We create an algorithm which
enables us to repeat voting decisions and outcomes for several generations and to
make several experiments for a variety of scenarios. We compare the intergenera-
tional equilibrium time series deriving from di¤erent initial conditions, showing, for
example, how low levels of initial wealth can lead to a long spell of considerably per-
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sistent intergenerational economic poverty trap, causing high taxation, inequality,
and low capital accumulation for a potentially very long period.
On the other side, higher initial wealth leads to lower taxation and higher equality
and capital accumulation. In a very poor country the role of luck will be higher com-
pared to a wealthy country; therefore individuals will vote for a higher redistribution,
trying to reduce the role of luck. However, high redistribution can impair e¤ort and
reduce per capita wealth. In this case a second generation would also observe that
di¤erences in wealth depend on luck and decide to vote for higher redistribution, and
so on, reaching a steady state with low capital accumulation, low wealth and high
taxes. Di¤erent initial ideas of social justice have a strong inuence on redistribu-
tion, so strong, in fact, that can bring about multiple steady states. We analyze how
the ideology learned from the parent can clash with the world signals, explaining for
example, how a very egalitarian "hippy" generation could be followed by a conserv-
ative Reagan or Thatcher era.
We also explore the role of culture. If it is true that ideology evolves over time,
culture is a country specic imprinting that inuences voting decisions. To study
the e¤ects of di¤erent culture, we distinguish between countries in which individuals
care about fairness, countries in which individuals only care about their position
in the wealth ladder, and countries in which individuals dislike inequality per se,
regardless the source of it. The main results are that preferences for social justice
matter, and that countries which are against any form of inequality might end up
with very low per capita income and very high redistribution.
Moreover, we analyze the role of shocks, showing how, according to the percep-
tion of individuals about the fairness of the new wealth distribution, the political
outcomes can be completely di¤erent, and even bring about multiple steady states.
In this thesis we also explore di¤erent forms of taxation and redistribution. In
chapter 3 a distortionary bequest tax is introduced, with counter intuitive results:
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if people believe that inherited wealth should be heavily taxed, without considering
the source of it, they should prefer to equalize everyones wealth at birth, bringing
about a very high level of distortionary bequest taxes. In this case parents, who
care about the net bequest and internalize the tax that will redistribute wealth
within their generation, would vote for a high tax rate. This of course could have
implications on all the aggregate economy. However, our experiments reveal that
the presence of a bequest tax does not change at all the decisions of the individuals
about the scal pressure, and that the bequest tax tends to be small.
We also, however, explore the role of di¤erent forms of redistribution in chapter
4, namely transfers, public goods, and public education, with the results that the
interaction between ideology and public education can strongly inuence policy out-
comes. In fact, ideas of fairness interact with preferences for the amount of public
schooling and with inequality. Moreover, this interaction does not have a limited
e¤ect on present time, but inuences future abilities, future degrees of inequality,
future levels of economic growth, and, more interestingly, helps shaping ideology.
An investigation about the interaction between ideology and public schooling
is new to our knowledge, as the e¤ects of ideas of fairness on di¤erent forms of
redistribution have never been studied before.
We show that there is empirical suggestion that higher proportional expenditure
for education is often associated with strong beliefs about fairness, namely that poor
individuals have been unlucky and deserve to be helped. We replicate this result
numerically. In the analytical model individuals care about fairness, and ideas about
public goods and public education do reect this role of ideology.
The main focus of chapter 4 is on how ideology a¤ects public schooling and,
by using a feedback mechanism, how public schooling inuences ideology. First, we
study how di¤erent initial ideas and denitions of fairness a¤ect voting and therefore
decisions about public schooling. We show experiments in which di¤erent cultures
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are compared, nding, among other results, that societies which are strongly against
inequality per se might impose such a heavy taxation that the positive e¤ect given by
an increase in abilities because of more public schooling would be more than o¤set by
the taxations discouraging e¤ect on e¤ort. On the other hand, stronger initial ideas
of fairness, bringing higher taxation for one generation only, might strongly boost
public schooling, and the e¤ect of the increase in the abilities could be so strong
that would lead, for several generations, to have individuals with high abilities, who
produce high e¤ort, who have high per capita income, and a society showing a low
Gini coe¢ cient.
At the same time, also the e¤ects of public schooling on ideology are studied,
with the result that higher public schooling in a generation will increase fairness
in the society, reduce redistribution, and encourage e¤ort for a very long period.
Finally, we show how the relationship between education and ideology is robust to
the introduction of transfers and distortionary bequest tax.
In chapters 3 and 4 we prove that a distortionary bequest tax does not change
the relation between redistribution (including indirect forms of redistribution),
inequality and ideology. However, the policy outcomes can radically change if a
non-distortionary inheritance tax is implemented, and its e¤ect combines with the
e¤ects of introducing ideology. In chapter 5 we explore this possibility. We assume
that individuals can vote, at the beginning of their life, to impose a tax on the
(gross) bequest they received from their parents, to be redistributed lump sum
between individuals belonging to the new generation. To avoid double taxation of
income we compute a tax di¤erential: we subtract, for each individual, the income
tax from the wealth tax. In this way, the government can distinguish between wealth
derived from work and wealth derived from bequest, and can impose an income tax
and a tax on the capital stock.
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The main strong result is that, if fairness matters to individuals, it is preferable
to have a higher wealth tax and a smaller income tax. We derive several analyt-
ical results, about the steady state level of wealth tax and income tax, in di¤erent
scenarios in which luck or abilities become predominant in determining di¤erences
in wealth. We also determine the wealth maximizing tax composition: we investi-
gate which amount of income and wealth tax can bring about the higher per capita
wealth. Moreover, we provide several numerical results, including simulations of the
di¤erences between this formulation and the one presented in Chapter 5, the reac-
tions to di¤erent origins of wealth, and a comparison between an income tax and a
wealth tax.
Finally, we slightly move the focus from ideology towards the relation between
altruism and redistribution, by presenting, in chapter 6, an interdisciplinary work
that o¤ers a study of the Big Society. In fact, recently, the British coalition govern-
ment started a plan to build a Big Societyin which public activities and spending
are rolled backand citizens themselves take more responsibility in running public
services. This hypothesis is based on the belief that high government expenditure
will a¤ect negatively volunteering because of a crowding out e¤ect, implying that
an increase (decrease) in public expenditure brings about a decrease (increase) in
individualspropensity to volunteer. However, there is very little theoretical and
empirical evidence to support this assumption.
For the rst time to our knowledge, we study the connection between volunteering
and government expenditure using three di¤erent instruments: an analytical model,
an empirical investigation, and a narrative analysis based on grounded theory. In the
model we build, we assume that individuals care about the e¤ects of volunteering
because of their altruism, as well as having a high level of wealth and receiving
public goods. As standard, we also assume they have increasing marginal disutility
of e¤ort, be it exerted in the market or in the volunteering activities. The main
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result of the model, contrary to the idea at the base of the Big Society, is that,
for individuals who work, an increase in government expenditure increases the time
spent volunteering. The same result emerges from econometric analysis developed on
the British Household Panel Survey data, and on the European Values Survey data,
as well as from the narrative analysis, conducted with interviews in the Glasgow
area.
Even though several aspects are analyzed, this thesis does indeed provide one
main conclusion: the complex interactions between ideology, altruism and redistri-
bution cannot be ignored.
The thesis proceeds as follows: in chapter 2 we present a review of the liter-
ature. In chapter 3 we provide an analysis of the evolution of ideology, fairness
and redistribution. In chapter 4 we provide a model of the relationships between
public schooling, ideology and fairness. In chapter 5 we introduce a study on the
tax di¤erential, wealth tax and the inuence of ideology. In chapter 6 we present an
investigation of the Big Society, and of the connection between redistribution and
volunteering capital. Finally, in chapter 7 we draw and present the conclusion.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This thesis explores several topics in political economy, and more in general in macro-
economics, such as the interactions between inequality and redistribution, ideology,
voting systems, capital taxation, education, altruism, and volunteering. Even if the
focus is specically on the relation between ideology, altruism, and redistribution,
we interact with other streams of literature. This chapter presents a brief review of
the literature streams which are mainly connected to this work.
A short section will introduce the pioneristic literature that studies the relation
between inequality and redistribution, this is necessary to give an introduction of
what are the results if no ideology is considered. After, we di¤erentiate between
forms of taxation and forms of redistribution: rst, we will di¤erentiate between
forms of taxation and present a short review of the literature about the optimal
capital tax and its e¤ects. Second, we will analyze di¤erent forms of redistribution
and review the literature about the e¤ects and forms of public education. Moreover,
we start exploring altruism, and what can be the e¤ect of redistribution on decisions
to volunteer according to the recent literature. Finally, we will dive more in core of
the literature that most inuenced this thesis: the one that focuses on the determi-
nation of preferences for redistribution. After a more general introduction, we will
review the work by Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) which especially relates to this
thesis, comparing its welfare functional to inequality measures, and o¤ering a short
comparative analysis of di¤erent voting mechanisms.
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2.1 The Relationship between Inequality and Redistribution
Since the 1980s several authors started investigating how inequality inuences redis-
tribution, and how this connection a¤ects economic growth. The idea is that indi-
viduals observe their position on the wealth ladder and decide to redistribute accord-
ingly. Therefore, the higher the wealth or income inequality, the higher the redistri-
bution. The pioneering work by Meltzer and Richard (1981) focuses on the relation
between the position of the pivotal voter in a majority rule and the size of redistrib-
ution. Their main nding is that the poorer is the pivotal voter the higher is going
to be the redistribution and the lower the economic growth.
The e¤ects of the redistribution on the wealth, on the other side, change according
to the specications of the models: Alesina and Rodrick (1994), and Persson and
Tabellini (1994) nd a monotonic determination of the link between growth and
redistribution. In both works authors proved that inequality brings about higher
redistribution, which, in turns, drives down economic growth.
On the other hand, Bertola (1993) builds an endogenous growth model, where
the median voters choices can help or damage economic growth, depending on eco-
nomic policies menu. Perottis empirical conclusions (1996) are that the relationship
between inequality and redistribution is non-signicant.
Other studies found out that the redistribution can boost wealth. Bénabou
(1996) and Galor and Zeira (1993) focus on the positive relation between redistribu-
tion and economic growth. In fact, due to credit market imperfections, the economy
cannot develop to its full potential, which is reached only through the distortions
created by taxation and redistribution.
Similar conclusions arise from the work by Aghion et al. (1999), who examine
credit market imperfections, as in Bénabou (1996), and introduce markets volatility
and the possibility for moral hazard, which can be corrected through taxation. If
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this is the case, in fact, redistribution can be used to correct market failures and
therefore lead to a virtuous circle where both equality and growth increase.
The main conclusion that can be drawn by this stream of literature is that indi-
viduals decide to vote according to the benet that they can get from redistribution,
and that taxation can have a strong inuence on the economic growth.
However di¤erent tax systems can have di¤erent e¤ect of the economic growth.
In Chapter 5, we will introduce a di¤erential tax system in which the income tax is
detracted from the wealth tax, and we will analyze the implications that will arise
for the preferences for redistribution and economic growth. In the next section we
will analyze the e¤ects of the introduction of a tax on capital.
2.2 Optimal Capital Taxation
The search for the optimal wealth taxation is still a timely and unresolved problem,
but it should not be forget that in has been one of the macroeconomics angular
stones. In particular, the problem of double counting when income is taxed has
already been deeply analyzed from the nineteen century. Mills (1884) proposes to
exempt savings from the income tax. The problem of double counting is also studied
by Fisher (1939), who analyses the e¤ects of an Accretion Tax, which is a broader
tax that can include savings, capital value and income capacity. Kaldor (1955)
arrives at the conclusion that, in order to avoid double counting, a consumption tax
is preferable to an income tax.
In more recent times, the debate about the opportunity of wealth and capital
tax has ourished. The typical result from the Ramsey literature, where lump sum
taxes are not available, is that in dynamic models with homogeneous individuals the
optimal capital taxation is zero (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976 and 1980 and Feldstein
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1978)1. The main reason is that a tax on capital income is seen as a di¤erential in
the commodity taxation. In fact, Atkinson and Stiglitz uniform commodity taxation
theorem (1976) states that if utility is weakly separable between consumption and
leisure, then it is optimal to tax all the goods at the same rate. Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) proved that a positive tax on capital income means imposing a higher tax on
the future consumption compared to the current one, and thus violates the uniform
commodity taxation theorem.
The result of zero capital taxation holds for overlapping generation models
with heterogeneous individuals (Diamond, 1973), and for innitely lived individuals
(Chamley, 1986). The zero capital taxation is also found in nite time, depending
on the classes of preferences (Basu et al. 2004). Moreover, the zero capital result is
also obtained by Lucas (1990) in the presence of human capital, and by Jones et al.
(1997), who build an innovative human capital accumulation process by di¤erenti-
ating between consumption goods that increase the productivity and consumption
goods that increase the abilities.
On the other hand, if the focus of the taxations is redistributive and the individ-
uals are heterogeneous it is possible to obtain, using politico-economic equilibria, a
positive capital tax (see Krussel et al., 1996). In a Ramsey framework, considering a
life-cycle economy in which individuals have to allocate their time between work and
leisure, Erosa and Gervais (2002) nd it optimal to violate the uniform commodity
taxation theorem, and therefore implement a positive capital taxation that varies
with the age of individuals. This result derives from the fact that even in a steady
state the allocation between consumption and savings varies in individualslives.
The optimal capital tax has also been studied in a business cycle model by Chari
et al. (1994), who obtain that the optimal policy is represented by zero capital
taxation and constant labour taxes. Chari et al. (1994), in fact, reject the idea of a
1See Renstrom (1999) for a detailed literature review on zero capital taxation.
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tax smoothing model and nd it optimal to have high capital taxation on the period
of transition of the cycle only.
Moreover, scal policy reforms and the possibility for alternative taxes were
analyzed by Bradford (1986), who denes the X Tax, which is a value added tax
the rate of which is linked to the income. Altig at al. (2001) make a comparative
study between ve alternative scal systems in the U.S. and prove how the X Tax
can replicate the income tax, at least in the U.S..
The debate regarding the optimal capital tax has recently found new strength
thanks to the insights of the New Dynamic Public Finance2, that originates from
the Mirrlees (1971) framework, but extends it in a dynamic environment, and in
contrast to the original Ramsey result, nds it optimal to impose a positive capital
taxation, at least for some individuals 3. Kocherlakota (2005) builds a model in which
abilities are private information and subject to aggregate shocks, and individuals are
heterogeneous. In this case, the average wealth tax is zero, because the optimal tax
is positive for people who will have low skills in the next period and negative for
people who will have high skills in the next period, in order to augment the next
period e¤ort.
In the work by Farhi and Werning (2008), the positive capital taxation arises
from decreasing marginal utility of wealth and stands only if there is not perfect
commitment. With perfect commitment, the average capital taxation would be
zero. Also in Farhi and Werning (2010) and in Golosov et al. (2011) redistribution
derives from the decreasing marginal utility only. In the work by Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2007) the positive taxation arises from the incomplete information about
consumption and trading. The authors show that if trade is not observable, the
equilibria deriving only from the market are not e¢ cient. If the consumption is
2See Golosov et al. (2006) for a literature review.
3In Mirrlees environment the tax rates are often nonlinear.
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perfectly observable, than neither taxes nor insurance can improve the allocation of
resources. When a positive capital tax is implemented, it reduces the return on the
retrading market, and increase the probability of the individual revealing the truth
about her skills.
Not only the type of tax is important, but also the type of redistribution. Lump
sum redistribution can have di¤erent impact compared to a specic form of redis-
tribution. In particular, in Chapter 4 we will introduce the possibility to use tax
revenue to nance public education. In the next subsection we o¤er a short review
of the literature about public education and inequality.
2.3 Inequality, Public Education, and Economic Growth
The role of public education in determining the inequality level and economic growth
of a country has been analysed from various perspectives. Without pretending to
comprehensively cover this burgeoning literature, here we distinguish between ve
important perspectives.
First of all, the general level of public education and the presence of education
subsidies have a positive inuence on economic growth (Bénabou 1996, Perotti 1996).
If there is only private education, the impossibility of parents to borrow for the
education of their children is detrimental for economic growth. The wealth can tend
to an ergodic distribution on the long run (Loury, 1981), or, if the technology is
non-convex and there are credit market imperfections (Galor and Zeira, 1993), it is
possible to have multiple steady states according to the initial wealth distribution.
The multiplicity of steady states with an imperfect credit market can depend on low
wages (Banerjee and Newman, 1994) and on high interest rate (Piketty, 1997)4.
4For the condition under which an ergodic distribution is reachable see Aghion and
Bolton (1997).
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Second, high initial inequality has a detrimental e¤ect on public education and
consequently on economic growth. According to an empirical study by Galor et al.
(2009), which focuses on the beginning of the 20th century in US, the inequality in
the distribution of land negatively a¤ects the implementation of public schooling.
The lack of public education in turns impedes the emerging of a skill-intensive
industry and slows down the economic growth.
Third, the positive role of education has been studied by the literature on human
capital5, which focuses on the decision of individuals about how much time allocate
to education (human capital accumulation), and how much time to allocate to leisure
or work. Individualsproductivity depends not only on their personal investment in
human capital, but also on the average level of human capital. This last feature can
depend on the change in the aggregate technology (Lucas, 1988) or on the fact that
rms invest more if they assume the workers have higher skills (Acemoglu, 1996).
Fourth, the role of public schooling has been analysed also in relation to public
economics, challenging the assumption that higher public schooling improves the
wealth of poorer individuals. In particular the implications of public and private
schooling regimes have been studied. If public education increases equality, pri-
vate education brings about higher average income (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992).
Moreover, if education is only partially publicly provided, then there is the possibility
that it will transfer resources from the low income individuals to high income individ-
uals (Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995), especially if public expenditure for education
is concentrated on secondary education. However, subsidies to education reduce the
wage inequality and therefore the di¤erences in individualslevel of education. This
last indirect e¤ect can more than o¤set the negative direct e¤ect that subsidies have
on education and increase social mobility while decreasing inequality (Hassler et al.,
2007).
5See Lucas (1988) for an analysis about human capital.
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Fifth, public education is also often seen as a way to reduce the level of social
exclusion. A public expenditure on education which is not perfectly distributed
between di¤erent economic classes is a form of social exclusion (Gradstein, 2003).
It causes a feedback mechanism: unequal access to education causes bigger future
di¤erences and the possibility of multiple equilibria. This mechanism depends on
the di¤erences in the distribution of political power. In a representative democracy
without lobbies, every family has the same inuence on political results, leading
to a "one person one vote" scheme in which the median voter is the pivotal one.
Otherwise, if political power is positively related to income, arriving to the extreme
"one dollar one vote" scheme, the scal policy will be determined by the preferences
of richer citizens only (Bénabou, 1996). This could lead to multiple equilibria,
which depend on initial income di¤erences. If there are little di¤erences between the
income of individuals, people will adopt a social inclusive system. So, the system will
converge to a relatively high mean income, with low inequality. On the contrary,
if inequality is high, the poorer individuals could be excluded from the political
decision and the economy could converge to a society with lower incomes and higher
inequality.
Chapter 4 further investigates what inuences the preferences for public schooling
(and vice versa). This is necessary because the idea that the poorer the individual
is, the higher her demand for public schooling will be, is not necessarily true. In
an economy in which public and private schooling are available, with credit market
imperfections, an increase in income might have two opposing e¤ects on individuals
scal preferences: an increase in income causes a higher demand for education, but
at the same time heavier taxation provokes a net loss (Gradstein, 2004). The older
the individual is, the lower her support for public schooling is probably going to be.
In the US, for example, public schooling expenditure has been found to decrease in
areas in which the number of elderly population increases (Poterba, 1997).
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Not only government expenditure can be used to nance public goods such as
public education, but also altruistic individuals can produce goods through money
or time donation. In next section we will introduce the literature about the deter-
minants of volunteering.
2.4 Volunteering, the State, and the Big Society Program
In the recent literature there have been several important developments for analysing
the connection between government expenditure and voluntary work at a macroeco-
nomic level. Over the past years several empirical works have studied the determi-
nants of voluntary work for the total population or for specic groups of people. For
example, at a general level people can decide to start volunteering, or give money to
charity, because of pure altruism or warm-glow altruism (Andreoni 1990), because
they want personally to make a di¤erence(Duncan, 2004), because they are the
most impatient to receive a certain good (Bilodeau and Slivinski 1996), because
giving can enhance their wellbeing (Meier and Stutzer, 2008), because of social pres-
sure (Della Vigna et al. 2011), or because they are obliged by social norms (Olken
and Singhal 2009). The decision to participate in voluntary activities is also likely to
be inuenced by the socioeconomic or ethnic composition of the individualsneigh-
borhood or community (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Atkinson & Kintrea, 2001;
Goodlad and Meegan, 2005).
Although the Big Society in particular aims at enhancing volunteering in
(deprived) neighbourhoods or communities, several authors have suggested that the
decision of citizens to volunteer might depend more strongly on macro-economical
factors rather than the characteristics of the area of residence (Hastings, 2003;
Amin, 2005; Atkinson, Buck, & Kintrea, 2005; New Economics Foundation, 2010).
An important stream of research has explored how a change in the size of the
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welfare state inuences the decision to volunteer (e.g. Khanna & Sandler, 2000;
Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005; Hackl et al., 2010). These studies have focused on the
entire population or on the specic age groups of young people and retired people.
However, perhaps the most crucial type of citizen, both for the Big Society as for
the relationship between government expenditure and volunteering in general, is
part of the population that has to allocate time between working in the market,
volunteering and leisure. In chapter 6, we explore the impact of public spending
on volunteering, but, for the rst time to our knowledge, only concentrate on the
employed part of the population.
At an aggregate population level, recent studies have investigated the possibility
of crowding in or crowding out e¤ects due to an increase of the welfare state. In
particular Khanna and Sandler (2000) nd an opposite e¤ect (crowding in) in a
study regarding money donations in the UK. Van Oorschot and Arts (2005) do
not nd evidence to support the hypothesis of crowding out when considering data
from the third wave of the World Values Survey, and using the total government
expenditure as measure of the welfare state. On the other side, Hackl et al. (2010),
when concentrating on the independent variable of social government spending in
their analysis of data of OECD countries, taken from the European Values Survey
and the World Values Survey, do nd a crowding out e¤ect on the four world waves
(1981, 1990, 1995, 1999).
Age tends to be a very strong determinant of the decision to volunteer. First of
all, rm evidence exists that individuals tend to start volunteering later in life, mainly
after their retirement (Mutchler et al., 2003). In fact, retired people are often so
overrepresented in voluntary activities that old age is one of the key characteristics of
the usual suspects(e.g. Barnes et al., 2007). To be sure, the reasons for volunteering
at an old age are likely to be varied and depend strongly on the health condition of
the individual (Erlighagen and Hank, 2006). At the same time, in the past years the
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voluntary work of young citizens has been studied in research about the interactions
between volunteering and human capital. For example, the study by Day and Devlin
(1998) nds a positive relation between the returning rates of income after having
done voluntary work in Canada. Young citizens, about to enter the job market,
can see volunteering as an optimal decision for enhancing their human capital and
thereby having prospects of a higher income.
Altruism does not only drive volunteering, but can also a¤ect preferences for
redistribution. Throughout this work will not consider individuals who vote only
accordingly to what is their position on the wealth ladder, but we will consider
individuals who care about living in just world. In the next section we describe the
literature which analyses di¤erent determinants for the preferences for redistribution.
2.5 Preferences for Redistribution
In the past years, scholars started investigating how preferences for redistribution
are not always directly related to how much an individual gains or loses from a
scal policy. First of all, preferences for redistribution can depend on the history
of an individual, namely on the past income (Piketty, 1995). Each individual does
not vote only according to the advantage she can actually get from redistribution
given her current condition, but she learns from her past social mobility and relies
on that when voting for scal policy. The key point in Pikettys model (1995) is
that in the long run this mechanism will bring about the development of di¤erent
dynasties, which di¤erences in the preferred level of redistribution and therefore in
the supplied e¤ort.
On the other hand, scholars also analysed the impact of future expectations of
social mobility on actual preferences. The POUM hypothesis (Prospect of Upward
Mobility) developed by Bénabou and Ok (2001) is key in this sense. The authors
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focus on individuals who know the stochastic process that drives income in the
society and vote accordingly. Depending on the shape of the function connecting
actual and future income and considering the fact that scal policies are, to some
degrees, persistent for future periods, even individuals poorer than the mean might
prefer a low tax rate. The reason is that each individual knows that she will lose
from an aggressive scal policy if she expects to be richer than the mean voter in
the future6.
Another factor that can inuence the preference about redistribution is the fear
that strong inequality can lead to a high crime rate. The interactions between
inequality and crime has been empirically studied, proving the existence of a strong
correlation between the two factors (see Fajnzybler et al. 2002). Moreover, strong
inequality in a society can be detrimental for property rights in two ways: (1) poorer
citizens can choose to implement redistribution using violence or revolutions, and
(2) the richer part of society can inuence or change the political or legal decision
through the use of political contributions or bribes (Glaeser et al. 2003). It should
be noted, however, that while the idea that inequality enhances criminality is unani-
mously accepted, the idea that redistribution can diminish the crime rate through a
reduction of inequality is not. According to Imrohoroglu et al. (2000), redistribution
could even enhance criminality because subsides and taxes may distort individuals
decisions between working and committing crimes.
Moreover, redistribution preferences can be inuenced by the expected impact of
taxation on social competition. According to this theory, citizens belonging to the
middle and the upper classes want to maintain the social gap respectively toward the
lower and the middle classes. Corneo and Gruner (2000) prove that the redistribution
preferred by the median voter turns out to be a decreasing function of the social
6Bénabou and Ok (2001) consider also agents who care about the future income of their
children.
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gap between the middle and the upper class, and an increasing function of the social
gap between the lower and the middle class. The median voter, who belongs to the
middle class in the Corneo and Gruners model (2000), wants to maintain the social
distance compared to the lower class individuals, and will vote accordingly, even if
this means choosing a relatively lower tax rate compared to the one they would have
chosen in a world where social life does not matter.
Some authors have recently started studying how personal characteristic can
inuence the preference for redistribution, in particular referring to gender and eth-
nicity. According to the result of the experiment by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001),
women and men di¤er in the demand for altruism and their equality preferences.
Alesina and Giuliano (2009), moreover nd that women tend to be more favorable
to redistribution than men.
Also ethnicity seems to be an important factor: one of the results of the empir-
ical work by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) is that white US citizens tend to be
more adverse to redistribution than Afro-American citizens. Luttmer (2001) proves
that interpersonal preferences about redistribution tend to be characterized by two
properties: (1) individuals diminish their support for redistribution as the recipiency
rate in their community increases; and (2) people tend to show a strong racial group
loyalty.
A recent and innovative idea is that personal opinion and beliefs about fairness
and social justice can inuence redistributive preferences. Authors stopped consid-
ering only selsh individuals and started analysing individuals who want to live in
a fair world, and vote accordingly. Fong (2001) analyses the relation between the
belief of self or exogenous income determination and redistribution. The author
investigates the role of beliefs about e¤ort, luck and opportunities in life, and redis-
tribution, and nds that, in some cases, these beliefs can be of more inuence than
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the personal position in the income ladder. Moreover, the author enquires into the
origins of those beliefs.
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) build a model where beliefs are shaped not only by
economical factors, but also by individualstargets and psychological needs.
In Alesina and Glaeser (2004), on the other side, ideas about redistribution can be
the result of manipulation by political parties. If Bénabou and Tirole (2006) explain
the redistributive di¤erences between Europe and United States in term of peoples
intrinsic optimism, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) explain the di¤erences by referring to
the idea that beliefs about social justice in the US have been determined by indoc-
trination controlled by right-wing parties and wealthier people. On the other side, in
Europe beliefs have been shaped by a predominant left-wing ideology. Alesina and
Glaeser (2004) study empirically the causes of redistribution, focusing on the di¤er-
ences between the scal systems adopted in Europe and the United States. Their
result is that geographical and historical factors shaped the institutional structure
of countries. At the same time, the institutional structure determined the predomi-
nance of a type of political party (right wing in the United States and left wing in
Europe). The mainstream political view in a country inuences individual opinions
about why people are poor and therefore about redistribution. If poor people are
unlucky then they deserve to be helped, if otherwise they are lazy, there is no reason
to help them. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) analyze the correlation between the beliefs
of citizens of di¤erent countries and redistribution, nding a strong 61%. A di¤erent
perception of poverty can bring about di¤erences in the tolerance for inequality.
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) prove, in primis, that the idea that the Unites States
has bigger social mobility than Europe is not supported by any empirical evidence.
The data about incomes mobility and inequality show that, economically speaking,
the hypothesis that the United States are a sort of "land of opportunities" is not true
relatively to Europe. American poorer individuals seem to have more probability
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to remain poor compared to European poor individuals. The study by Alesina and
Glaeser (2004) shows that about 60% of Americans who belong to the fth income
quintile did not show any variation in income in 9 years. In Germany this happened
only to the 46,3% of people who belong to the last quintile.
In both the US and Europe beliefs about economic mobility are not consistent
with the actual data. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) examine the World Values Survey
data about the United States and Europe. In the United States, 29% of the people
who participated in the survey think that poor people are condemned to remain
impecunious. Sixty percent of the participants believe that poor people are lazy. In
Europe, 54% of the population believes that poor people are just unlucky and only
the 26% thinks that they are lazy. The majority of the Europeans believe that the
wealth of the family of origin determines individual future income. Moreover, they
tend to believe that poor people cannot come out of poverty. The majority of the
US citizens, on the contrary, believe that poor people are just lazy and do not take
advantage of living in "the land of opportunity".
At the same time the average income in US is higher than in Europe. Having
ancestors who moved from Europe to the US to look for better condition might
inuence the way of thinking of US citizens. According to Alesina and Gleaser (2004)
empirical results, individuals living is US are less keen in believing that there are
social classes, and more keen to believe that poor people deserve to be poor. Not
just political party have a role in shaping people preferences, but also education.
Public education in US always had a very clear direction, and ideas introduced at
school were the ideas of richer citizens, who would nance, through donations, public
schooling. Even nowadays, and even consider the pluralistic forces in universities,
public schools are manage by local authorities, who are usually strongly against
the possibility of left wing ideas being taught during classes. Such an education
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federalism is absent in Europe, were teachers can more freely decide what exactly
to teach.
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) also analyze the e¤ects of opinion about the causes
of poverty on redistribution systems. They found that the more proportional is the
system, the higher is redistribution, and the strongest is the belief that poor people
have just been unlucky. However, the redistribution itself cannot be considered
endogenous.
Another determinate for di¤erent beliefs and redistribution preferences seems
to be the area of a state. A very big country might create a geographic barrier
to workers movements. Alesina and Gleaser (2004), in fact nd that, considering
countries whose per capita GDP is higher than $15000, the correlation between area
of the country and laziness of poor people is 66%. Finally, Alesina and Gleaser (2004)
focus on ethnic fragmentation, nd out how more ethnically fragmented countries
tend to have lower redistribution.
Luttmer and Singhal (2011) empirically analyse the scal preference of immi-
grants across thirty-two countries of origin, proving that the average preference for
redistribution of the country of origin has a large and signicant e¤ect on the pref-
erence for redistribution even after years the individuals have moved. Moreover, the
e¤ect is persistent to the second generation. So, the cultural imprinting regarding
social justice is at least as important as the actual context in shaping preferences.
In the next subsection we will analyze the dynamic model by Alesina and
Angeletos (2005), which relates the most this thesis. The model will be deeply
studied deeply, and a comparative study to other possible ways of modelling will be
o¤ered.
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2.6 Fairness and Redistribution: Analysis of Alesina and Angeletos
(2005a)
This thesis is strongly related to the work by Alesina and Angeletos (2005a). They
study how the beliefs of citizens about the origins of inequality, combined with a
demand for fairness, determine the scal policy of a society. In Alesina and Angeletos
(2005b), individuals consider inequality originating by corruption and rent seeking
more unfair than inequality originating from di¤erences in e¤ort. The more unfair
citizens consider society, the more they are willing to redistribute. This will lead to
bigger governments, which in turn will raise the possibility for corruption, creating a
vicious circle where inequality, taxes and corruption increase. Alesina and Angeletos
work (2005a) contains two models: a static and a dynamic model. In both cases,
the authors analyse the equilibrium deriving from the decisions of individuals who
care about the economy wide wealth distribution. In this way, the authors are able
to incorporate social preferences about the aversion of inequality, when individuals
believe that social iniquities ultimately depend on luck. The main result of the
static model is the multiplicity of equilibria, whereas the dynamic version of the
model predicts the possibility of multiple steady states.
Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) built a dynamic model with intergenerational
linkages. Society is composed of a sequence of non overlapping generations, indexed
as t. Each individual observes her own characteristics such as the innate abilities
Ai > 0, willingness to work i > 0, luck i
7; and the capital inherited from her
parent kit 1. After voting for the wealth tax  it, which will imposed at the end of
life, individuals produce e¤ort eit and, after the taxation is imposed and the revenues
redistributed, individuals decide how to allocate the end of life wealth wit between
consumption cit and bequest for the child kit:
7Luck is i.i.d. distributed, with mean 0.
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Gross wealth depends on abilities, e¤ort, luck and capital inherited form the
previous generation
yit = Aieit + i + kit 1
and the individual budget constraint
cit + kit = wit(1   it)yit +Gt
Private utility depends positively on consumption and capital, and negatively on
the e¤ort. The negative e¤ect of the e¤ort is mitigated by the willingness to work
i :
uit = V (cit;kit; eit) =
1
(1  )1  c
1 
it k

it  
1
2i
e2it,
where  2 (0; 1) represents the intergenerational generosity parameter. The
optimal consumption, capital, and e¤ort are given by
cit = (1  )wit, kit = wit, and eit = (1   t)Aii,
Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) use a quasi linear utility function. For the pri-
vate utility function uit they use a Cobb-Douglas component 1(1 )1  c
1 
it k

it to
which they subtract the square e¤ort component mitigated by the willingness to
work 1
2i
e2it: Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) use a warm glow form of altruism. If
other forms of altruism were chosen, the private utility function would change. If
author had chosen pure altruism, then the whole utility of the subsequent generation
would be included in the utility function, and the problem could be solved through
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dynamic programming, using an innite sequence of controls uit to maximize the
whole sequence:
1X
t=0
tr(xt; ut)
subject to xt+1 = g(xt; ut); where  2 (0; 1) is a discount time factor and xt
the state variable, with x0 given. In this case, given that certain conditions on the
function r(xt; ut) and the set (xt; xt+1) were satised8, it could be possible to build
a value function, generate a Bellman Equation, and solve the problem recursively,
without the need for a politico-economic equilibrium, with repeated voting in every
generation and making a static model, indeed, dynamic.
However, the model of Alesina and Angeletos (2005a), could not be transformed
easily into a dynamic model with pure altruism. The reason is the welfare functional:
the measure of unfairness 
t, is subtracted from the private utility function. The
measure of social justice is given by the distance between the actual utility and the
fair utility for each individual:

t =
1Z
0
(ujt   bujt)2dj
In fact, Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) dene for each real variable in the economy
also the fair shadow values, which depend only on e¤ort and abilities of the individual
and her whole family history:
bcit = (1  )bzit bkit = bzit byit = bwit = Aieit + bkit 1 =X
st
s tAise
i
s
8For a detailed description see Persson and Tabellini (2000).
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This formulation of Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) is innovative compared to
others, as they do not focus on inequality indexes but on unfairness index. Several
papers have analyzed measure of inequality, starting from di¤erent assumptions.
Conventional measures of inequality are represented by: rst, the simplest possible
measure is the variance of the wealth:
Z
(wjt   wt)2dj:
In this simple case the higher the variance of wealth the higher the inequality.
Second, the coe¢ cient of variation, which divides the income distribution for its
average. For example Dalton (1920) denes the inequality measure as:
R
U(y)f(y)dy
U(y)
where y represents the income, U(y) the actual social welfare, and U(y) the
social welfare that would derive from an equal income distribution. This measure,
although generally accepted, has been criticized by Atkinson (1970), as it does not
allow for linear transformations.
Third, the relative mean deviation, as dened by Schutz (1951), which partially
combines the distance from mean approach and the ration approach.
R jyjt   ytj
yt
dj:
Fourth, a more rened measure of inequality: the Gini coe¢ cient, here shown as
in Sens (1973) formulation:
G =
n+ 1
n
  2
n2y
nX
i+1
(n+ 1  i)yi
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Where n represents the number of individuals, and i the individual. The Gini
coe¢ cient represents the normalized area between the Lorenz curve and the 45 line.
The Lorenz curve is the graphic representation of the Lorentz ranking against the
portion of the population n; where the Lorentz ranking consists in the normalization
of the cumulative income functional by the mean9:
L(F; n) =
C(F; n)
F
Finally, the Atkinson Index (Atkinson, 1970), requires an also an indication of
the strength of the inequality aversion " :
I = 1  2
y
Z
y1 "dF (y)
 1
1 "
According to Cowell (1998) there are two main points to be considered for
inequality aversion: First, how should transfers from rich to middle class be ranked
to transfers from middle class to poor? And, second, at what rate should society
trade more equality for lower mean income?
Dening an inequality aversion parameter is comparable to Alesina and Angeletos
(2005a) importance of unfairness , and it can be considered as a measure of culture,
rather that ideology. In Alesina and Angeletos (2005a), in fact, ideology has the
possibility of changing and creating multiple equilibria. In fact, in equilibrium uit buit = wit   bwit; and therefore Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) can rewrite:

t = 
2
tV ar(byit) + (1   t)2V ar(yit   byit) + 2 t(1   t)Cov(byit; yit   byit)
9For a complete description of inequality indexes formulation see Cowell (1998).
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The tax rate is monotonically related to the signal-to-noise ratio, which depends
on the policies in every period s  t: A society with high distortions, according to
Alesina and Angeletos, will have high levels of inequality and a heavy wealth tax,
which will stay constant over time. The optimal tax rate for generation t is given
by  0 = ( ;E):
( ;E)  arg min
 t2[0;1]

1
2
 2t    t

(1   t) + (1  )
1  (1  )(1  )


+(1   t)2

1 +
(1  )
1  (1  )
2
2
+

(1   t) t   (1  )
1  (1  )(1   t)(1  ) +

1  (1  )
2

2

Where 2 represents the variance of luck distribution, 
2
 the variance of the
combination of abilities and willingness to work  = A2ii, and  the distance
between the mean and the median voter.
2.6.1 Alesina and Angeletos Voting Framework and Alternatives
Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) assume that the preferences for redistribution of the
government coincide with the ones of the median voter. However, other voting
frameworks could have also been applied: probabilistic voting, lobbying, or citizen
candidate, with the possibility of changing the outcome of the policies. The decision
about which voting system to choose, in fact, it is not neutral, as shown by Hassler
et al. (2003). In what follows we present a comparison of the e¤ects of di¤erent
voting system on Alesina and Angeletos(2005a) model.
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Median-Voter Equilibrium
Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) dene the su¢ cient condition for the median-voter
framework to be applied to their dynamic model as maxi fA2iig  2
Z
A2iidi; in
this way the authors provide su¢ cient condition for the single-peakedness of voting
preferences.
According to median-voter theorem if all citizens have single-peaked preferences
on a sequence of alternative policies, than a Condorcet solution always exists and
is the same one preferred by the median voter. The Condorcet winner is a policy
capable of beating any other alternative policy in a pairwise vote. For the median
voter to apply it is necessary to have single-peaked preferences, plus three conditions
have to apply10:
1: Direct democracy - Citizens make the policy choices
2: Sincere Voting - Citizens vote the policy that gives them the highest utility
3: Open Agenda - Citizens vote over pairs of policy alternatives
According to Persson and Tabellini (2000), in the median-voter framework, a
voter i decides to votes for a candidate (A) with certainty if the wealth that derives
from party A preferred policy W i(ga) is bigger than the wealth that derives from
the other candidate (B) preferred choice W i(gb) , and vice versa. The probability of
winning for party A is therefore:
10From Persson and Tabellini (2000)
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pA =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if Wm(ga) < W
m(ga)
1
2
if Wm(ga) =W
m(ga)
1 if Wm(ga) > W
m(ga)
The main implication of the median-voter is that the poorer the median voter,
the higher the taxation is going to be, as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). However,
in Alesina and Angeletos (2005a), this is not always the case, because of the e¤ect
of ideology. A more equal society with strongly egalitarian vision might redistribute
more than a very unequal society which does not care about unfairness. In the next
subsections, alternative voting frameworks are presented.
Probabilistic Voting
If the policies space is multidimensional, preferences are not single-peaked it becomes
necessary for the probability of winning the elections pA to become a smooth function
of the distance between the two electoral platforms.
The probabilistic voting, introduced by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) serves this
purpose. Following Persson and Tabellini (2000) we dene 3 groups of individuals:
J=R,M,P respectively representing the rich, the middle class, and the poor. When
individuals vote, they consider both the preferred policy of party A and B, as well as
the candidatesideologies. Each individual, in fact, will have a pro-party A ideolog-
ical bias i, and the all society will generally have an average relative preference for
candidate A . Both i and  can be positive or negative, with  uniformly distributed
on support
h
  1
2 
; 1
2 
i
, and i uniformly distributed on support
h
  1
2'j
; 1
2'j
i
:Also, it
is usually assumed that  > j. In this case the probability for party A to win the
elections will be a function of the distance of the wealth obtained under the policies
of party A and B:
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pA =
1
2
+
 

"X
j
jj

W j(ga) W j(gb)
#
.
where j represents the specic features of group j, and  Pj j'j represents
the average density across groups. Therefore in order to maximize the probability of
winning both candidates will converge to the same platform, because the candidates
are facing the optimization problem. Inserting a probabilistic voting framework
in Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) model could allow for more robust equilibria, in
fact the condition that guarantees single-peakedness of preferences maxi fA2iig 
2
Z
A2iidi, would not be necessary, and even polynomials higher than grade 2 in
the taxation would not represent an obstacle to the determination of the equilibria .
Lobbying
In the median voter and probabilistic voting frameworks every individual has the
same power. However, some individuals might exert pressure on the policy process,
as in the case of lobbying. Assuming that some individuals jointly decide to give
contribution to party A, then the candidate for party A could use the contributions
to increase her popularity, changing ; which in this case would be dependent on the
ex ante popularity ; and on the distance between the contributions made to party
A (CA) and the contributions made to party B (CB) :
 =  + h(CA   CB)
The probability of winning the elections for party A becomes:
pA =
1
2
+  
"X
j
jW j(ga) 
X
j
jW j(ga) + h(CA   CB)
#
.
33
Since the campaign contribution is a cost for the individual, she maximizes the
expected utility derived from the elections, minus the costs for contribution, which
allows to obtaining the optimal campaign contribution:
CJA =Max[0;  h
 
W j(ga) W j(gb)

]
And candidate for party A will maximize the probability of winning given by:
X
j
j

 +Oj( h)2

W j(ga)
Where Oj is a dummy variable that takes values 1 if the group is organized and
0 if not. If all the groups (or no group) are organized, then the lobbying solution
coincides with the one of the probabilistic voting framework. If, on the other side,
only few groups are organized, then they will be able to tilt the equilibrium in their
favour. If lobbying based on personal wealth was inserted in Alesina and Angeletos
(2005a) model, the results of the model itself would not necessarily change. For
example, if rich citizen would have more political power, but would believe in the
necessity for a fair society, than the lump sum tax could be even higher than in the
case in which poor individuals who do not care about fairness would have higher
political power.
However, if di¤erent cultures were introduced in the utility function (1; 2);
with 1 < 2, then the scal policy would strongly be inuenced by the lobby who
gained more power. As the culture is directly related to redistribution (see Alesina
and Glaeser, 2004), a society in which individuals who care strongly about fairness
would be in power, would show a higher level of redistribution.
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Citizen-Candidate
Median voter, probabilistic voting, and lobbying, all assume politicians interested
only in being elected. However, it is possible for the candidates to be directly
motivated by policy outcomes, like in the case of citizen-candidates à la Besley and
Coate (1997). The rst assumption is to have to candidate L and R; representing
left-wing and right-wing, with yL < ym < yR: The optimal voting behavior is exactly
the same as the one in a median voter framework:
pL =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if Wm(gL) < W
m(gR)
1
2
if Wm(gL) =W
m(gR)
1 if Wm(gL) > W
m(gR)
The candidate L announce the policy gL that maximizes her expected utility:
E

WL(g)

= pLW
L(gL) + (1  pL)WL(gR)
Where pL is the probability for candidate L to win the elections. In this case
there two forces a playing: a centrifugal force, which push the candidate towards
pursuing a policy which coincides with her bliss point; and a centripetal force
which pushes the candidate to move her announced policy towards the median voter
preferred policy in order to increase the probability of winning the elections. The
optimal strategy will be therefore to set gL close enough to the preferred policy of
the median voter gm so that pL = 1: The same strategy will be followed by the
candidate R, so that the equilibrium is the same as the median-voter one.
However, if there is no perfect commitment, the solution of the citizen-candidate
model will di¤er substantially from the solution of the median-voter model, and
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might change the results in Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) model. With no commit-
ment possible (as in Alesina 1988), after the elections, winning candidate would have
incentive to pursue her bliss point. As no other per-electoral announcement would
be credible, the candidate whose bliss point is closer to the median voter would win,
assuming that the preferences are monotone on the individualswealth.
In this case it could be possible to have more extreme policies, with higher or
lower tax rate compared to the one preferred by the median voter.
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Chapter 3
The Evolution of Ideology, Fairness and Redistribution
3.1 Introduction
This chapter, co-authored with Alberto Alesina and Guido Cozzi, analyses the inter-
actions between ideology and redistribution. The poor want to tax the rich, but that
is not all what determines redistributive policies. Ideas about what is "fair" and
about what is an acceptable level of inequality above and beyond the individuals
position in the income ladder also matter.1 The same level of inequality may be more
or less acceptable by di¤erent individuals in di¤erent countries depending upon their
beliefs that wealth has been accumulated with e¤ort and ability rather than by luck,
connections or even corruption. In one word whether di¤erent levels of income and
wealth are "deserved" or not. These views about inequality and justice (which we
may label "ideology") determine tax rates and the evolution of the distribution of
income and wealth. But the latter itself generates changes in the proportion of
wealth inequality due to e¤ort or to other factors including luck and government
intervention, thus changing individual views about redistribution.
In this chapter we provide a politico economic model that can trace over time
the evolution of policies (income taxes and bequest taxes and transfer schemes),
1See for instance the recent survey of preferences for redistribution by Alesina and
Giuliano (2010) and the references cited therein. Alesina, Di Tella and McCulloch (2004)
discuss di¤erent levels of inequality tolerance in various countries. Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) focus on a comparison between Continental Europe and US. Persson and Tabellini
(2000) provide an excellent overview of politico economic models of redistributive policies.
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the evolution of inequality, and of the political preferences for redistribution, as
a function of the changes in what individuals perceive as fair and unfair wealth
di¤erences. The introduction of concerns for fairness reconciles several empirical
observations which would be inconsistent with models based upon individual income
(and position in the income ladder) as the only determinant of the votersviews
about taxes and transfers.
In our model di¤erent generations of voters are linked by bequests, thus redistrib-
utive policies in the past and past beliefs about what was fair inuence the current
generations preferences. We are especially interested in two issues. One is how
di¤erent initial conditions lead to long lasting di¤erences in policies. The other one
is how shocks to inequality imply di¤erent policy reactions. Regarding the rst issue
we study not only di¤erences in the initial conditions of the economic system, but
also, and perhaps more interestingly, di¤erences in views about social justice and
about the fairness of the inherited level of inequality. For instance two countries
may be completely identical except for their views about the fairness of their initial
inequality, and as a result they may adopt di¤erent redistributive policies over a long
period of time which determines di¤erent wealth and inequality dynamics. These
di¤erent patterns of taxation, inequality, and growth would be completely unexplain-
able without reference to initial views about what is fair or not, i. e. about social
justice. These examples allow us to explain, for instance, di¤erent levels of redistri-
bution between the US and Europe and their persistence along the lines of Alesina
and Glaeser (2004) who stressed, informally, the role of the perception of poverty
as an explanation of US versus Europe. We also show that for some parameter
values economies with di¤erent initial beliefs but otherwise identical converge slowly
to the same steady state. Another implication of our model is that, contrary to
standard result from the Meltzer and Richards (1981) model, more inequality may
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be associated with less redistribution. This is because di¤erent levels of measured
inequality may be considered more or less fair.2
The second set of results concerns the e¤ect of shocks to wealth inequality like
those generated by wars (Piketty and Saez, 2003, and Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez,
2010) or possibly the 2007-2009 nancial crisis (Saez, 2008). Sudden exogenous
shocks to inequality may generate very di¤erent policy reactions depending on the
perception of individuals about who lost and who gained, namely if those who lost
were those who were rich because of "luck" (broadly dened) or were those who
had become rich because of e¤ort and ability. Thus the same changes in inequality
may have di¤erent e¤ects on redistributive policies depending on the nature of how
these shocks are perceived. An innovative feature of our model is that we can trace
not only the evolution of wealth, inequality, and redistributive policies, but also of
the views about "fairness" in society, that is we can measure how much of the total
inequality is considered fair at di¤erent points in time. We can also examine the
e¤ects of changes on peoples views about fairness.
This chapter is related to the work of Alesina and Angeletos (2005a,b) but it
is richer in its dynamic dimension and it uses a di¤erent voting mechanism. We
adopt as our benchmark the same denition of fairness as theirs, but we also analyse
di¤erent denitions and we emphasize the transition to the steady state, which may
take a long time. Therefore, for the rst time to our knowledge, we analyze the whole
transition path for an ideology and redistribution model, which leads to a deeper
understanding of the interactions between ideology, redistribution, and inequality.
Also, di¤erently from Alesina and Angeletos (2005a,b), which use a median voter
model, we adopt a probabilistic voting framework, which is a more exible tool
to analyse various types of distribution of political inuence, an issue which we
2See in fact Perotti (1996) and Bénabou (1996) for empirical evidence regarding this
relationship.
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explicitly explore in the present chapter. Finally, for the rst time to our knowledge,
we introduce the possibility for individuals to di¤erentiate between income tax and
bequest tax in relation to ideology.
Even though we assume that all families have the correct beliefs about the incen-
tive structure in the economy, we can envisage a more complete version that incor-
porates Pikettys (1995) intra-dynasties evolution of heterogeneous beliefs about the
incentive costs of redistribution. Here past experiences and views about history a¤ect
beliefs homogeneously within our stylized economy, because we intend to focus on
the evolution of the aspect of ideology intended as the "fair" wealth distribution.
Another possible extension should incorporate Bénabou and Tiroles (2006) impor-
tant point, allowing beliefs to get shaped not only by the actual data, but also by
individualspsychological needs and objectives.
The present chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model:
both the economy and the political aspects of it, and the equilibrium. Section 3.3
illustrates the dynamic evolution of the model and performs several experiments.
Section 3.4 extends to bequest taxation alongside income taxation. The last section
concludes. The Matlab codes used in the present chapter are available from the
authors upon request.
3.2 The Economy
We have non overlapping generations of individuals, indexed by t. Population is
constant, there is one active individual per-family, and the total mass of families is
normalized to one. Each individual, indexed by i 2 [0; 1], lives for one period and
is characterized by a certain degree of endurance to e¤ort, i > 0, luck, i 2 R,
and innate abilities, Ai > 0; average luck is zero, that is
Z 1
0
idi = 0. These
40
family-specic variables are assumed, for now, fully persistent over time. In an
extension below we also allow for non persistent luck. Each individual i cares about
consumption, cit, and how much wealth to bequeath to the next generation, kit -
which we label "capital" - and negatively on his e¤ort, eit, on the job. All choice
variables are constrained to be non-negative. The private utility function is:
uit =
1
(1  )1  c
1 
it k

it  
1
2i
e2it,
0 <  < 1. The nal life gross wealth is:
zit = Aieit + i + kit 1. (3.1)
For simplicity, capital is assumed to yield zero rate of return. Each generation
votes on the tax rate,  t, which is proportionally applied to end-of-life gross wealth
zit; all tax revenues are to be redistributed lump sum to all individuals. Note that
we are imposing that income and bequest taxes are the same; in an extension below
we allow for di¤erent tax rates on income and bequests and show that our results
hold in that case as well. Hence, we denote nal life post-tax and transfer wealth
as:
wit = (1   t)zit +Gt, (3.2)
where Gt =  t
Z 1
0
zitdi is the per capita transfer. The government budget is
always balanced. Notice that in our stylized economy, individual income is yit =
(Aieit + i) (1   t)   tkit 1 +Gt, and the aggregate income of generation t is:
Yt =
1Z
0
[(Aieit + i) (1   t)   tkit 1 +Gt] di =
1Z
0
Aieitdi,
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which is identical to per capita income due to the population normalization.
The warm glow intergenerational altruism implies that fraction  of end of life
wealth is bequeathed, as seen by maximizing uit subject to cit+kit = wit. Therefore,
plugging the optimal consumption and bequest into the private utility function, we
obtain:
uit = wit   e
2
it
2i
. (3.3)
Individuals vote on taxation at the beginning of life, before deciding on e¤ort.
Maximizing uit, using (3.3), (3.1), and (3.2), gives:
eit = (1   t)Aii,
which shows that individual e¤ort gets discouraged by expected taxation, and is
increasing in the individual work ability and decreasing in the disutility of e¤ort3.
The denition of a period needs discussion. In the model the period is one
generation and it is also the length of time for which the redistributive policy cannot
be changed. We solve the model below by computational methods and not in closed
form. Therefore it would be relatively straightforward to allow many periods within
one generation and allow for a vote on a tax rate in every period, so many votes
and possibly many tax changes within one generation. However, this complication
would make the interpretation of the simulations heavier without adding much to
the basic message of the chapter. In addition, the choice of a "tax rate" should
not be interpreted as the day to day or year to year changes in scal policy, but the
broad redistributive stand of a certain period in a certain country. For instance more
3As in Heckman (2008), we could distinguish between cognitive abilities (here summa-
rized by Ai) and non-cognitive abilities (1=i).
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redistribution in the US with the Great Society in the Sixties, or with the New Deal
in the Thirties, less redistribution starting with Reagan in the Eighties and what
followed. In Europe an increase in redistribution at the end of the Sixties, possibly
a slowing down today etc.
3.2.1 Inequality and Fairness
In addition to the standard utility function described above, we postulate that utility
also depends negatively on some measure of inequality, i.e of wealth dispersion in
society. In our benchmark case, as in Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) we posit that
individuals tolerate inequality coming from innate ability and e¤ort, but are averse
to inequality arising from everything else, luck and redistribution.
More specically, let us dene "fair" utility and wealth as follows:
buit = bwit   e2it
2i
,
bwit = Aieit + bkit 1.
Remembering that each individual chooses kit = wit, where  represents the
generosity towards the next generation, we dene fair consumption, fair bequest,
and fair disposable wealth as:
bcit = (1  )bzit bkit = bzit bzit = bwit = Aieit + bkit 1. (3.4)
The generation t individual i utility, Uit, is dened as:
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Uit = uit   
t, (3.5)
where

t =
1Z
0
(ujt   bujt)2dj = 1Z
0
(wjt   bwjt)2dj. (3.6)
and  > 0 is the parameter which measures the importance of unfairness for
society. This representation of utility implies that individuals in society dislike
deviations from a distribution of wealth/utility in which everybody gets only the
benets from e¤ort and innate ability. Note that the di¤erence between total wealth
and fair wealth is due to luck and government intervention with taxes and transfers.
The higher the tax rate, the lower the equilibrium choice of e¤ort; therefore the
larger is the percentage of individual income due to luck rather than e¤ort4, and
the larger the proportion of di¤erences across individuals due to luck rather than
e¤ort. In addition, to the extent that government transfers are not included in the
denition of fair luck because not due to e¤ort, this is an additional channel through
which higher taxes induce a higher proportion of wealth perceived as not fair over
the fair portion.
3.2.2 Choice of Utility Function and Alternative Modelling
In this chapter, following Alesina and Angeletos (2005a), we use a quasi-linear private
utility function. The advantage of using such a formulation is that it allows us to nd
a simple solution, not only for the optimal level of capital and consumption, but also
for the optimal level of e¤ort, which linearly negatively depends on taxation, and
4Notice that, for unlucky individuals, that percentage has opposite sign.
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positively of abilities and willingness to work: eit = (1  t)Aii. This solution allows
us to arrive to a simple formulation also for the total utility, keeping the notation
short, and helping analytically and computationally to nd meaningful solutions.
However, it would be possible to transform the utility function without losing the
main properties of optimal e¤ort, capital, and consumption. A simple transformation
of the type:
euit = f(uit) =  1
(1  )1  c
1 
it k

it  
1
2i
e2it,

where f is a positive function of the utility. This would be a non-linear trans-
formation, valid as long as the expression in the logarithm is positive, keeping the
function quasi-linear and maintaining its optimal solutions about e¤ort, capital, and
consumption.
A logarithmic form of the type:
euit = ln 1
(1  )1  c
1 
it k

it

  1
2i
e2it
would imply the same level of optimal capital and consumption, according to the
parameter : However, the optimal level of e¤ort would be a lot more complicated:
eit = (1   t)(i + kit) +Gt
+
  ((1   t)(i + kit) +Gt)2 + 4iAit(1  )2	 12
fAit(1  )g 1
In this case, the e¤ort would not only depend negatively on taxation  t; positively
on abilities Ai, and willingness to work i, but it would also depend non linearly on
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the transfers Gt (which also contain  t), luck i, capital inherited from the previous
generation kit: Moreover, a rational solution for the e¤ort might not even exist.
If we would, on the other hand, dene a formulation of the type:
 !u it = ln

1
(1  )1  c
1 
it k

it

  ln

1
2i
e2it

the optimal e¤ort would have a simpler formulation, but it would still depend
on taxation  t; abilities Ai, transfers Gt (which also contain  t), luck i, and capital
inherited from the previous generation kit::
 !e it = 2(kit + i)
(1  2)  
Gt
(1   t)Ait(1  2)
However, in this case it would be simple to calculate the rst derivative of
the optimal e¤ort  !e with respect to the taxation  t once we substitute Gt =
 t
Z 1
0
[Ajejt + kjt 1] dj
@ !e it
@ t
=  
Z 1
0
[Ajejt + kjt 1] dj
(1   t)2
Therefore the optimal e¤ort would be anyway a decreasing function of  t, and
our results would be robust to this transformation.
3.2.3 Alternative Definitions of Fairness
In our denition of fairness we assume that unfairness can arise because of the
existence of luck i or because of the bequest given by the parents kit derives from
unfairness. While the fair value of kit varies, the only fair value of luck is 0. In
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most of the thesis we assume that luck is perfectly inherited from the parent, but
we also introduce, in section 3.6, the possibility for stochastic luck distribution to
be randomly assigned in every generation. In this case, it is possible to observe the
case in which an individual has average luck it = 0; but her parent has positive luck
it 1 > 0. In this case, even if the child herself is not lucky, she might be considered
lucky because her parent was.
If instead, (as we will show in section 3.4) we assume that the only fair bequest
in each generation is the average one bkt 1 = R kjt 1dj, then an individual with zero
luck could still be lucky because her parent was lucky it 1 > 0 or because her
parent had a high level of innate abilities Ait 1; or high endurance to e¤ort it 1: In
all these cases the result would be a high level of bequest.
If it is not possible to distinguish amongst the nature of wealth of ones parent,
then agents would be, for what concerns bequest, favorable to a complete egalitarian
distribution. The reason is that even if the higher bequest would derive from the
parents e¤ort, rather than the parents luck, it would make no di¤erence in the
voting preferences of the subsequent generation. Considering any form of di¤erences
in bequest unfair would cause stronger ideology in societies and bring about higher
taxation and lower per capita wealth, as we will show in section 3.4.
In the numerical simulations of the model we investigate also for other denitions
of fairness. First we consider the case in which tax and transfers are considered
part of fair wealth. Second, we look at cases in which the e¤ect of Ai is part of luck.
One may argue that being born smart is part of a sort of genetically induced "luck".
Alternatively one may argue that intelligence is fostered by growing up in a rich
family with more child care and investment in education5. Finally we consider the
case in which individuals dislike inequality per se, namely any deviation of wealth
5We consider innate abilities only, which are perfectly inherited from the parent. In
more complex models it is possible to distinguish between genetic heritage and social
heritage. Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2000) distinguish between intelligence, which is a
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and utility from equality for all at the average is costly. The latter would be an
extreme denition of fairness in which any di¤erence in wealth even if arising from
harder work and more e¤ort is unfair.
3.2.4 The Polity
We use a probabilistic voting model6. There are two parties - L , for "left", and
R, for "right" - each of which simultaneously and credibly commits to a tax rate
P 2 [0; 1], P = L, R, at the beginning of each period - coinciding with a generation.
The individuals vote for a party at the beginning of their life. Then the individ-
uals choose e¤orts. The party that obtained the majority of the votes is the only
one in o¢ ce, and it will apply the announced tax rate and will redistribute accord-
ingly. Finally, individuals choose their consumption and bequest. Individuals have
heterogeneous degrees of political party identication: the complete utility function
including economic variables and party identication is the following:
~UitP = uit   
t + (it + "t)L(P ), where P = L;R.
Variable P denotes the party that wins the election, and can be L ( meaning
"left") or R ("right"). Indicator function L(P ) is 1 if P = L and 0 if P = R.
Random variable it represents individual is pro-party L ideological bias, while "t is
an aggregate random variable capturing party Ls popularity for generation t. While
we assumed (for simplicity) that individualspecuniary utility and ability shocks are
genetic heritage less the perfeclty correlated through generations; and social assets, which
consists in knowledge transmitted from parents to children.
6Note that this voting model, due to Lindbeck and Weibull (1987,1993) does not require
single peakness of preferences .
For the implications of using probabilistic voting model, compared to simple majority
voting and lobbistic model see Hassler et al. (2003).
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fully persistent across generations, that is it = i, it = i, and Ait = Ai, political
popularity may change from generation to generation both at the aggregate and
at the family level. Each generation, "t will be uniformly distributed on supporth
  1
2 
; 1
2 
i
, and individual specic variables it are uniformly distributed on supporth
  1
2'i
; 1
2'i
i
. All random variables are independent. Therefore, in the support of the
corresponding distributions, the density function of aggregate popularity of party
L is  > 0, and family-specic density functions are 'i > 0, with the correlated
(aggregate) component of the party identication assumed less variable than the
individual components - that is  > 'i, 8i 2 [0; 1]. The two parties commit to their
tax rates before they know the realization of the random variables "t and it. They
only care about winning the election, and hence choose their policies Lt and 
R
t by
trying to maximize the probability of being elected, pP , P = L, R. This is consistent
with maximizing the expected rents from being in o¢ ce7.
The "popularity shocks" should not be viewed as the day ebbs and ows of
electoral politics. Given our denition of a period as one generation these shocks
should be seen as long term switches of one generation to the left (say the sixties)
or to the right8, (say the eighties in the US).
3.2.5 Equilibrium
After simple substitutions, and momentarily neglecting the party L bias components,
we obtain the indirect utility function of each individual in each generation. That
function ultimately depends on exogenous parameters, on expected taxation and on
all the wealth distribution of the previous generation:
7Let P > 0 denote the (non-transferable) ego rent of party P = L, R, from being in
o¢ ce, the expected rent of party L will be LpL = L(1 pR); whereas party R maximizes
RpR = 
R(1  pL).
8See Song (2008) for an interesting model of political economy under persistent political
ideology shocks.
49
Uit = [i(1   t) + i + kit 1] (1   t) +
1Z
0
[j(1   t) t +  tkjt 1] dj   (1   t)2 i
2
  
Z 1
0
264 (s(1   t) + s + kst 1)(1   t)
+
Z 1
0
(j(1   t) t +  tkjt 1)dj   s(1   t)  bkst 1
375
2
ds (3.7)
 U^it( t).
Where i  A2ii. The proof of Lemma 3.1 is in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.1. In pairwise majority voting, there will exist a unique equilibrium
in which the two parties will select the same policy variable, Lt = 
R
t   t , given by
 t = arg max
 t2[0;1]
1Z
0
'iU^it( t)di. (3.8)
As in other probabilistic voting models, the same equilibrium policy variable
would also be chosen by a biased social planner who maximized the following
weighted aggregate welfare functional:
W () 
1Z
0
'iU^it( t)di,
with each individuals indirect utility function (where e¤ort, consumption, and
bequest are all optimal) being weighted inversely to vulnerability, 1='i, to party-
related attributes. In the special case of individuals who have the same densities
'i = ', Lemma 3.1 implies that 

t = argmax tW ( t) would coincide with the tax
rate chosen by a social planner who adopts a utilitarian welfare functional. Notice
that, from eq. (3.7), the equilibrium tax rate  t will depend on generation t   1s
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bequest distribution kt 1, generation t   1s fair bequest distribution bkt 1, and of
course on the parameter vectors  and ; that is  t = 
(kt 1;bkt 1; ; ).
3.2.6 Intergenerational Links
The equilibrium tax rate  t determines the level of capital and fair capital for each
family of the current generation. Therefore the link between di¤erent generations is
summarized by the dynamics of kit and bkit. The intergenerational link kit is derived,
for each individual, from substituting the level of wealth wit inside the optimal level
of capital derived from the private utility optimization uit:
kit = wit (3.9)
=  f[i(1   t) + i + kit 1] (1   t) +Gtg
At the same time it is possible to obtain a fair intergenerational link bkit substi-
tuting the level of fair wealth bwit inside the optimal level of fair capital derived from
the private utility optimization buit:
bkit =  bwit (3.10)
= 
n
i(1   t) + bkit 1o .
The level of fair bequest does not include any income derived from luck, nor any
change in wealth caused by the government, in the form of taxes and redistribution.
Fair bequest depends, in fact, only on the itergenerational generosity parameter ,
on the e¤ort exerted by the individual i(1    t), and on the fair capital that her
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parent had inherited bkit 1. Therefore, ideas about what is fair are built partially
according to the parents ideas, and partially are derived from personal characteristics
and current taxation. There is a double link between ideology and taxation: on the
one hand ideology inuence voting preferences, and on the other hand redistribution
helps shaping future ideas of what can be considered fair.
A possible criticism is why we use an atemporal utility function, and then insert
intertemporal fair bequest value, rather than solving a dynastic economy. The reason
is to be found in the fair bequest: in every generation a new distribution of fair
bequest is derived. The distribution of fair bequest, for each family, evolves with
time, and inuences the preferences for redistribution of the entire community. When
voting, individuals will not only look at their level of fair bequest (lets say compared
to the average), but at all the levels of fair redistribution for each individual. This
implies that in order to solve a dynastic economy we should be able to dene, in
the rst generation, the whole distribution of capital, and fair capital for an innite
number of generations.
Based on these dynamic equations, we notice that the distribution of i should
be high enough relative to the support of the distribution of i in order for nal life
wealth never to be negative9. In all our simulations, the relative importance of mere
luck is never overwhelming, and hence the non-negative nal life wealth constraint
is never violated.
3.2.7 Discussion
Note that in eq. (3.10), fairbequests - i.e. fair initial wealth distribution, over
the generations - are obtained by removing from the parental end of life wealth, the
e¤ects of the luck variable, i, and of the taxes paid to and transfers received
9See Lemma 1.2 in the Appendix for a su¢ ciency condition.
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by the government. However, the indirect e¤ect of tax rates on individual e¤orts
is included in this denition of fairness. The reader may wonder why "(1    t)"
should enter the "fair wealth": after all, it is an individually rational response to
the distortion induced by taxation, and indeed eit = (1    t)Aii. If redistribution
did not exist in the model, the individual would have exerted a rst best e¤ort level
eFit = Aii. We have run simulations under such a di¤erent view of fairness, based
on "potential" rather than actual e¤orts, without much change in the results about
the dynamics of kit. By eq. (3.10), it simplies the dynamics of bkit, which would
tend to i
1  . However, the results of our computations do not change qualitatively.
A second objection could be raised against using additive luck i and multi-
plicative abilities Ai. Formally, luck enters additively while ability as the marginal
product of e¤ort: both could be viewed as "gifts of nature". Replacing Ai with
A =
R 1
0
Aidi would both be reasonable and consistent at the macroeconomic level
(fair value added = actual value added). Using Aeit = A(1   t)Aii as the valued
added component of the end-of-life wealth, however, would not change the qualita-
tive results much, as actual individual ability, Ai, would still enter multiplicatively
indirectly via optimal e¤ort choice. Purging this e¤ect too, in addition to neglecting
macroeconomic consistency, would not change much10. Hence we can say that all
the main qualitative results from the simulations are robust to the introduction of
multiplicative luck, provided that also additive luck is present.
A third objection could be raised against considering i always fair, as also this
could be considered as something that does not depend on individuals choices but
enhances their wealth. Assuming i as unfair would imply that the e¤ort would
be positively driven by an unfair component: as long as it enters multiplicatively
10Notice that, while in the previous case replacing Ai with its expected value in the direct
abilities reduced the variance of i (due to the elimination of the quadratic exponent on
abilities), eliminating the variance of Ai completely could even increase the variance of i:
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in the optimal e¤ort, higher levels of endurance to work i would translate into
high level of e¤ort. Moreover, unlike Ai; i only enters in the utility function via
the e¤ort. In this case we would have to distinguish between an actual level of
e¤ort eit = (1   t)Aii, and a fair level of e¤ort, in which everyone have the same
endurance to work eFit = (1   t)Ai: Using this formulation would slightly increase
the measure of unfairness 
t =
Z 1
0
(ujt   bujt)2dj; which in this case would become:

t =
Z 1
0
264 (A2ss(1   t) + s + kst 1)(1   t)  (1   t)2A
2
ss
2
+
Z 1
0
(A2ss(1   t) t +  tkjt 1)dj   A2s(1   t)  bkst 1   (1   t)2A2s2
375
2
ds
Qualitatively, our results would not change. Quantitatively we would obtain a
higher level of unfairness that would imply higher taxation, whose purpose would
partially be to discourage e¤ort.
Finally, an objection could be about the role of luck: it does not bear any
productive contribution, not only because it has sum-zero
R
jdj = 0, but also
because it is additive with respect to the capital and e¤ort. In particular, if luck
could inuence abilities Ai or willingness to work i the situation would be di¤erent.
In that case luck would have an e¤ect on aggregate production, according to its
correlation to abilities and/or willingness to work. Therefore, luck would not be
anymore something that simply redistributes wealth among individuals, but instead
some kind of ability/willingness to work enhancer, and its interpretation should
change drastically: it could not anymore represent corruption and criminality, which
do not add to a nations wealth, but it would represent a stricter denition of luck,
and its e¤ect could be distinguished from the abilities and/or willingness to work.
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3.3 Intergenerational Dynamics
Starting from an initial vector of actual and fair wealth levels, (ki0; k^i0)i2[0;1], we can
iterate the model and determine the intergenerational evolution of (kit; k^it)i2[0;1] and
 t for all t 2 N . We use equations (3.7), problem (3.8), and eq.s (3.9) and (3.10),
which, once iterated for an arbitrary number of generations, allows to calculate the
sequence of equilibrium values of the endogenous variables of our dynamic economy
for all parameter vectors, initial wealth distribution, and initial fair wealth distri-
bution. By simulating the model for a su¢ ciently high number of generations, we
can approximate the stable steady state value of the endogenous variables associated
with each initial condition.
Generation ts pair of distributions (kit; k^it)i2[0;1] describe the interaction of real
and "ideal" variables at time t. More precisely, the comparison between how society
currently is - the actual distribution (kit)i2[0;1] - and how society thinks it "should be"
- the fair distribution (k^it)i2[0;1] - sets the goals of the political action; together with
the method of political competition - i.e. pairwise majority voting - this describes
the political ideology prevailing for generation t in that economy. The resulting
political equilibrium generates the evolution of (kit+1; k^it+1)i2[0;1], and therefore the
political ideology (i.e policy goals) prevailing in the next generation. Thus we trace
the evolution of ideology, fairness and redistribution, as well as the aggregate GDP
per capita. We focus our attention on the e¤ects of:
1. di¤erent initial beliefs about the fair wealth distribution (sub-section 3.3.1).
2. di¤erent initial inequality (section 3.3.2).
3. alternative denitions of fairness (section 3.3.3).
4. alternative denitions of fair capital (section 3.3.4)
5. di¤erent initial levels of aggregate wealth and poverty traps (section 3.3.4).
6. temporary shocks to wealth inequality (section 3.3.5).
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7. bequest taxation (section 3.4.1.1).
It should be noticed that in our experiments, throughout this dissertation, we
simulate the economy for several generation without calibrating any parameter. The
reason for this choice is to be found in the very nature of the model: it is made
to describe a long run evolution rather than short run cycles. Moreover, given
the presence of ideology, private utility has to be necessarily relatively simple in
its notation. As a result only two parameter are present in the model: , and
: Finally, the main reason to perform the experiments is to analyze how general
countries would react to certain shocks, and calibrating the two parameters could
certainly add to the understanding of a single specic country, but would not add
qualitatively to our general results.
3.3.1 Different Initial Ideas about Social Justice
A society where citizens believe that the observed cumulated wealth di¤erences are
derived from previous family luck will choose to redistribute more than a society in
which voters think that the current capital accumulation depended on past e¤orts
and talents. In Europe, preexisting forms of feudalism and wealth related to nobility
di¤ered from the US, where modern capitalism developed without a long previous
history of privilege and class di¤erences.
In this section, we simulate the dynamics of two societies, characterized by
identical real economic and personal characteristics, but with di¤erent initial ideas
of the fair wealth distribution. In the rst country, A, every individual of generation
0 believes that all the inequality is unfair, namely the initial wealth levels of their
cohort should be equal to be fair. At the other extreme, the citizens of country B
are initially convinced that the prevailing capital distribution is exactly the fair one.
Figure 3a shows two economies, identical in all market fundamentals, including
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inequality, but that at some point in their history a generation is born and it judges
di¤erently the (same) prevailing wealth distribution. In fact, our "period zero" is
simply the start of our period of interest, but, of course, a long history might have
preceded the "initial generation" we are considering, which otherwise would have
started with no initial capital. Therefore a di¤erent way of interpreting these results
is this: all of the sudden in an unexpected matter a new generation is born with
extremely egalitarian views, with a break of the past. Thus we study how a new
egalitarian generation of individuals might a¤ect the resulting political equilibrium
and economic performance over the subsequent generations.
Figure 3.1a: Di¤erent Initial Ideas of Fairness
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Figure 3.1a shows that, as a consequence of their perception of unfairness in the
initial wealth distribution, country As voters chose a high tax rate in period zero.
Meanwhile, this does not take place in country B, where as a consequence work e¤ort
is higher and capital accumulation faster. Individual preferences and the equilibrium
tax rate ("ideology") evolve from generation to generation. Consider country A. The
rst generation judges all inequality unfair; the second generation will believe their
parentsideal of their generations fairness, but it will attribute part of the current
pre-tax inequality to the e¤orts and abilities of their generations members: therefore
the desired tax rate will be lower. The high tax rate chosen by the rst generation
in country A will induce a relatively low choice of e¤ort and work, and therefore
the percentage of individual wealth due to luck is relatively high, thus the tax rate
desired by generation 1 will still be relatively high. In country B the rst generation
will not tax inequality because they perceived it as fair but the chosen tax rate will
not be zero due to the need for correcting the e¤ect of luck on unfairness within their
cohort. But then the following generation will perceive that some of the inherited
inequality is due to luck and therefore will choose to tax it. Since the initial tax
rate was quite low much of the inequality within generation 1 will be due to e¤ort,
not luck, and therefore the chosen tax rate will not be much higher than in period
zero. This shows that the two countries will remain rather di¤erent in terms of
policy goals and tax/transfer redistributive schemes for many periods/generations.
Initial conditions matter much. Policy goals (ideology) evolve over time together
with the evolution of the economy, but initial di¤erences in perception imply long
lasting di¤erences across countries.
More precisely, let us review the evolution of ideology implicit in eq. (3.10): bkit =
i(1  t)+bkit 1. Individuals belonging to generation t believe that every member
of their cohort should bequeath a wealth level that reects the bequest parental
choice of a fraction, , of their end of life wealth; however that fraction should have
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been taken provided they earned the "fair" end-of-life wealth, given by bzit = i(1 
 t)+bkit 1. Thus individuals believe in the idea of fairness of their parents (as from the
presence of "+bkit 1" in the formula); however, since the term "i(1   t)" is just the
equilibrium value of Aieit, they also believe that the additional "fair" income of their
peers should only arise from their individual e¤orts and productive abilities. Since,
in turn, the e¤ort chosen by the individual turns out to be equal to eit = (1  t)Aii,
its level will also reect the individuals love for work, indeed represented by i. Thus
the view of fair versus unfair inequality evolves from generation zero to generation 1
and this will imply di¤erent choices of tax rates and di¤erent bequests. The same
considerations apply in the transition from generation 1 to 2, and one can simulate
the model forward to trace the transition to a steady state.
As shown in Figure 3.1b, we can keep track of the level of the variance of the
wealth distribution viewed as fair by all the future generations in country A: as we
can see, that level increases over time. The o¤spring of a very egalitarian generation,
though agreeing with their parents view of the world of their times, by critically
assessing the productive participation by their peers, will become increasingly more
tolerant of wealth disparities.
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Figure 3.1b:Evolution of Unfairness
For some parameter values we have multiple steady states. In such cases,
the strictly egalitarian ideology prevailing in an initial generation in country
A can support very strong redistributive policies. High enough taxation would
then discourage individual e¤orts so dramatically that a large part of individuals
wealths would be the result of luck, and hence deemed very unfair. Therefore,
the next generation would decide to tax a lot as well. In the long run the unfair-
ness/redistribution/poverty trap would never be corrected, and the two economies
would di¤er in everything, with country B richer, but more unequal, than country
A.
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3.3.2 Initial Inequality
In a dynamic version of the Meltzer and Richards (1981) model, higher initial
inequality leads to more redistribution, higher taxes and lower capital accumula-
tion and growth (Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson and Tabellini (1994)). It
is straightforward to reproduce this result in our framework. Imagine two countries
with di¤erent initial level of inequality, associated with their di¤erent initial capital
distributions, each viewed as fair in each country; all parameters are the same in
both countries. Then there would be higher taxes and more redistribution in the
country with more inequality. Simulations along those lines are available from the
authors.
However, Perotti (1996) rst and then others have questioned empirically, the
positive correlation relationship between more pre tax inequality and redistribu-
tion.11 A negative correlation between initial inequality and redistribution can be
easily obtained in our model. Imagine two countries, with di¤erent levels of initial
inequality, but suppose that in the country with more inequality the latter is consid-
ered fair, while in the other country the inequality, even though lower, is considered
unfair. Imagine also that in the second country the parameter  is especially high,
namely in this country citizens are especially averse to inequality (unfairly induced).
One can easily generate examples in which more inequality leads to less redistri-
bution. One needs di¤erent ratios of fair versus unfair inequality and/or di¤erent
weights given in the two countries to the cost of inequality and unfairness.
Another reason why inequality may not lead to more but less redistribution is
the case when more inequality leads to a stronger inuence of rich voters in the
political equilibrium. 12 So far, in our probabilistic voting framework, we have
11See also Bénabou (1996) for a survey.
12Bénabou (2000) analyzes the departures from one person, one vote, considering even
the opposite one dollar, one vote. Using results from Rosenstone and Hansen (1993)
he empirically studies how the representation ratio in politics varies across socioeconomic
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worked under the assumption of common values of 'i for all i 2 [0; 1]. However,
this may not be the case, as di¤erent voters are di¤erently reactive to the parties
announcement of di¤erent policies, based on the relative importance they give to
ideological and personal characteristics associated with the di¤erent parties. Our
model allows all possible assumptions about the individual political biases. When
the rich have larger political inuence and when wealth is correlated to more political
inuence redistribution is lower. This will of course imply higher growth and a larger
Gini. All the simulations regarding these cases are available upon request.
3.3.3 Different Views About What Is Fair
In this section we analyse the e¤ects of di¤erent views about fairness, by comparing
three countries.
1) Country A is our benchmark case and we assume  = 0:1. Thus individuals
in country A have preferences described by eq.s (3.5) and (3.6);
2) In country B  = 0: This is the traditional Meltzer-Richard case in which
redistribution occurs only for selsh reasons, namely the poor want to tax the rich
and there is no distinction between fair and unfair inequality;
3) In Country C, individuals are averse to inequality per se, as measured by the
variance of end-of-life post-tax wealth, wit, that is individuals in country C have
preferences for redistribution in which:

Ct = var(wit). (3.11)
groups. The disparities turn out to be quite striking especially with respect to contribu-
tions for the political campaign. By incorporating this in a political economy model, the
conclusion is that an increase in inequality can make the system more pro-wealth biased,
with a consequential reduction in the redistribution. See also Karabarbounis (2010) for
cross country empirical evidence on this point, and Mc Charty, Poole, and Rosenthal
(2008) for a discussion on the United States.
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In Lemma 3.1 we compare the performance of economies with everything else
equal, but the three di¤erent concepts of social justice.
Figure 3.2: Di¤erent Ideologies
As in the gure, countryB immediately starts with no redistribution (the tax rate
always stays on the horizontal axis: Bt = 0, for all t (= 1; 2; :::), whereas countries
A and C approach steady states with positive redistribution. The reason why the
usual inequality-redistribution channel is not at work in country B is probabilistic
party loyalty, along with the symmetric party bias among the citizens. However,
positive taxation emerges also in the  = 0 case as soon as we introduce asymmetric
63
policy bias. Thus the fact that in this experiment Bt = 0 is just a special case,
but in any case country B would have lower taxes than countries A and C. In our
example, country B will become persistently richer than country A, which in turn
gets richer than country C. In this example, country As tax rate tends to 32.6%,
while country Cs tax rate tends to 50.4%.
3.3.4 A Poverty Trap
By poverty trap we mean a situation in which a country does not manage to exit
poverty because the policies induced by poverty itself are not growth enhancing: even
if two countries have all the same parameters regarding intergenerational generosity
; importance of fairness ; and the exact same distribution of innate abilities Ai;
willingness to work i; and luck i; they will take a long time to converge to the
same steady state (gure 3.3a), or might even end up to two di¤erent steady states
(3.3b). So, the only reason for these di¤erences has to be found on the di¤erent
levels of initial capital distribution kit. In this case a country might be stuck in
poverty, even if in theory it would have all the instruments to increase the level of
per capita wealth.
Consider two economies sharing the same distribution of luck, willingness to
work, and innate abilities, but di¤erent initial levels and distributions of capital and
fair capital. Assume that one economy, A, starts from a low and unequal level of
capital endowment; while the other, B, from a high and similarly unequal level of
capital endowment, as shown in Figure 3.3a:
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Figure 3.3a: Poverty Trap
In both countries the initial level of fair wealth is set equal to the actual initial
wealth distribution. This example is representative of cases in which, when the
country is poor, the luck component represents a larger share of realized wealth, and
this induces the voters to prefer a high level of taxation. The poorer country starts
with a higher redistribution, while the rich country simply increases redistribution
at a lower pace. This in turn disincentives e¤orts and capital accumulation, thereby
causing lower aggregate wealth accumulation. The country is cast for long into a
poverty trap; with high taxes and low wealth.
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Eventually, after some generations, in the previous gure, the poorer country
starts slowly to accumulate more capital and to vote for reducing tax rates. Growth
starts to increase and the poorer country tends to catch up with the other countrys
level of capital and taxation. The evolution of the concept of fairness plays a very
important role also in this case. As the generations pass by, the individuals in
the poorer country start to consider more and more fair the di¤erences in the cap-
ital accumulation deriving from the abilities and the e¤orts. In this way taxation
decreases and the capital accumulation can nally take o¤.
However, by slightly altering the parameters, we can provide examples in which
the poverty trap is more extreme, as shown in Figure 3.3b below13:
13To generate this kind of examples, it su¢ ces to slightly increase the value of  and to
slightly increase the dispersion of the luck distribution.
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Figure 3.3b: Persistent Poverty Trap
In this example, we have assumed that country B starts ten times poorer than
country A, while both countries believed their own initial wealth distribution to be
fair (to avoid adding interfering ingredients). In country B, sheer poverty implies
that a large part of people end-of-life wealth is due to luck, which causes the election
of very highly redistributive policy platforms. Once in place, they will discourage
individual e¤orts, thereby causing luck to play a central role in individual enrich-
ment; this in turn reinforces the perception of unfairness in the wealth distribution,
and corroborates drastically redistributive policies, thus perpetuating the poverty
trap. Country B will never catch up with country A: it will rather converge to
a di¤erent steady state wealth distribution, characterized by more poverty, more
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taxation, and less inequality. It should be noted that very poor countries often do
not have a well developed tax structure. Often in these countries redistributive poli-
cies take even more distorting forms often associated with corruption and in many
cases ethnic politics. All the factors would make matters even worse and increase
the chances of a poverty trap. Di Tella and Mc Culloch (2007) discuss reason why
free market capitalist institutions may be fragile in developing countries precisely
because the wealth inequality generated in those countries are (perhaps correctly
so) perceived as generated by corruption and connections rather than abilities and
e¤ort.
3.3.5 Different Definitions of Fair Capital
We choose to dene the fair level of capital as the capital that would have been
reached if no luck nor government would have been present. This means that dif-
ferent levels of inheritance are tolerated if they derive from e¤ort eit, abilities Ai; or
the willingness to work of the parent i, implying an intertemporal value judgment.
However, at individual and government level only atemporal value judgment applies.
Using the average level of the bequest kit would be an option, as for the average
wealth the total e¤ect of taxes and redistribution would be 0. The problem with
this approach would be of inconsistency with the notion of fairness itself: it would
not consider di¤erences between wealth derived from luck i, e¤ort eit, abilities Ai
nor willingness to work i: Therefore, individuals would simply be against any form
of capital inequality, rather than unfairness.
The result is shown in gure 3.4, where we assume two identical countries A
and B; the only di¤erence between the two being in the denition of fair capitalbkit. In country A, represented by the solid line, the fair capital is dened as in our
benchmark model:
68
bkit = ni(1   t) + bkit 1o (3.12)
While in country B agents consider fair only the average capital inherited from
the previous generation:
ebkt = Gt + (1   t)Z j(1   t) + j + kjt 1 dj
The result is that country B has a higher level of redistribution and lover level of
percapita wealth, while showing a lower level of inequality. Therefore, if the agents
believe that, in every generation, the fair capital should be equal to the mean of the
actual capital distribution, they will constantly vote for a higher level of tax rate,
as they would consider every form of di¤erence in bequest as unfair.
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Figure 3.4: Di¤erent Denitions of Fair Capital
3.3.6 Shocks to Wealth Distribution
3.3.5.1 Shocks Which Equalize Capital Holdings
We can trace the e¤ect of a shock in our stylized economy, by assuming that at some
date - say, generation 4 - in country B - otherwise identical to country A - there is an
unexpected shock that cuts all initial capital levels at a ceiling equal to 70% of the
highest inherited capital level. We maintain the assumption of initial distribution
viewed as fair. Figure 3.5 shows what would happen without the shock (country A)
and with the shock (case B):
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Figure 3.5: Shock on Capital
Since the shock is equalizing wealth levels, there is a temporary negative e¤ect on
the equilibrium tax rate due to the fairness motive. The reduction in redistribution
implies only a relatively weak negative temporary e¤ect on income and on inequality.
The economy will re-absorb them completely within few generations.
3.3.5.2 Shocks Which Equalize IndividualsProductivities
Suppose now that the top individual abilities are curtailed: in country B for one gen-
eration ~t (in the example of the gure ~t = 4) we have i~t = min{i, 0:60maxj2[0;1] j}.
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That is, we set a temporary ceiling for the abilities/stamina equal to 60% of their
highest level in normal times. Lower abilities are left unchanged. In country A
nothing happens. Figure 3.6 shows the e¤ects:
Figure 3.6: Shock on the Abilities
Because of the shock growth falls in B. Unlike in Figure 3.5, here the crisis is
followed by an increase in redistribution: despite the crisisequalizing power, country
Bs voters choose more redistribution and higher tax rates. Why so? Fairness con-
siderations tilt scal policy in favour of higher redistribution: if it is not creativity or
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hard work that pays o¤ the rich so much, then the relative importance of unjustied
"luck" (which may include all sorts of non-work related sources of extra gains/losses)
increases since top productivity level has gone down. Therefore, the perception of
unfairness in the wealth increases, thereby inducing voters to increase redistribution
and exacerbate the economic consequences of the crisis. As shown in the example
illustrated by Figure 3.6, in the generation after the crisis (generation 5), country
As tax rate is 26% while country Bs tax rate is 31.5%. Moreover, as the gure
shows, these e¤ects could be persistent, since higher tax rates introduce additional
departures from fairness, to be corrected by the next generation, and so on.
One of the e¤ects of the nancial crisis of 2007-09 might have been to convince
(rightly or wrongly) that much of the wealth built in the period leading up to the
crisis were due to "luck" . The comparison of the nancial market to "a Las Vegas
casino", where, in fact, you win mostly by luck, were common. Our model would
predict that despite the fact that the crisis itself might have reduced inequality, it
would increase the political support for more redistribution precisely for a changed
perception of what is "fair" wealth.
3.3.5.3 Non-Persistent "Luck"
If luck were not persistent, perhaps a negative shock on the most able individuals
would not entail a higher than usual weight of luck in income and wealth. To
check the robustness of these - along with other - result, we have run simulations
by assuming that for every generation t the inter-family luck vector at birth, it, is
independently drawn from a zero mean uniform distribution. This eliminates luck
persistence completely, thereby allowing a substantial degree of upwards and down-
wards social mobility. Interestingly, all simulations we have performed reproduce
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the regularity observed in the simpler deterministic case it = i: after the ability-
equalizing shock, the winning tax rate is always higher than in the absence of the
shock. A representative example is shown in the following Figure 3.6b:
Figure 3.6b: Shock to the Abilities with Non Persistent Luck
The fact that "luck" is stochastic generates uctuations. In our simulations, the
realizations of random luck vector, it, generated is the same in both countries A
and B, which explains why they are correlated; country B, represented by dashed
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lines, is subjected to a one time ability ceiling (of 60% of the top ability, as in
previous section 3.3.5.2) in period 4, whereas country A is not. In all cases we have
tried, right after the negative shock on the top abilities, the country B voters are
more inclined to redistribute than the voters of country A: the reason is that at the
aggregate level, in the generation hit by the shock, luck matters relatively more than
ability in explaining individual riches. Country Bs higher than usual taxation in one
generation implies higher distortions (i.e. less e¤ort and lower production), hence
higher relative weights of luck, thereby inducing persistence in the propensity to
vote for higher tax rates. Despite uctuations led by changing luck distribution, the
e¤ects of a onetime ability-equalizing crisis take some time to be fully re-absorbed,
with the two countries eventually converging to the same stochastic process.
If the parameters are such that multiple (stochastic) steady states can arise, the
long term e¤ect of a temporary nancial crisis could be a persistent "soak the rich"
e¤ect, as shown in the following example:
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Figure 3.6c: Shock to the Abilities with non Persistent Luck 2
In Figure 3.6c, despite the same realization of the luck vector, the arrival in
country B of a temporary negative shock to the top abilities triggers drastically dif-
ferent economic performances: while country A follows a trajectory characterized by
very low taxation and very high per capita wealth, country B becomes characterized
by the periodic choice of high tax rates, accompanied by lower per capita wealth,
and with higher growth volatility than country A.
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1.3.5.4 U-Shaped Top Income Shares
In light of the previous sections, we could use our theory to provide additional
explanations to the centennial U-shaped evolution of top income shares observed
by Piketty and Saez (2003) and Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2010) in the US, in
the other Western English speaking countries, and in non-Continental European
countries. In fact, we could obtain the U-shape pattern by assuming that the top
abilities rst decrease and then increase after a number of periods. A representative
example is shown in Figure 3.6d, where we depict in dashed line a country - B - that
abandoned its steady state for a long sequence of periods in which the top abilities
have been truncated, and then returns to its initial steady state.
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Figure 3.6d: U-Shaped Top Income Share
Not only this long-lasting negative shock to top abilities generates the U-shaped
evolution of the before tax top income shares, but also generates the inverse changes
in redistribution that accompanied it, as well as the evolution of ideology that marked
the periods of change: rst more and more in favour of redistribution, later more
and more tolerant of inequality. According to our theory, the beginning of period
exogenous decrease in the top abilities rendered their incomes more a¤ected by luck
as opposed to hard work, thereby justifying a stronger desire of redistribution; the
end of period increase in top abilities would lead (even the poorer) voter into thinking
that a larger part of the richest incomes is due to their productive contribution,
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thereby deserved and less rightly redistributed. These shifts in top abilities generate
fundamental changes as well as ideology and policy changes, that certainly reinforce
the trends in the fundamental.
3.4 Bequest Tax
Our probabilistic voting structure allows multidimensional voting. Allowing for both
inheritance taxes and income taxes, which in the previous sections were constrained
to be the same, is interesting since with inheritance taxes one could much better
target / remedy the e¤ects of luck in past generations. The private utility function
does not change but now bequest is taxed, and parents care about net bequests,
hence:
kit = (1   bt)bit
The nal life gross wealth is:
zit = Aiteit + it + kit 1, (3.13)
Let wit denote nal life post-tax and transfer wealth. Then the warm glow inter-
generational altruism implies that fraction  of her end of life wealth is bequeathed,
as seen by maximizing uit subject to cit+ bit = wit. Therefore, plugging the optimal
consumption and bequest into the private utility function, we obtain:
uit = wit(1   bt)   e
2
it
2it
, (3.14)
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and hence:
kit = (1   bt)wit.
As before, scal policy platforms are voted by each generation before exerting
their e¤ort choices. Income tax rate,  yt, is proportionally applied to end of life
incomes. All tax revenues are to be redistributed lump sum to all individuals.
Hence
wit = (1   yt) (Aiteit + it) + kit 1 +Gt. (3.15)
Government budget is always balanced, and after rearranging can be written as:
Gt =
[ yt +  bt(1   yt)]
Z 1
0
Ajtejtdj +  bt
Z 1
0
kjt 1dj
1   bt .
Notice that, consistently with the simple structure of our stylized model, we have
assumed that bequest taxes are redistributed within the bequest donors group, which
might seem bizarre at rst sight. However, somewhat paradoxically, this is much
more realistic than assuming that inheritances are all redistributed at the beginning
of life. In fact, assuming that inheritance taxes are redistributed within the imme-
diate inheritance recipient group would be stretching the models simplication too
far, in particular the working assumption that all individuals die at the same date:
it would bias the conclusion of our model in the direction of a too high equilibrium
bequest tax rate.
Since taxation is known at the beginning of life, before the e¤ort choice is taken,
maximizing uit, using (3.14), (3.13), and (3.15), gives optimal e¤ort choice:
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eit = (1   yt)(1   bt)Aitit,
which shows that individual e¤ort will be discouraged by expected taxation, and
is increasing in the individual work ability and decreasing in the disutility of e¤ort.
Hence equilibrium lump sum transfers are:
Gt =
1
1   bt
8><>:
[ yt +  bt(1   yt)]Z 1
0
jt(1   yt)(1   b)dj +  bt
Z 1
0
kjt 1dj
9>=>; .
Consequently, the reduced form private utility is:
uit = [(1   yt)((1   yt)(1   bt)it + it) + kit 1 +Gt] (1   bt)
 (1   yt)
2(1   bt)2it
2
. (3.16)
As before, we posit that in individuals tolerate inequality coming from innate
ability and e¤ort, but are averse to inequality coming from everything else, luck
and taxation. As mentioned before, each individual chooses kit = wit, where 
represents the generosity towards the next generation.
The generation t individual i utility, Uit, after fairness considerations are included
and before including the political party bias, is:
U^it( yt;  bt) = uit   
t, (3.17)
where
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t =
1Z
0
(ujt   bujt)2dj = 1Z
0
[wjt(1   bt)   bwjt]2 dj = (3.18)
1Z
0
24 (1   yt)( 1   yt)(1   bt)jt + jt+ kjt 1 +Gt (1   bt)
 [(1   yt)(1   bt)jt + bkjt 1]
352 dj
and  > 0 is the parameter which measures the importance of unfairness for
society. The complete utility function would then be:
U^it( yt;  bt) + it + "t,
with same interpretation of the party identication idiosyncratic and aggregate
shocks it and "t. Using ( yt;  bt) instead of  y in the same steps as in Lemma 3.1,
the reader can straightforwardly verify the following:
Lemma 3.3. In pairwise majority voting, there will exist a unique equilibrium in
which the two parties will select the same policy variables, ( yt; 

bt)
L = ( yt; 

bt)
R 
( yt; 

bt), given by
( yt; 

bt) = arg max
(yt;bt)2[0;1]2
1Z
0
'iU^it( yt;  bt)di. (3.19)
In the case of perfectly symmetric political bias, the resulting probabilistic voting
equilibrium will maximize the utilitarian welfare functional, that is
( yt; 

bt) = arg max
(yt;bt)2[0;1]2
1Z
0
U^it( yt;  bt)di. (3.20)
Since now the voters have a larger tax menu, they will achieve higher welfare
than if they can vote on only an income tax or only on a bequest tax.
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3.4.1 Discussion
Given that the utility of consumption is a Cobb-Douglas:
uit =
1
(1  )1  c
1 
it k

it  
1
2i
e2it,
and that individuals can vote on both bequest and income; if individuals were to
vote on the private utility only, than the optimal bequest tax would be 0:The reason
is to be found in Atkinson and Stiglitzs uniform commodity taxation theorem (1976),
which states that if utility is weakly separable between consumption and leisure, then
it is optimal to tax all the goods at the same rate. In fact, a bequest tax violates
the theorem, and implies a non-uniform commodity tax, because, as Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976) proved, future consumption (equivalent to capital) is more heavily
taxed than present consumption.
However, as it will be possible to see in the next subsection, in our model we
obtain a positive bequest tax. The reason is to be found entirely in the aversion
to unfairness component 3.18: if individuals believe that the distribution of bequest
is unfair, because not all the wealth of the parent derives from work, abilities, or
willingness to work, they will vote for a positive bequest tax. Agents want to tax
unfair bequest as well as unfair income, and thus tend to impose positive taxation
on both.
Therefore, having a measure of unfairness in our welfare functional allows us
to obtain an innovative result compared to the existing literature, by violating the
uniform commodity theorem.
83
3.4.2 Numerical Examples: Dynamic Evolution
As in the previous sections, we can run simulations of the di¤erent scenarios in the
presence of multidimensional policy, and track the evolution of ideology, scal policy,
and macroeconomic variables in the presence of bequest taxes. Figure 3.6 shows a
representative case, in which we have set symmetric policy identication, under three
di¤erent assumptions about ideological preferences: distaste for unfairness - country
A; distaste for inequality per se, that is:

Ct = var(wit), (3.21)
in country B. This is the multidimensional equivalent to the exercise of Figure
3.2, when voters can vote for both an income tax rate and a bequest tax rate. If
people believe that inherited wealth, no matter how generated, should be heavily
taxed to equalize everybody at birth this would imply a very high level bequest
taxes. This of course could have implications on savings, capital accumulation, and
the amount of bequest, and the structure provided by this variant of the model seems
ideal to study this set of issues. Simulations show that, contrary to this intuition,
the presence of a bequest tax as di¤erent from an income tax would not lead to an
egalitarian society for the same reasons why a wealth tax did not: being individuals
di¤erent, the fair end of life wealth distribution would entail some inequality, and
this would be transmitted over the generations. This is shown it Figure 3.7 country
A simulations.
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Figure 3.7: Di¤erent Ideas of Fairness with Bequest Tax
It is worthwhile noting that Figure 3.7s country B, shows that even in a society
that only cared about inequality per se, bequests would not be taxed too highly. In
fact, since parents care about the net inheritance received by their children, they
would not want to penalize them too much by voting for taking all of it away. It
is important to note that in the stylized model we proposed, childrens inheritances
get taxed without the children being immediately and automatically redistributed
lump-sum all the inheritance tax proceeds: this is only partially obtained, while most
of the tax proceeds actually go to fund current scal policy, and therefore become
available income to the whole population who are deciding how to split their wealth
between consumption and bequest. This is crucial for the realism of our model,
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because in the real world inheritance tax proceeds would actually accrue to all tax
payers, regardless of their being the small fraction of per-year inheritance recipients.
Consistently with what has been shown in the unidimensional voting case of
Figure 3.2, Figure 3.7 shows that introducing the bequest tax as a policy measure
in two countries that di¤er only in their preferences on the wealth distribution leads
to a dynamic equilibrium in which both tax rates are higher in the country in which
voters dislike inequality per se than in the country that dislikes unfairness.
In summary the critical points regarding bequest taxes are two. Their introducing
does not imply that income taxes would never be used. Second bequest taxes would
not be set at the level that (accounting for disincentive e¤ects) would maximize
redistribution from bouquets. This is because part of wealth left for bequest is
viewed as "fair" thus fairness concerns work against taxation of inheritance. Thus
our results generalize to the case of bequest taxation. Income taxes and bequests
taxes in our simulations are positively correlated.14
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have shown how the evolution of the political ideology regarding
the fairness of the constellation of income and wealth in society can generate eco-
nomic and political persistence in inequality, redistribution, and growth. According
to our simple framework, ideology does not entail information nor cognitive dis-
tortions of reality, but it shapes the moral judgement on what wealth distribution
would be fair, as well as it internalizes into peoples preferences how strongly the
distance between the current wealth distribution and the fair one makes people
14The correlation between the revenues as percentage of GDP of income and prot tax
and inheritance and gift tax on 25 OECD countries is 0.48. For an extensive analysis of
tax systems in industrialized countries see Messere (1998).
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unhappy. Our model is consistent with a variety of observations about the relation-
ship between inequality, redistribution, and persistence of poverty which could not
be explained with more standard models of redistributive policies.
As we have seen, there are several possible extensions to our basic framework.
Probably the most interesting one was to extend the policy set of tax and transfer
schemes. Two particularly relevant ones come to mind, namely endogenous abilities
and inheritance taxation. This model with its emphasis on fairness seems ideal to
address issues of social justice like equalizing initial conditions versus redistribution.
Equalizing the initial condition can be achieved in two ways: through high public
schooling and inheritance taxation. In Chapter 6 we analyse economies were gov-
ernment can use tax revenues to provide public good and public education, while
in Chapter 5 we study the possibility of an inheritance tax and an income tax,
calculated through the use of a tax di¤erential.
APPENDIX
Lemma 3.1. In pairwise majority voting, there will exist a unique equilibrium
in which the two parties will select the same policy variable, Lt = 
R
t   t , given by:
 t = arg max
 t2[0;1]
1Z
0
'iU^it( t)di. (3.22)
Proof. In fact, individual i of generation t will vote for party R if U^it(Rt ) >
U^it(
L
t ) + it + "t, that is if it < U^it(
R
t )   U^it(Lt )   "t. Given our assump-
tion on it, this event happens with probability
h
U^it(
R
t )  U^it(Lt )  "t
i
'i +
1
2
.
Aggregating over all individuals and using the law of large numbers, the fraction
of votes that goes to party R is: R =
Z 1
0
nh
U^it(
R
t )  U^it(Lt )  "t
i
'i +
1
2
o
di =
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Z 1
0
h
U^it(
R
t )  U^it(Lt )
i
'idi '"t+ 12 , where ' 
Z 1
0
'idi is the average of the indi-
vidual ideological densities. Party R wins if R > 12 , which happens if and only if
"t <
Z 1
0
[U^it(Rt ) U^it(Lt )]'idi
'
. From our assumptions on "t, this happens with proba-
bility
0BB@
Z 1
0
[U^it(Rt ) U^it(Lt )]'idi
'
 
h
  1
2 
i1CCA =  
Z 1
0
[U^it(Rt ) U^it(Lt )]'idi
'
+ 1
2
 pR. Party
R therefore chooses  t = argmax pR = argmaxRt
Z 1
0
U^it(
R
t )'idi. Swapping nota-
tions, party L chooses  t = argmax pL = argmaxLt
Z 1
0
U^it(
L
t )'idi. By Weierstrass
theorem a maximum certainly exists. Moreover, it is generically unique. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.2. Let us assume that the distribution of abilities and luck are such
that inf fA2ii : i 2 [0; 1]g >   inf fi : i 2 [0; 1]g. Then wit  0 for all i 2 [0; 1],and
t = 1; 2; :::, for every non-negative initial capital vector ki0, i 2 [0; 1], and for every
tax rate sequence  t 2 [0; 1].
Proof. First notice that the above stated condition implies:
1Z
0
A2jjdj >   inf fi : i 2 [0; 1]g  jinf j. (3.23)
Let us consider the worst possible scenario, in which kit 1 = 0 for all i 2 [0; 1]:
if we are able to prove that kit = wit  0 in this case, then kit  0 will hold in all
other cases.
From the denition of end-of-life post-tax wealth, optimal e¤ort choice,and gov-
ernment transfer, it easily follows that:
wit = (1   t)zit +Gt = (1   t)2A2ii + (1   t)i +  t(1   t)
1Z
0
A2jjdj, (3.24)
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which expresses wit as a quadratic function of  t. Hence, wit = 0 if and only if
 t = 1 and:
 t =   i + A
2
iiZ 1
0
A2jjdj   A2ii
. (3.25)
Let us rst focus on the  t = 1 root. Since in  t = 1, wit = 0, as  t becomes
lower than 1, we need to make sure that wit does not immediately become negative:
that is we want wit to be locally a decreasing function of  t. Taking the derivative
of wit with respect to  t we get:
dwit
d t
=  2(1   t)A2ii   i + (1   t)
1Z
0
A2jjdj    t
1Z
0
A2jjdj < 0 (3.26)
if and only if:
i >  2(1   t)A2ii + (1  2 t)
1Z
0
A2jjdj. (3.27)
Notice that if  t = 1 inequality (3.27) holds true if:
i >  
1Z
0
A2jjdj, (3.28)
holds, which is a consequence of inequality (3.23).Clearly, this guarantees only
that wit > 0 for  t slightly less than 1:
Setting  t = 0 in (3.24), it becomes:
wit = A
2
ii + i, (3.29)
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which is positive if A2ii >  i, which holds under the condition in the statement.
Hence, being wealth (3.24) quadratic in  t, the second root of wit = 0 - given by eq.
(3.25) - has to be negative if the corresponding parabola is concave or larger than 1
if it is convex15. In both cases, wit > 0 for all  t 2 [0; 1]. QED
15Simple graphing shows that any parabola y = ax2+ bx+ c sloping down at x = 1 and
positive at x = 0, will be positive for all 0  x < 1.
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Chapter 4
IDEOLOGY AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
4.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the connection between ideology and public education. It
shows how the idea of fairness and the preferences for public schooling interact with
each other and with wealth inequality, and, secondly, how this inuences future
abilities, the future per capita wealth distribution, and economic growth.
It analyses, for the rst time to our knowledge, the connection between the idea
of fairness and the preferences for public schooling. The main innovation, compared
to the existing literature, is that we study how ideology, and in particular ideas of
fairness, through inuencing preferences for redistribution, can create long lasting
e¤ects on public education, and therefore on the abilities of individuals. This aspect
of ideology has not been explored yet, even if there are empirical suggestion that
ideology might inuence education (see Alesina and Gleaser 2004). In this chapter we
will provide an extensive analysis of the interactions between ideology and inequality
in determining public schooling, and how public schooling, by a¤ecting the general
level of abilities, and therefore of future income, inuence voting and ideology with a
novel feedback mechanism, which, at least to our knowledge, has never been explored.
We observe the voting behavior of individuals whose preferences for redistribution
and public education depend on their ideas about what is fair as well as the economic
variables in the society.
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Thus, this chapter presents a model in which individuals care about their per-
sonal wealth, which is allocated between bequest for the subsequent generation and
consumption, as well as about the public expenditure, which is allocated by the
government between education and the public good. In an extension of the model
we also insert transfers. As in the benchmark model in Chapter 3, the ideology, and
in particular the idea of fairness, helps to shape the preferences of the individuals.
The main goal of this chapter is to explore how ideology a¤ects public schooling
and, by using a feedback mechanism, how public schooling inuences ideology. There
are two main issues to be considered. First, we study how di¤erent initial ideas and
denitions of fairness a¤ect voting and therefore the decisions about public schooling,
both with wealth tax and with income and bequest tax. Second, we analyse how
di¤erences in the initial level of education a¤ect ideology and voting.
This chapter continues from Chapter 3, which analyses the whole transition of
the dynamic model of Alesina and Angeletos (2005a).Given the complex structure of
the model, it is hard to fully characterize the dynamic transition of this model ana-
lytically. Therefore, we develop and use a general algorithm that allows simulating
numerically the dynamic version of the model, and starts from any distribution of
actual and fair wealth of the initial generation. We compute the whole dynamic
transition, with the sequence of redistributive policies that win the electoral game
and the associated public education and actual and fair wealth distribution of every
generation.
In Chapter 3 we introduced a probabilistic voting framework in order to rely
on more robust equilibria, and provided simulations for several cases that we con-
sider also here. This chapter compares the intergenerational equilibrium time series
deriving from di¤erent initial conditions. It analyses how di¤erent ideas and def-
initions of fairness a¤ect the equilibria and the dynamic transitions deriving from
democratic elections. We also provide an extension of the model where individuals
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vote on the allocation of the tax revenues between the transfers, the public good
and the education.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model. Section
4.3 analyses data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey.
Section 4.4 analyses di¤erent ideas of fairness. Section 4.5 di¤erentiates between
income tax and bequest tax. Section 4.6 introduces an extension of the model
with transfers. Section 4.8, nally, presents the conclusions. The Matlab codes are
available from the author upon request.
4.2 Public Education, Wealth Tax, and Redistribution
The framework used here is similar to Chapter 3. We assume a society composed
of successive generations t of individuals, each living for one period, with each indi-
vidual indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. The total mass of individuals is normalized to 1. There
is only one active individual per family, and she is characterized by a certain degree of
innate abilities ri > 0, endurance to work i > 0; and luck i which is i.i.d. between
the individuals, with
R 1
0
jdj = 0. i and i are both invariant over time. Each
individual inherits capital from her parent kit 1  0 and receives public education
ht 1  0, which helps to dene her abilities.
Individuals maximize the private utility uit that derives from the private wealth
and public spending. The utility depends positively on consumption cit, bequest
kit; and the government expenditure Gt. The private utility also depends negatively
on e¤ort eit. Therefore, the warm glow intergenerational altruism translates in the
capital that each individual leaves to her child, and is represented by the parameter
 2 (0; 1):
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uit =
c1 it k

it
(1  )1  +BG

t  
1
2it
e2it, (4.1)
individuals do not value government expenditure as much as their own private
wealth, therefore the parameter that represents the marginal utility of public expen-
diture is positive, but smaller than 1:  2 (0; 1). The government expenditure is also
multiplied to a constant B  1, as individuals still want a positive public expendi-
ture. The utility is maximized under a private budget constrain, as the consumption
and the capital left to the child cannot exceed the after tax wealth:
wit = kit + cit
Where the after tax end of life wealth wit depends on abilities, e¤ort, luck, capital
inherited from the previous generation, and lump sum tax:
wit = (Aiteit + i + kit 1)(1   t). (4.2)
The optimal amounts of capital and fairness are represented by a proportion of
the end of life net wealth:
kit = wit cit = (1  )wit
The government maximizes the impact of the public expenditure, which depends
positively on the public good gt and on the public schooling ht:
Gt =
h!t g
1 !
t
!!(1  !)1 !
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The parameter ! 2 (0; 1) represents the importance of the future generations
for the state. The public good is consumed equally by the individuals, while public
schooling increases the abilities of the subsequent generation. The abilities, for
each individual, are partially innate and perfectly inherited from the parent1 ri >
0; and partially dependent on the public schooling implemented by the previous
generation2:
Ait = ri + ht 1
There is no possibility for public debt, therefore the expenditure for the public
good and public education cannot exceed the tax revenues for each generation:
ht + gt =  t
Z 1
0
(Ajtejt + kjt 1)dj
The tax revenues do not include luck, as it brings no productive contribution on
average.
The optimal public resource allocation is:
ht = ! t
Z 1
0
(Ajtejt + kjt 1)dj , and gt = (1  !) t
Z 1
0
(Ajtejt + kjt 1)dj
Plugging in 4.1 the optimal values of capital, consumption, transfers, and public
schooling, the utility becomes:
1Assuming abilities extracted from a random distribution in each generation does not
change our qualitative results.
2Using a function for the abilities in which the level of learning from the public school
depends on the innate abilities would complicate the computation but not add to the
qualitative analysis.
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uit = (1   t) (Aiteit + i + kit 1) +B

 t
Z 1
0
(Ajtejt + kjt 1)dj

  e
2
it
2i
The optimal e¤ort, which is discouraged by taxation, is:
eit = (1   t)Aiti, (4.3)
4.2.1 Fairness and Equilibrium
As in Chapter 3, the utility also depends on the distance between the actual variables
and the variables individuals consider fair. The total utility Uit is composed of the
private utility uit and the disutility of living in an unfair society 
t :
Uit = uit   
t
Where  is a country specic parameter that represents the importance of distaste
for unfairness. The disutility of living in an unfair society is dened as the distance
between the actual private utility and the private utility which is considered fair by
each individual:

t =
Z 1
0
(ujt   bujt)2dj (4.4)
The denition of fairness follows Alesina and Angeletos (2005a). Individuals do
not tolerate inequality when it does not come from e¤ort, willingness to work and
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abilities. Namely, they consider wealth unfair if it is generated from luck or public
expenditure. The utility considered fair by the individuals therefore di¤ers from the
actual utility because of the absence of public expenditure:
buit = bwit   e2it
2i
(4.5)
At the same time, the end of life wealth does not incorporate luck and does not
include taxes
bwit = Aiteit + bkit 1 = (1   t)A2iti + bkit 1 (4.6)
The e¤ort is always considered fair, and is diminished by taxation. Therefore,
the idea of fairness is shaped by the taxation decided by the previous generation, and
individuals learn from the actual decisions of the society. The idea of fairness depends
also on the idea of fairness inherited from the parent. In fact, every parent transmits
to her child her idea of fairness. The optimal fair capital and fair consumption are:
bkit =  bwit =  h(1   t)A2iti + bkit 1i (4.7)
bcit = (1  ) bwit = (1  ) h(1   t)A2iti + bkit 1i (4.8)
After some simple substitutions it is possible to dene the total utility Uit for
each individual
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Uit =

A2iti(1   t) + i + kit 1

(1   t)
+B
0@ t 1Z
0

A2jtj(1   t) t +  tkjt 1

dj
1A   (1   t)2A2iti
2
  
Z 1
0
2664 (A
2
jtj(1   t) + j + kjt 1)(1   t)
+B
Z 1
0
(A2jtj(1   t) t +  tkjt 1)dj

  A2jtj(1   t)  bkjt 1
3775
2
dj
 U^it( t). (4.9)
4.2.2 Voting and Timing
As in Chapter 3 we use a probabilistic voting framework. We assume there are two
political parties L and R which commit simultaneously to a tax rate  t . Individuals
vote for a party at the beginning of their life, after observing their luck, innate
abilities, education, capital, and willingness to work. Parties L and R have a certain
degree of popularity. In fact, every individual identies with one party or the other.
The complete utility function includes the aggregate popularity and the individual
popularity of the parties L and R
~UitP = uit   
t + (it + "t)L(P ), where P = L;R.
L is a dummy variable which takes value 0 if the party is R, and 1 if the party
is L3. Therefore it; which can be positive or negative, represents the individual
popularity of party L, and "t the aggregate popularity of party L. Both it and
"t are uniformly distributed, with mean 0, respectively on supports
h
  1
2'i
; 1
2'i
i
and
3The opposite also would work.
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h
  1
2 
; 1
2 
i
. The support of the individual popularity is larger than the support of
the aggregate popularity:

  1
2'i
;
1
2'i

>

  1
2 
;
1
2 

 > 'i
Therefore, single individuals can have more extreme preferences for one party
or the other, while the aggregate society tends to be more moderate. Parties L
and R commit to the policy platform before knowing the aggregate and individual
popularity, and maximize the probability of being elected.
Lemma 4.1. In pairwise majority voting a unique equilibrium exists in which
parties L and R select the same policy variable, Lt = 
R
t   t , given by
 t = arg max
 t2[0;1]
1Z
0
'iU^it( t)di. (4.10)
Which is the same equilibrium policy variable that would be chosen by a biased
social planner who maximizes a weighted aggregate welfare functional:
W () 
1Z
0
'iU^it( t)di,
The proof of Lemma 4.1 is the same of Lemma 3.1.
After voting, individuals decide how much e¤ort to provide. The elected party
fully commits to the announced policy and implements the taxation, transfers and
public education for the next generation at the end of individuals life. Finally,
individuals decide how to allocate consumption and bequest.
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The link between di¤erent generations is represented by the transmission of
actual capital, fair capital, and education:
Ait = ht 1 + ri = ! t 1
1Z
0

A2jt 1j(1   t 1) t 1 +  t 1kjt 1

dj + ri
and
kit = (1   t)
 
A2iti(1   t) + t + kit 1

while:
bkit = A2iti(1   t) + bkit 1
After the decisions about the allocation of capital, consumption and public edu-
cation, the model is iterated.
4.2.3 Discussion
In building the model we assume that education a¤ects the productivity of the
subsequent generation by increasing abilities Ait, and, at the same time, we assume
that education enters in the utility of the parents as a form of public good :
Gt =
h!t g
1 !
t
!!(1  !)1 ! (4.11)
Therefore, the government also care about the future generation, and its abilities,
and does it in measure ! 2 (0; 1): However, alternative modelling strategies are
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possible. Schooling could not a¤ect future abilities, or could not enter in the utility
function of the present generation. Lets consider the implication of both cases,
starting with the possibility that public schooling does not a¤ect future abilities.
In this case the utility function and the constraint would not change, because the
utility function would be atemporal. The main di¤erence compared to the actual
model would be in the intergenerational abilities link, which in this case would
become:
Ait = ri
Therefore, all the wealth invested in schooling would be lost. Nevertheless, indi-
viduals would vote only according to their utility function, and the government
would still maximize the government spending allocation as in 4.11, as they would
systematically not be able to foresee that public education does not enhance future
abilities. Compared to our benchmark model, the election results would be the same,
however, the percapita wealth would be consistently lower given the lower abilities.
The second case to explore is the one in which public education does not enter in
individuals utility function, but still enhances future abilities. In this case the main
di¤erence would be in the government spending allocation, as all the government
spending would be used to produce the consumption public good:
Gt = gt
Therefore this case, would be the opposite of the previous one, but have similar
consequences: even if public education will have an impact on future generations
abilities, agents are not able to foresee that, and therefore the government will
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systematically invest no wealth in public education. Given that the parameter !
would be equal to 0, the intergenerational abilities link would be once again:
Ait = ri
From an e¢ ciency point of view this case could be preferred to the rst one
because no resources would be wasted. These two examples show how, in order to
obtain public education to have an e¤ect on future wealth, it is necessary that public
education both inuences future abilities, and enters in the utility function.
Another strong assumption that we make in this chapter is the complete absence
of private education. The reason for this choice is to keep the focus on the relation
between ideology and education, allowing the government to maximize the public
expenditure impact, and in section 4.7, individuals to decide how to allocate public
spending between transfers, and public good/public education. If parents could
choose to use their private wealth to provide a di¤erent education for their children
(i.e. private education), they would face a decision between public schooling and
private schooling. The consequences of the assumption that only public education
is available are that every agent will receive the same level of education, without
the possibility of di¤erences, no matter the wealth of the parent, her preferences,
or the personal characteristic of the child. This implies our denition of schooling
to be really simple, and probably unsuitable to describe the subject of education in
its full. However, in order to study the interactions between public education and
ideology, inserting private education would not qualitatively add much, and would
severely complicate the notation.
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4.3 The Connection Between the Idea of Fairness and Public Edu-
cation
The rst issue that needs to be explored is if there is a relation between the ideology
and the idea of fairness in societies. In the European Values Review (2008), individ-
uals replied to the question v-674: "Why people are in need?". The possible choices
were: 1) Unlucky, 2) Laziness or Lack of Willpower, 3) Injustice in Society, 4) Part
of Modern Progress, 5) None. While answer 1,3, and 4 do not consider being poor
as a failure of the person herself, answer 2 implies that if someone is poor she is to
blame for it.
If this idea would reect the true situation of equal opportunities in societies one
should expect that the more people answer 2, the more the equal the opportunities
are. However, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) proved this is not the case.
In this chapter we analyse specically if changes in the idea of fairness inuences
the public expenditure for education. We consider the intersection of European
Union and the European countries part of the European Values Survey.
In Figure 4.1, we plot the data about the percentage of people who believe that
if someone is poor it is because she is lazy or lacks willpower, and the data about
the Expenditure for Public Education as percentage of GDP in the year 2008 taken
from the World Bank data5, and insert a simple linear tting6:
4The complete data and metadata for the European Values survey can be found at
http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp
5Data regarding the public education expenditure as a percentage of GDP were taken
from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS
6This is just a visualization of the connection between public expenditure in education
and beliefs about fairness, and it is not meant to be an econometric analysis.
For substantial econometric analysis about the role of ideology in determining the public
expenditure see: Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Alesina and
Giuliano (2010).
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Figure 4.1: Public Education and Belief Wealth Distribution is
Fair
It can be seen that, for these countries, the more individuals believe that poor
people deserve to be poor, the lower the expenditure for public education is. The
correlation between the percentage of individuals who believe that people in need
are lazy or lack willpower and the public expenditure for education is -0.267. Could
this be a European anomaly?
Lets consider other countries. In the World Values Survey, for the wave 1994-
1999, individuals replied to the question "Why do people live in need?". In this
case individuals could decide between: 1) Poor Because of Laziness and Lack of Will
Power, 2) Poor Because of an Unfair Society, 3) Other Answer. The correlation
between the percentage of individuals who replied 1) and the public expenditure
for education is -0.254. The correlation between the percentage of individuals who
replied 2) and the public expenditure for education is 0.179. Figure 4.2 shows the
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scatter plot of the countries studied by the World Values Survey and inserts a linear
tting. Since the year of the survey varies from country to country from 1994 and
1999, we used for each of them the Public Expenditure on Education for the exact
year.
Figure 4.2: Public Education and Belief Wealth Distribution is
Unfair
Does the model presented in Section 4.2 t the data derived from the World
Values Survey and the European Values Survey? Using a program written in Matlab
code, the model is simulated and reiterated for 100 generations, converging to the
steady state. This process is repeated for di¤erent levels of importance for fairness
in the society, namely varying the parameter . In Figure 4.3, it is possible to see
that plotting the di¤erent values of  and the Public Expenditure for Education in
the steady state we obtain a positive relation. This means that the more unfairness
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is important for a society, the higher public education. At same time, the lower the
importance of unfairness for a society, the lower public expenditure for education.
Figure 4.3: Public Education and Importance of Unfairness
4.4 Effect of Ideology on Public Education
Starting from distributions of capital kit 1 and fair capital bkit 1 and dening para-
meters relative to personal and country specic characteristics, it is possible to study
some specic scenarios and analyse how the model behaves in response to them. The
analysis focuses on how ideology a¤ects voting, and, together with wealth inequality,
shapes the economic outcomes of elections. We analyse di¤erent ideologies and dif-
ferent initial ideas of fairness. For each scenario, the whole transition is studied and
completely showed.
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4.4.1 Different Ideology
As in Chapter 3, we focus on what happens if two countries have di¤erent ideologies.
The question is: does ideology really matter for public education? The answer is
shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. In Figure 4.4, two countries are analysed:
Country A is the benchmark case, while in Country B individuals do not care about
fairness, namely in their utility function  = 0. For both countries we show the
initial distribution of capital and whole transitions of the tax rate  t, per capita
abilities
R 1
0
Ajtdj, per capita gross wealth
R 1
0
(Ajtejt + kjt 1)dj and Gini coe¢ cient.
Figure 4.4: Di¤erent Ideologies
Di¤erently from Chapter 3 even if individuals do not care about fairness, they
still want a positive public expenditure and therefore both Country A and Country
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B implement a positive taxation. However, the two countries converge to two dif-
ferent steady states. Country A implements a higher level of taxation, which brings
about higher public expenditure for education, higher per capita income and a lower
Gini coe¢ cient, performing overall better compared to Country B. In this case the
disincentive e¤ect of the taxation on the e¤ort is overpowered by the positive e¤ect
regarding the increase of the abilities.
We also consider di¤erent denitions of fairness: in Figure 4.5 it is possible to see
the comparison between our benchmark case, represented by Country A in which
the measure of unfairness is represented by the distance between the utility and the
utility considered fair:

t =
Z 1
0
(ujt   bujt)2dj
And Country B, in which individuals are against wealth inequality per se, and
therefore the measure of unfairness is represented by the variance of wealth:

t = var(wit)
Individuals who are intolerant to inequality per se constantly vote for a higher
taxation with consequences on abilities, income, and Gini coe¢ cient:
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Figure 4.5: Di¤erent Denitions of Fairness
The higher taxation of Country B brings about higher public expenditure and
therefore higher abilities compared to Country A. However the taxation is so high
that its discouraging e¤ect on taxation prevails on the higher abilities. Therefore,
Country B has lower per capita income than Country A. The lower income means
that individuals do not accumulate enough capital, and the wealth distribution
reects the di¤erences in luck, bringing about a higher Gini coe¢ cient.
4.4.2 Different Initial Ideas of Fairness
Voting and abilities are not a¤ected solely by the ideology in a country, but also by
the initial idea of fairness, which can a¤ect public education for generations. Suppose
there are two countries, Country A and Country B, identical in every aspect but the
109
initial distribution of the capital considered fair. This means that the di¤erence
between the two stands only in how the rst generation pictures a fair society. First
generation individuals in Country A believe that the actual capital distribution is
fair, while the rst generation individuals in Country B believe that the distribution
of capital would be fair only if every individual would have inherited the exact same
wealth.
As in Chapter 3, the scenario of Country B can picture a society in which there
is a sudden shock that changes the ideology, like the 60ths in Europe and US.
Figure 4.6: Di¤erent Initial Ideas of Fairness
Country A starts with a low taxation and low expenditure for public schooling.
Individuals produce high e¤ort and therefore their per capita income is higher than
the one of the individuals in Country B. In fact, individuals in Country B are so
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convinced by their ideology in the rst generation that decides to vote for a very
high tax rate, impairing e¤ort.
In the rst periods the abilities in the two countries are the same, since even if
Country B imposes higher taxes, e¤ort is so much discouraged that the tax revenues
are relatively small. Moreover the Gini coe¢ cient is higher than in Country A as it
reects the uneven distribution of luck.
As generations go by, their idea of fairness changes, the taxation in Country B
decreases, and the revenues increase, leading to high abilities. The higher abilities
combined with the higher e¤ort bring about a dramatic increase in the per capita
income and a decrease in the Gini coe¢ cient, leading to better equilibria compared
to Country A for more than 25 generations. After that the two countries slowly
converge.
While in Chapter 3 higher taxation decreased the productivity, and therefore the
per capita income; here scal policy can be used to increase, in the long run, the
productivity and the income.
4.4.3 Different Initial Public Education
We analyse what happens when two countries start with di¤erent initial levels of
public education. We assume that the rst generation of Country A (represented
by the continuous line) receives double education compared to the individuals who
populate Country B (represented by the dotted line).
As a result, country A implements lower taxation for generations. The individuals
in Country A have higher abilities, higher per capita income and there is lower Gini
coe¢ cient in the country compared to Country B.
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Figure 4.7: Di¤erent Initial Public Education
The e¤ect of a di¤erence in the expenditure for public education lasts for gen-
erations, a¤ecting not only the productivity, but also the future decisions about
taxation. However, the two countries eventually converge.
Up to now we considered only one policy instrument: a wealth tax. In the next
section we di¤erentiate, as in Chapter 3, between income tax and bequest tax.
4.5 Public Education with Income Tax and Bequest Tax
In this section we investigate if di¤erentiating the wealth tax between income tax
and bequest tax impacts the models numerical result. The utility function takes
the same form as in the benchmark model 4.1.
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uit =
c1 it k

it
(1  )1  +BG
   1
2it
e2it, (4.12)
However, this time personal budget constraint is di¤erent:
wit = bit + cit
Where the variable bit represents the gross bequest. The after tax end of life
wealth is given by the wealth minus the income tax  yt:
wit = (1   yt)(Aiteit + i) + kit 1
And the net bequest:
kit = (1   bt)bit
where  bt is the tax imposed on the bequest. The parents therefore care about
the net wealth that they are leaving to their children along with the education that
will enhance their ability to earn. So in this case we move from the pure warm-
glowing altruism towards the interest of parents for the "ability of their children to
receiving income" (Grossman and Poutvaara, 2008).
The optimal values of kit and cit are:
kit = (1   bt)wit (4.13)
cit = (1  )wit (4.14)
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The governments objective function is the same as in the model with wealth tax:
Gt =

h!t g
1 !
t
!!(1  !)1 !

And it is maximized under the public budget constraint:
ht + gt =  yt
Z 1
0
(Ajtejt) dj +  bt
Z 1
0
bjtdj
The optimal values of ht and gt are:
ht = !

 yt
Z 1
0
(Ajtejt) dj +  bt
Z 1
0
bjtdj

, and (4.15)
gt = (1  !)

 yt
Z 1
0
Ajtejtdj +  bt
Z 1
0
bjtdj

(4.16)
The utility, once we plug the optimal values of the choice variables 4.13,4.14 ,
4.15, and 4.16 in the private utility function 4.12, becomes:
uit = (1   bt) ((1   yt)(Aiteit + i) + kit 1) (4.17)
+B

 yt
Z 1
0
Ajtejtdj +  bt
Z 1
0
bjtdj

  1
2it
e2it
Where bit = wit = (1  yt) (Aiteit + i)+kit 1: The optimal e¤ort is discouraged
by the bequest tax and by the income tax:
eit = (1   bt)(1   yt)Aiti
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Plugging the optimal value of eit in 4.17, the explicit private utility function is
given by:
uit = (1   bt)
 
(1   yt)((1   yt)(1   bt)A2iti + i) + kit 1

+B

 yt
Z 1
0
A2jtj(1   bt)(1   yt)dj
+  bt
Z 1
0
 
(1   yt)
 
A2jtj(1   bt)(1   yt) + j

+ kjt 1

dj

 A
2
iti(1   bt)2(1   yt)2
2
(4.18)
4.5.1 Fairness
As in the model with wealth tax, the total utility function includes also the prefer-
ences for fairness. Therefore we need to introduce the measure of unfairness 
t

t =
1Z
0
(ujt   bujt)2dj =
1Z
0

wjt(1   bt) +BGt  
A2jtj(1   bt)2(1   yt)2
2
  bujt2 dj(4.19)
The value of fair utility includes the disutility of e¤ort:
buit = bwit   A2iti(1   bt)2(1   yt)2
2
(4.20)
The fair level of wealth does not comprehend luck nor redistribution:
bwit = (1   yt)(1   bt)A2iti + bkit 1 (4.21)
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The optimal fair consumption and fair capital are:
bcit = (1  ) bwit bkit =  bwit (4.22)
Plugging 4.18, 4.20 and 4.21 in 4.19 we obtain:

t =
Z 1
0

(1   bt)
 
(1   yt)((1   yt)(1   bt)A2jtj + j) + kjt 1

B

+ yt
Z 1
0
A2jtj(1   bt)(1   yt)dj
+ bt
Z 1
0
 
(1   yt)
 
A2jtj(1   bt)(1   yt)

+ kjt 1

dj

 (1   yt)(1   bt)A2jtj   bkjt 1o2 dj (4.23)
Also in this case a probabilistic voting framework is used. The two political
parties L and R commit simultaneously to the tax rates  yt and  bt .
Lemma 4.2. In pairwise majority voting a unique equilibrium exists in which
parties L and R select the same policy variable, Lyt = 
R
yt   yt, and Lbt = Rbt =
 btgiven by
 t = arg max
 t2[0;1]
1Z
0
'iU^it( yt;  bt)di. (4.24)
After voting, individuals decide how much e¤ort to produce. Again there is full
commitment to the scal policy by the parties. The intergenerational links are again
represented by abilities, actual capital, and fair capital.
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Ait = ri + ! yt 1
Z 1
0
A2jt 1j(1   bt 1)(1   yt 1)dj
+! bt 1
Z 1
0
 
(1   yt 1)
 
A2jt 1j 1(1   bt 1)(1   yt 1)

+ kjt 2

dj
kit = (1   bt)
 
(1   yt)
 
(1   yt)(1   bt)A2iti + i

+ kit 1

dj
bkit = (1   yt)(1   bt)A2iti + bkit 1
4.5.2 Importance of Fairness
As in the model with wealth tax, the fact that a country cares about fairness has a
strong impact on the voting and on the economy. Assume there are two countries:
Country A and Country B. Country A represents the benchmark model with bequest
tax and income tax, while individuals in Country B do not care about the unfairness
in society, i.e.  = 0:
The result, as in Figure 4.8, is that the society that cares about unfairness shows
higher levels of redistribution. Both the income tax and the bequest tax are higher
compared to those in the society where the individuals care only about the personal
gain they get from redistribution.
In this case, however, the tax burden is so heavy for Country A that even if it
should bring higher abilities and therefore higher per capita income, the disincentive
e¤ect on e¤ort causes lower abilities and lower per capita income. As a result,
Country A is caught in a poverty trap.
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Figure 4.8: Di¤erent Ideologies with Bequest
As in Chapter 3, the results of the model with bequest tax and income tax are
specular compared to the results with wealth tax. The decision of public spending
allocation between public education and public good, in fact, is solely dependent on
the parameter !:
4.6 Optimal Allocation of Transfers, Public Good and Public Edu-
cation
Up to now we assumed that the government allocates public expenditure between the
public good and public schooling. However, the reader might wonder if individuals
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would still allocate resources to public schooling and the public good if they could
instead devolve resources to transfers that would increase their per capita wealth.
In this section we analyse voting reactions when individuals decide how to allocate
tax revenues between transfers and public good/public education. The allocation is
decided at the voting stage by the individuals. The form of the utility function is
the same as in the previous sections.
uit =
c1 it k

it
(1  )1  +BG

t  
1
2it
e2it; (4.25)
The private budget constraint also does not change:
wit = kit + cit
The after tax end of life wealth wit depends on abilities, e¤ort, luck, capital
inherited from the previous generation, and the lump sum transfers:
wit = (Aiteit + i + kit 1)(1   t) + Tt. (4.26)
The optimal amounts of capital and fairness are represented by a proportion of
the end of life net wealth:
kit = wit cit = (1  )wit
The total tax revenues Et must be allocated between the public good, public
schooling, and transfers:
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Et = Tt +Gt = Tt + gt + ht
As in the original model in section 4.3, the government decides how to allocate
wealth between the public good and public schooling according to the proportion
! and (1   !). The allocation between Gt and Tt is decided by the individuals
during voting, according to the proportion  and (1  )7. While ! is an exogenous
parameter,  is endogenous and its optimal value is decided through voting together
with the optimal taxation. The expenditure for the public good, education, and
transfers cannot exceed the tax revenues for each generation:
ht + gt + Tt =  t
Z 1
0
(Ajtejt + kjt 1)dj
The tax revenues do not include luck, as it brings no productive contribution on
average.
The optimal public resource allocation is:
Tt = t t
Z 1
0
(Ajtejt + kjt 1)dj
ht = (1  t)! t
Z 1
0
(Ajtejt + kjt 1)dj
gt = (1  t)(1  !) t
Z 1
0
(Ajtejt + kjt 1)dj
Plugging in 4.25 the optimal values of the capital, consumption, transfers, public
schooling, and e¤ort, the private utility becomes:
7As !, also  2 (0; 1):
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uit = (1   t)
 
A2itit(1   t) + i + kit 1

+ t t
Z 1
0
(A2jtjt(1   t) + kjt 1)dj
+B

(1  t) t
Z 1
0
(A2jtjt(1   t) + kjt 1)dj

  A
2
itit(1   t)2it
2
The optimal e¤ort 4.3 is the same as in the model with wealth tax, as the fair
variables 4.6, 4.8, 4.7, and the measure of unfairness 4.4. The indirect utility function
becomes:
Uit =

A2iti(1   t) + i + kit 1

(1   t) + t t
Z 1
0
(A2jtjt + kjt 1)dj
+B

(1  t) t
Z 1
0

A2jtj(1   t) t +  tkjt 1

dj

  (1   t)2A
2
iti
2
  
Z 1
0
2664 (A
2
jtj(1   t) + j + kjt 1)(1   t) + t t
R 1
0
(A2jtjt + kjt 1)dj
+B

(1  t)
Z 1
0
(A2jtj(1   t) t +  tkjt 1)dj

  A2jtj(1   t)  bkjt 1
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2
dj
 U^it( t). (4.27)
Parties L and R this time commit simultaneously to the optimal taxation  t and
to the optimal allocation of public funds t:
Lemma 4.3. In pairwise majority voting a unique equilibrium exists in which
parties L and R select the same policy variable, Lt = 
R
t   t , and Lt = Rt = t
given by
t = arg max
 t2[0;1]
1Z
0
'iU^it( t; t)di. (4.28)
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Where t is the combination of the optimal policy 

t and 

t : After voting,
individuals decide how much e¤ort to produce. The intergenerational links are rep-
resented by the abilities, actual capital, and fair capital:
Ait = ht 1 + ri = !(1  t 1) t 1
1Z
0

A2jt 1j(1   t 1) t 1 +  t 1kjt 2

dj + ri
kit = 
0@(1   t)  A2iti(1   t) + t + kit 1+ t t 1Z
0

A2jti(1   t) t +  tkjt 1

dj
1A
bkit = A2iti(1   t) + bkit 1
4.6.1 The Role of Fairness
Again we analyse two countries: Country A is as described in 4.27 while in Country
B individuals do not care about unfairness, i.e.  = 0 . The results are similar to the
results in section 4.3. The country which does not care about fairness has lower levels
of redistribution8, with lower abilities, lower per capita income and a higher Gini
coe¢ cient. In both countries, individuals divide the tax revenues between transfers,
the public good, and education, without using all the revenues for the transfers. In
particular, in the value of  is 0.758 in Country A and 0.508 in Country B.
8With these specic parameter the tax is really small, 0.0022, but it is possible to
obtain higher level with di¤erent parameter. We are mainly interested in the fact that it
is positive.
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Figure 4.9: Di¤erent Ideologies with Transfers
The results obtained in this section replicate the results with only the public
good and public education. Therefore, the model is robust to the introduction of
transfers.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter analyses the impact of ideology, and in particular of the idea of fairness,
on public education. Personal ideas about what is fair in a society help shaping
the preferences for redistribution and inuence the economic fundamentals. Public
education is one these. There are two main issues analysed in this chapter: 1) how
the idea of fairness inuences public education, 2) how public education inuences
the idea of fairness.
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The more a country cares about fairness, the higher the wealth tax is going to
be and, therefore, the higher the abilities and the per capita income. However, a
La¤er curve is present: if the taxation is too heavy it will discourage the e¤ort so
much that the tax revenues will be small and, hence, also the public expenditure for
education and the per capita income.
At the same time, public schooling inuences ideology. A relatively high initial
level of education reduces the dependence of wealth on luck and makes individuals
believe to live in a more just world. This has an impact on voting and on the
expenditure for public education.
In conclusion, this chapter adds a new point of view to the literature about
public education and to the literature about fairness, by connecting the two for
the rst time and observing how they shape the preferences for redistribution and
the economic outcomes of elections. In the future, the analysis of the connection
between public education and ideology could be deepened by introducing a more
complex function of learning that depends on the innate abilities or by introducing
private education along public education. Moreover, in this simple framework we
do not consider the e¤ect of political institutions on the government expenditure
allocation. However, public good provision depends also on the political institution
(Marsiliani and Renstrom, 2007), and this might be the target of future research.
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Chapter 5
TAX DIFFERENTIAL, WEALTH TAX AND THE INFLUENCE OF
IDEOLOGY
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter, co-authored with Guido Cozzi, extends the model presented in
Chapter 3 by introducing a wealth tax and an income tax. In several western
democracies not only income, but also wealth is taxed. Motives for redistribution
have already been studied for the income tax and for a general wealth tax and were
found to be not only consistent with how much one can get from redistribution,
but to depend also on other factors such as the ethnic composition of the country
(Luttmer 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005); the struggle between the signals
received from the society and the willingness to belief in a just world (Bénabou and
Tirole 2006), and distaste for unfairness or willingness to live in a system able to
provide the same opportunity to everyone (Fong 2001, Alesina and Glaeser 2004,
Alesina and Angeletos 2005a, Alesina et al. 2009).
On the one hand, our work deepens the analysis of the connection between ideas
of fairness and redistribution and how these evolve over time, and, on the other hand,
it considers a society in which two instruments are available: an income tax and a
wealth tax. The main novelty of this chapter, compared to the existing literature, is
that we study the e¤ect of ideology on an income and capital tax model. In fact, at
125
least to our knowledge, the e¤ect of ideology has only been study on taxes income or
end of life total wealth. However, in this chapter we will prove that if individuals care
about social justice, then an income and a wealth tax are not equivalent, and depend
on the perception of individuals. At the same time the pressure and composition of
taxes impose a feedback mechanism on the ideology, inuencing future generations.
To avoid double taxation of the income we compute a tax di¤erential, which
means that we subtract the income tax from the wealth tax. We build a simple
model in which there is a tax on income and a tax on wealth that is comprehensive
of detraction from the income tax. This particular formulation allow us to avoid
double counting and di¤erentiate between the part of wealth deriving from work (so
from e¤ort and ability) and part of wealth deriving from the capital inherited from
the previous generation. In fact, if the government can subtract income from wealth
and tax them separately, it can impose a taxation that maximizes the productivity
and at the same time increase the equality in society. The scal policy in this case is
the opposite compared to what the literature has suggested up to now: the growth
enhancing and fair taxation is represented by a combination of heavy wealth tax and
light income tax.
Our work is innovative in many aspects, but strongly relates to the recent liter-
ature on capital taxation. The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals
who live for one period only, leaving bequest to the subsequent generation. At the
beginning of each generation, decisions about capital tax and income tax are taken
by individuals, who then choose the e¤ort level, consumption, and bequest. As in
Farhi and Werning (2008), we use a probabilistic voting framework in order to sim-
ulate the decision making process. But di¤erently from them we obtain positive
capital taxation although there is perfect commitment in the model.
In our case, the wealth tax arises from the distaste for unfairness. For the rst
time, at least to our knowledge, the motive for wealth taxation derives from non-
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selsh motivations. In our model, therefore, it is not always true that more unequal
countries redistribute more and have higher wealth tax.
By plotting at a basic linear interpolation between 30 OECD countries it is
possible to notice that it would be very di¢ cult to state that there is a positive
association between the Gini Coe¢ cient and the revenues from Estate, Inheritance
and Gift tax as a percentage of GDP1.
Figure 5.1: Estate Tax and Gini Coe¢ cient
Therefore, there must be something more than the decreasing marginal utility in
wealth to drive the decision about the tax rate, such as ideology and the willingness
to live in a just world.
1The data refer to the year 2005, and are obtained from the OECD website:
OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics - ISBN 92-64-
08356-1 - c OECD 2010 for the Gini Coe¢ cient ; and Dataset: Revenue Statistics -
Comparative tables for the revenues from Estate, Inheritance and Gift taxes ( code 4300).
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It should be noticed that our economy is populated by individuals who live for
one period only. Therefore, the wealth tax coincides de facto with the inheritance
tax. In this way, not only is the motive for redistribution important, but also the
motive for bequest itself. In other words, the specication of the inner reason that
pushes parents to reduce their consumption and leave inheritance to their children.
In some models the bequest is just accidental, in the sense that parents do not plan to
leave bequest, but it arises from the fact that individuals need to have precautionary
savings because of the imperfection of the markets (Abel, 1985). However, in more
recent models, parents consciously decide to leave bequest to their children. In some
models, parents care about the utility deriving from consumption of their children
(as in Farhi and Werning 2008). In others, parents care about the income that
the children will receive (as the joy-of-children-receiving-incomeby Grossman and
Poutvaara, 2009). In this work, we propose a joy-of-giving2 form of altruism (also
dened warm glow altruism), as in Bossmann et al. (2007) and Michel and Pestieau
(2004).
An aspect that needs to be analysed is the timing of the tax implementation. In
our work, as in Michel and Pestieau (2004), the tax is imposed on the generation
that receives the bequest, and can therefore be considered as an inheritance tax.
Moreover, the income tax will be imposed at the end of the life of each generation.
In other works the timing is di¤erent from ours; in Farhi and Werning (2008), for
example, individuals rst observe their productivity (or the shock on the productivity
in the model with innite horizon), and then take decisions about e¤ort. After that,
individuals vote for parties according to the platform they propose and their taste
or distaste for the party. The winning party implements tax rates on the income
and on the bequest. Agents consume and take decisions about the investment of
capital. In period two, the candidates decide whether to reform the system or not.
2The warm glow altruism was introduced by Andreoni (1990).
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In the present work, not only is the steady state determined analytically, but the
entire transition path is going to be studied. In this way it is possible to observe the
evolution of the inheritance tax and of the income tax, the evolution in inequality
and fairness, and their interdependence.
The present chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the model
and presents the analytical results. Section 5.3 illustrates the results of numerical
experiments. Section 5.4 concludes. The Matlab codes used in the present chapter
are available from the authors upon request.
5.2 The Economy
As in Alesina and Angeletos (2005a), and Alesina et al. (2009), we have non over-
lapping generations t of individuals, with only one active individual per family and
constant population. Each individual, indexed by i 2 [0; 1], lives for one period and
perfectly inherits willingness to work i > 0, luck, i 2 R with
Z 1
0
idi = 0 and
innate abilities, Ai > 0. The private utility uit depends positively on consumption
cit, and on the bequest to the next generation, kit - which we label "capital" - and
negatively on e¤ort, eit:
uit =
1
(1  )1  c
1 
it k

it  
1
2i
e2it,
Where 0 <  < 1 is the intergenerational generosity parameter. The nal life
gross wealth is:
zit = Aieit + i + kit 1. (5.1)
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For simplicity, initial capital is assumed to yield no return. Each generation votes
on the wealth tax rate, wt, which is proportionally applied to end-of-life gross wealth
zit and on the income tax rate  yt; all tax revenues are to be redistributed lump sum
to all individuals. Being income added to wealth, the scal authorities, in order to
avoid double taxation, compute a (possibly negative) income tax di¤erential, Tyt.
Therefore the actual income tax rate is  yt = Tyt+ wt. Hence, we denote end of life
post-tax and transfer wealth as:
wit = (1  wt)zit   Tyt (Aieit + i) +Gt (5.2)
where Gt = wt
Z 1
0
zjtdj + Tyt
Z 1
0
 
Ajejt + j

dj is the per capita lump sum
government transfer. The government budget is always balanced.
Using the previous denitions, the end of life wealth of each individual is:
wit = (1  wt)zit Tyt (Aieit + i)+Gt = (Aieit + i) (1   yt)+ (1  wt)kit 1+Gt
(5.3)
which means that the wealth and income tax menu we are studying in our stylized
economy turns out to be equivalent to an income tax plus a delayed bequest tax.
This makes sense because the individual gets her wealth taxed at a tax rate except
when her wealth is the result of her income, in which case it is taxed at the income
tax. In our simplied economy, with no marriage market and no life-cycle structure,
the only part of someones wealth that cannot be subject to the income tax would
be her inherited initial wealth. However, in a more complex model, this simplied
interpretation may be blurred.
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In the special case of wt =  yt, the model becomes equivalent to the one in
Chapter 3. Unlike what happens in Chapter 3, here the voters have an additional
scal instrument to choose, which, in a symmetric probabilistic voting framework,
would allow for a better outcome (higher aggregate utility). If voters choose wt >
 yt, the individual taxpayer would have an incentive to report as much taxable
income as possible in order to obtain tax credit  Tyt = wt    yt.
Notice that in our stylized economy, individual income is yit = (Aieit + i) (1  
 yt)  wtkit 1 +Gt, and the aggregate income of generation t is
Yt =
Z 1
0
 
Ajejt + j

(1   yt)  wtkjt 1 +Gt

dj =
Z 1
0
Ajejtdj,
which is identical to per capita income due to the population normalization.
It is important to remark that, according to our assumed tax policy, all incomes
would be subject only to proportional income taxation  yt: even the interest incomes
on initial bequest would not be subject to the wealth tax wt, but to the income tax.
That is, if we had assumed positive real interest rate  > 0, the nal life individual
income would be equal to:
Yt =
Z 1
0
 
Ajejt + j

(1   yt)   ytkjt 1   wtkjt 1 +Gt

dj =
Z 1
0
Ajejtdj,
(5.4)
and therefore our assumed wealth/bequest tax rate, by not hitting capital
incomes, would not distort saving decisions in a growth harmful way.
Warm glow intergenerational altruism implies that fraction  of end of life wealth
is bequeathed, as seen by maximizing uit subject to cit + kit = wit. Therefore,
plugging the optimal consumption and bequest into the private utility function, we
obtain:
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uit = wit   e
2
it
2i
. (5.5)
Individuals vote on taxation at the beginning of life, before deciding on e¤ort.
Maximizing uit, using (5.5), (5.1), and (5.2), gives
eit = (1   yt)Aii, (5.6)
which shows that individual e¤ort gets discouraged only by expected income
taxation, and is increasing in the individual work ability and decreasing in the disu-
tility of e¤ort. This suggests that our income corrected wealth tax rate (in practice
a delayed bequest tax) could be the best scal instrument to reduce unfairness,
because it does not discourage individual e¤ort.
5.2.1 Is Income Tax Harmful for Growth?
In this framework, we prove that, in our stylized economy, there is a strong case for
using only the wealth tax. In fact, in light of eq. (5.6) and eq. (5.4) for aggregate
income becomes:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Aj(1   yt)Ajjdj = (1   yt)
Z 1
0
A2jjdi  (1   yt). (5.7)
Eq. (5.7) implies that per capita income is a decreasing function of the income
tax rate. The following therefore holds:
Proposition 5.1. The wealth tax does not a¤ect aggregate income, and if all
redistribution was carried out by taxing wealth, aggregate income would be maximized
in every generation.
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Notice that, no matter the level of the wealth tax rate, zero income tax would
always imply maximum aggregate income in each generation. Of course, maximum
aggregate GDP is not the same thing as maximum utility. However, it also implies
that:
Proposition 5.2 The steady state aggregate wealth is maximized when only
bequest wealth is taxed.
Proof. Integrating (5.3) we can derive a law of motion of aggregate wealth Wt
as follows:
Wt =
Z 1
0
wjtdj = Yt +
Z 1
0
kjt 1dj = Yt +
Z 1
0
wjt 1dj = Yt + Wt 1. (5.8)
In a steady state the income tax rate is constant, i.e.  yt =  y, and hence (5.7)
implies that Yt = (1   y). Plugged into (??) gives:
W = (1   y) + W = (1   y)

1   . (5.9)
Therefore, regardless of the level of the wealth tax rate, the highest aggregate
wealth level is achieved if  y = 0. This is certainly achieved if wealth tax was the
only tax instrument used in this economy. QED
Let us remark that we have not found the best tax policy, but the class of GDP
enhancing tax policies: they include a positive tax (to be decided by voters) on the
stock of wealth of the individuals, with the possibility of deducting all incomes from
the tax base. In our stylized economy, this scheme unravels back to waive taxes
from all saved income, leaving only the initial bequest taxed. Hence, a highly skilled
individual with little initial bequest will favour this policy a lot, whereas the lazy
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child of a rich family would strongly oppose it. According to this policy, individuals
have no incentive whatsoever to hide their income, because every penny of income
declared to IRS implies a tax reduction.
5.2.2 Fairness and Polity
As in Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) individuals tolerate inequality when it derives
from e¤ort and abilities, but do not tolerate it when it derives from luck or transfers.
The utility and wealth considered fair by the individuals are:
buit = bwit   e2it
2i
,
bwit = Aieit + bkit 1.
We dene fair consumption, fair bequest, and fair disposable wealth as:
bcit = (1  )bzit bkit = bzit bzit = bwit = Aieit + bkit 1. (5.10)
The generation t individual i utility, Uit, is dened as:
Uit = uit   
t, (5.11)
where

t =
1Z
0
(ujt   bujt)2dj = 1Z
0
(wjt   bwjt)2dj. (5.12)
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and  > 0 is the parameter which measures the importance of unfairness for
society.
As in Chapter 3 we use a probabilistic voting model, where there are two par-
ties L and R, that simultaneously commit to a tax rate menu
 
Lyt; 
L
wt
 2 [0; 1]2,
P = L, R, at the beginning of each period. The individuals vote for a party at
the beginning of their life. Then the individuals choose e¤orts. The party that
obtained the majority of the votes is the only one in o¢ ce, and it will apply the
announced tax rates and will redistribute accordingly. Finally, individuals choose
their consumption and bequest. Individuals have heterogeneous degrees of polit-
ical party identication. Hence, the complete utility function including economic
variables and party identication is the following:
~UitP = uit   
t + (it + "t)L(P ), where P = L;R.
Variable P denotes the party in o¢ ce. Indicator L(P ) takes on value 1 if P = L
and 0 if P = R. Random variable it (uniformly distributed on support
h
  1
2'i
; 1
2'i
i
)
represents individual is pro-party L ideological bias, while "t (uniformly distributed
on support
h
  1
2 
; 1
2 
i
) is an aggregate random variable capturing party Ls popu-
larity for generation t; with  > 'i, 8i 2 [0; 1]. The two parties commit to their
tax rates before they know the realization of the random variables "t and it. They
only care about winning the election, and hence choose their policies
 
Lyt; 
L
wt

and 
Ryt; 
R
wt

by trying to maximize the probability of being elected.
5.2.3 Equilibrium and Dynamics
After simple substitutions, and momentarily neglecting the party L bias components,
we obtain the indirect utility function of each individual in each generation. That
135
function ultimately depends on exogenous parameters, on expected taxation and on
all the wealth distribution of the previous generation:
Uit = [i(1   yt) + i] (1   yt) + kit 1(1  wt)
+
Z 1
0
[j(1   yt) yt + wtkjt 1] dj   (1   yt)2 i
2
  
Z 1
0
24 [s(1   yt) + s] (1   yt) + kst 1(1  wt)+R 1
0
[j(1   yt) yt + wtkjt 1] dj   s(1   yt)  bkst 1
352 ds
 U^it ( yt; wt) . (5.13)
Where i  A2ii. It is straightforward to see that ( the proof follows the steps
of the proof of Lemma 3.1).
Lemma 5.1. In pairwise majority voting, there exists a unique equilibrium
in which the two parties select the same policy variable,
 
Lyt; 
L
wt

=
 
Ryt; 
R
wt

= 
 yt; 

wt

, given by
 
 yt; 

wt

= arg max
(yt;wt)2[0;1]2
1Z
0
'iU^it ( yt; wt) di. (5.14)
As in other probabilistic voting models, the same equilibrium policy variable
would also be chosen by a biased social planner who maximizes the following
weighted aggregate welfare functional:
W ( yt; wt) 
1Z
0
'iU^it ( yt; wt) di,
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with each individuals indirect utility function (where e¤ort, consumption, and
bequest are all optimal) being weighted inversely to vulnerability, 1='i, to party-
related attributes. In the special case of individuals who have the same densities
'i = ', Lemma 5.1 implies that
 
 yt; 

wt

= argmax(yt;wt)W ( yt; wt) would
coincide with the tax rate chosen by a social planner who adopts a utilitarian welfare
functional. Notice that, from eq. (5.13), the equilibrium tax rates
 
 yt; 

wt

will
depend on generation t 1s bequest distribution kt 1, generation t 1s fair bequest
distribution bkt 1, and of course on the parameter vectors  and ; that is   yt;  wt =
(kt 1;bkt 1; ; ).
The equilibrium tax rates
 
 yt; 

wt

are used to determine the level of capital
kit and fair capital bkit, which represent the intergenerational links:
kit = 

i(1   yt)2 + i(1   yt) + kit 1(1  wt)

+ Gt (5.15)
bkit = i(1   yt) + bkit 1. (5.16)
5.2.4 Political Equilibrium Tax Rates
Will voters always care about macroeconomic performance? Inspired by the results
illustrated in Proposition 5.1 and 5.2, will they consistently prefer a zero income
tax rate? As we shall see, there are motives for doubting that all redistribution
will be done by wealth/bequest taxes. For example, some voters, who have inher-
ited a large wealth, but whose ability and will to generate income through e¤ort
is not high, would certainly prefer lower inheritance tax rates and high income tax
rates, in order to redistribute income from their hard working and more able co-tax
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payers. Assuming persistent abilities and luck, it is possible that less work e¤ec-
tive individuals will eventually leave small bequests, yet, for some combinations of
parameters, we cannot exclude that they would still make a case for positive income
tax rates coexisting with some degree of wealth tax even in the long run. Under the
assumed probabilistic voting mechanism, all votersheterogeneities are weighted and
aggregated, and therefore contribute to the nal outcome. In this section we will
here undertake a preliminary analytical characterization of possible interior equi-
libria (with positive income and wealth tax rates), and then we will move on to the
numerical simulations of the most interesting cases.
If equal weights are assumed, according to Lemma 5.1 the voting equilibrium will
be such that the following is maximized:
1Z
0
U^it ( yt; wt) di = (5.17)
=
1Z
0
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:

j(1   yt) + j

(1   yt) + kjt 1(1  wt)+Z 1
0
[j(1   yt) yt + wtkjt 1] dj   (1   yt)2 i2 

R 1
0
264 [s(1   yt) + s] (1   yt) + kst 1(1  wt)+Z 1
0
[j(1   yt) yt + wtkjt 1] dj   s(1   yt)  bkst 1
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2
ds
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
di
Hence we can prove the following:
Proposition 5.3. The equilibrium value of the bequest wealth tax rate  wt 2
[0; 1], follows a simple rule:
 wt = min
"
max
 
1  (1   yt) [cov(s; kst 1) yt   cov(s; kst 1)] + cov(
bkst 1; kst 1)
var(kst 1)
; 0
!
; 1
#
,
(5.18)
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which, if  yt = 0 and 

wt 2 (0; 1) becomes:
 wt = 1 +
cov(s; kst 1)  cov(bkst 1; kst 1)
var(kst 1)
. (5.19)
Proof. Taking the rst derivative of (5.17) with respect to the wealth tax rate,
wt, we obtain:
d
Z 1
0
U^it ( yt; wt) di

dwt
= 0   d
t
dwt
, (5.20)
where

t = Z 1
0
8><>:
[s(1   yt) + s] (1   yt) + kst 1(1  wt)+Z 1
0
[j(1   yt) yt + wtkjt 1] dj   s(1   yt)  bkst 1
9>=>;
2
ds
=
Z 1
0
24  s(1   yt) yt + s(1   yt) + kst 1(1  wt)
+(1   yt) yt + wtkt 1   bkst 1
352 ds
Hence,   d
t
dwt
=
= 2
Z 1
0
24     s (1   yt) yt + s(1   yt) +  kst 1   kt 1 (1  wt)
+kt 1   bkst 1
35 kst 1   kt 1 ds
= 2
h
var(ks)(1  wt)  cov(s; ks)(1   yt) yt + (1   yt)cov(s; ks)  cov(bkst 1; kst 1)i
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which satises Kuhn-Tucker conditions only if wt is as in the stated expression.
QED
Remark Notice that, according to Lemma 5.2, wt is higher if luck plays a large
part in explaining beginning of life wealth (i.e. cov(s; ks) is low), and actual
inheritances are not positively related with fair inheritances (i.e. cov(bkst 1; ks) is
high). Moreover, if these e¤ects are very high, wt can even become equal to 100%
(complete redistribution of bequests).
As for the income tax rate, we can di¤erentiate (5.17) with respect to  yt getting:
d
Z 1
0
U^it ( yt; wt) di

d yt
=   yt    d
t
d yt
, (5.21)
but
d
t
d yt
= 2
Z 1
0
24     s (1   yt) yt + s(1   yt)+ 
kst 1   kt 1

(1  wt) + kt 1   bkst 1
35
 
   s

(1  2 yt)  s

ds
= 2[var(s)(1  2 yt)(1   yt) yt   cov(s; s)(1   yt)2
 (1   yt)var(s)  cov(kst 1; s)(1  wt)(1  2 yt)
 cov(kst 1; s)(1  wt) 
Z 1
0
bkst 1     s (1  2 yt)ds]
Since in the steady state bks1 = s(1 y)1  , the last integral is:
Z 1
0
bkst 1     s (1  2 yt)ds = (1  2 yt)(1   y)
1   var(s) (5.22)
it follows that:
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d
t
d yt
=
2
24 var(s)(1  2 yt)(1   yt)   yt   1   cov(s; s)(1   yt)2   (1   yt)var(s)
 cov(ks1; s)(1  wt)(1  2 yt)  cov(ks1; s)(1  wt)
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Since cov(ks1; s) > 0, thencov(ks1; s) > 0. Assuming cov(s; s)  0, it follows
that d
t
dyt
< 0 at  yt = 0, that is  yt = 0 is a local minimum. However, we cannot
exclude that if  is small enough the derivative could change sign, which may entail
a non-zero  yt provided  is large enough.
Since, as we have seen, unambiguous predictions on the aggregate utility max-
imizing choices of the income tax rate cannot be guaranteed, in the next section
we will show the most representative numerical simulations. What we can say is
that we expect both tax rates to be positive, but that a country which taxes zero
on income will have a superior macroeconomic performance, in terms of aggregate
income and long run wealth.
5.3 Intergenerational Dynamics
Dening initial vectors of actual and fair wealth levels, (ki0; k^i0)i2[0;1], it is possible to
iterate the model for several generations, and observe the intergenerational evolution
of (kit; k^it)i2[0;1] and
 
 yt; 

wt

for all t 2 N as well as the fundamentals of the
economy. Therefore we trace the evolution of ideology, fairness and redistribution,
as well as the aggregate GDP per capita and Gini Coe¢ cient. We focus our attention
on the e¤ects of:
1. Di¤erence between this model and the one presented in Chapter 3, (section
5.3.1).
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2. Comparison between capital accumulated because of luck and capital accu-
mulated because of past e¤ort (section 5.3.2).
3. The connection between inequality and redistribution in the model (section
5.3.3)
4. Comparison between income tax and wealth tax (section 5.3.4).
5. Alternative denitions of fairness (section 5.3.5).
5.3.1 Innovation of the Model
The possibility of using two di¤erent tax rates enlarges the policy menu and improves
the economic outcomes. In gure 5.2 we compare two economies: in the rst case -
in solid lines - we simulate the model presented in Chapter 3, showing the economy
of a country which imposes one tax rate only  t. In the second one - with dashed
lines - we simulate the actual model, which represents a country that can use two
forms of taxation:  yt and wt.
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Figure 5.2: Innovation of the Model
Country A, the country which has only one scal tool, shows a lower per-capita
wealth, a lower utility level and a higher Gini coe¢ cient than country B. From the
tests made3 the result seems really robust; in fact the results on the Gini coe¢ cient
and on the utility were veried 100% and the results on the per-capita wealth 98%
of the times.
5.3.2 Different Origins of Wealth
3We made 100 tests for each of the cases we consider.
143
In this set of experiments we want to compare countries that start from the same
level and distribution of accumulated capital, but with di¤erent capital origins. In
the rst country (A) all the wealth derives from the abilities and e¤ort and not from
luck (i.e. the variance of , 2, is zero, which the variance of , 
2
, is positive), while
in the second country (B) all the wealth came from luck and not from e¤ort ( i.e.
2 > 0 and 
2
 = 0
4). Agents respond in opposite ways to these two scenarios. In
fact if the rst case both the bequest tax and the income tax will tend to zero in the
long run, showing that if the unfairness is so small, there is no reason to redistribute.
In the second case the bequest tax will always tend to one in the steady state, while
the steady state income tax will depend on the variance of , on  and on the value
of the . This shows how individuals respond in a di¤erent way to a society with
high unfairness according to which tax they are considering. If they are in general
not willing to redistribute all the wealth deriving from work, they are willing to
redistribute everything that comes from inheritance.
4Notice that although the variance of  is equal to zero, the mean of the variable is not
zero, otherwise we would have negative incomes.
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Figure 5.3: Di¤erent Origins of Wealth
As it is possible to see in the gure the individuals of the country in which
wealth derives from e¤ort do not wish to redistribute at all. On the other side, in
the country where the di¤erences in wealth depend on luck individuals vote in order
to impose a conscatory tax rate on bequest and a positive tax rate on the income.
This scenario can be easily proved analytically. For the rst case, if the variance
of  is equal to zero and the variance of  is positive we obtain, from equations (5.18)
and (5.21), that:
d
Z 1
0
U^jt ( yt; wt) dj

d yt
=   yt 2
24 var(s)(1  2 yt)(1   yt) 
 yt   1 
  cov(ks1; s)(1  wt)(1  2 yt)
35 ,
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which has a local maximum when  yt = 0. And therefore:
d
Z 1
0
U^jt ( yt; wt) dj

dwt
=  2
h
var(ks)(1  wt)  cov(bkst 1; kst 1)i
that has a local maximum when wt = 0.
In the second case, where 2 > 0 and the variance of 
2
 = 0, wealth taxation
will be equal to one:
d
Z 1
0
U^jt ( yt; wt) dj

dwt
=  2
h
var(ks)(1  wt) + (1   yt)cov(s; ks)  cov(bkst 1; kst 1)i , and
wt = 1 +
(1   yt)cov(s; ks)  cov(bkst 1; kst 1)
var(ks)
Notice that this has a local maximum where the bequest tax is approximately
equal to 1.
On the other side, the FOC for income taxation is5:
dUt
d yt
=   yt   2 ( (1   yt)var(s)  cov(ks1; s)(1  wt)) = 0
and therefore:
 yt =
2var(s)
 + 2var(s)
So, the equilibrium income tax rate is less than 1 and it decreases in the average
level of .
5Given that we already proved that in this case wt = 1
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5.3.3 How Inequality Affects Redistribution
In this section, we compare two countries: one starts with a non equal distribution
of capital (A), and the other with a perfectly equal distribution of capital (B). The
reason that brings about positive redistribution in recent models with bequest is the
decreasing marginal utility6. Instead we do not need a decreasing marginal utility
of wealth, and the positive redistribution arises from the dislike for unfairness in
society. As a consequence the more unequal country will not redistribute more. It is
possible that the more equal country redistributes more, imposing a higher tax both
on income and on bequest. The most common case that arises from our simulation,
however, is that the more equal country starts with a higher bequest tax and a lower
income tax than the other country. After some generation, usually, the two systems
converge.
6See as example Farhi and Werning (2008) and Golosov et al. (2006).
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Figure 5.4: Inequality and Ideology
In gure 5.4 we have plotted also the evolution of the variance of capital. The
two variances converge over generations. In this case the equal country redistributes
more on bequest and less on income, showing a pattern with higher per capita utility
and wealth and lower Gini coe¢ cient.
5.3.4 Comparison Between Income Tax and Wealth Tax
We now analyse what happens if a country has to choose between imposing a tax rate
on wealth or on income only. We suppose there are two countries A and B; country
A can tax the income only and country B can tax only the net of income individual
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wealth. As it is possible to notice from gure 5.5, the country that can impose a
taxation on the bequest wealth shows better outcomes in terms of per-capita wealth,
Gini coe¢ cient, and aggregate utility.
Figure 5.5: Income Tax and Wealth Tax
The results are quite robust, and consistent with Proposition 5.1 and 5.2. In the
steady state the country that can impose a tax only on non-income-related wealth
performs better or equally well than the country that can tax only income: in terms
of per-capita wealth (in 100% of the simulations), in term of Gini (in 93% of the
times), and in terms of aggregate utility (in 87% of the simulations).
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5.3.5 Alternative definitions of fairness
So far we have assumed that the individuals consider bequest as a fair component
of wealth, for the part that depends on the ability and e¤ort of parents. The fair
capital in fact converges always to a distribution with positive variance. If we impose
it to be equal to zero for one period, its variance will increase over the generations7.
It is therefore interesting to see what happens if the individuals, regardless of its
origin, considers any di¤erence in the inherited capital endowment as undeserved,
and hence unfair. To depict such a case, we rewrite the law or motion of fair capital
as:
bkit =  Z 1
0
w^jt 1dj = 
Z 1
0
h
j(1   yt) + bkjt 1i dj.
From a theoretical point of view the analysis is similar to one in chapter 3 (
"Alternative denitions of fairness" section 3.2.3): with stochastic luck it would be
possible to observe the case in which an individual has average luck it = 0; but her
parent has positive luck it 1 > 0. In this case, even if the child herself is not lucky,
she might be considered lucky because her parent was. Moreover, if agents were
unable to distinguish between the various origins of wealth, then the only possible
fair bequest would the average one bkt 1 = R kjt 1dj: the individual might be lucky
(and therefore inherit more than the average) because her parent was lucky it 1 > 0
or because her parent had a high level of innate abilities Ait 1; or high endurance to
e¤ort it 1:
However, the similarities between this case and the one presented in Figure 3.4
end here. In fact, in this case are not the parents who decide whether what they
leave to their children is fair, but is the subsequent generation (the children) who
7For a similar result, see Alesina et al (2009).
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vote for the bequest. Theoretically is even stronger: individuals are born with
di¤erent levels of capital, but cannot identify (or do not care about) the origins of
that wealth, and consider every di¤erence unfair. The resulting wealth tax would
be di¤erent compared to the one in our benchmark case, although it is not possible
to theoretically dene with certainty if it would be higher or lower. The wealth tax
in this case would be equal to:
 wt = min

max

(1   yt) [cov(s; kst 1) yt   cov(s; kst 1)]
var(kst 1)
; 0

; 1

, (5.23)
and the income tax:
 yt = 2[var(s)(1  2 yt)
 
(1   yt) yt   kst 1
  cov(s; s)(1   yt)2
 (1   yt)var(s)  cov(kst 1; s)(1  wt)(1  2 yt)
 cov(kst 1; s)(1  wt)]
In gure 5.6 we show a representative gure with the comparison between our
benchmark case (country A, solid line), and this di¤erent ideology that views other
people initial wealth as equivalent to luck (country B, dashed line).
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Figure 5.6: Di¤erent Denitions of Fairness
Country B redistributes more, imposing higher tax rate both on income and
wealth. It will have a lower per-capita wealth, utility, and Gini coe¢ cient. The
results seems pretty robust: the benchmark country shows lower income tax rate
(82% of the times), lower wealth tax rate (95% of the times), higher utility (93% of
the times), and higher per-capita wealth (99% of the times).
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter originates from the work by Alesina and Angeletos (2005a), and
Chapter 3, but departs from their framework by introducing a new way of thinking
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about the wealth tax. We analysed the possible consequences of implementing a
wealth tax and an income tax, where the latter is dened through a tax di¤er-
ential. This policy is studied within an environment in which individuals do not
only care about the personal gain they can get from redistribution, but also about
their ideal society and their concept of social justice. Our main analytical result,
opposite to a classic result of the literature, is that it can benecial to tax mainly
bequest-related wealth and avoid heavy taxes on income, as this policy can enhance
e¤ort and therefore the aggregate income. Moreover, given the dependence of the
political preferences on the idea of fairness, the origin of wealth itself matters. If
the di¤erences in wealth derive from di¤erent levels of e¤ort, individuals will be
less keen to redistribute, while if the di¤erences in wealth derive from an uneven
distribution of luck, individuals will want to implement a higher redistribution.
Through numerical simulations we show how our model can be adapted to dif-
ferent situations: it is able to explain why more equal countries tend to implement
higher wealth taxes, and how di¤erent ideologies can help shape policies.
In conclusion, this work adds an innovative point of view on the debate about
the optimal wealth and capital tax; and at the same time integrates the decisions
about wealth tax with ideology, and in particular the ideas of fairness.
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Chapter 6
"Big Society", Redistribution and Volunteering Capital
6.1 Introduction
This chapter, co-authored with Koen P.R. Bartels and Guido Cozzi, studies the
relation between redistribution and volunteering. Recently, the British coalition
government launched its plan to create a Big Society in which public activities
and spending are rolled backand citizens themselves take more responsibility in
running public services. Ever since, commentators have vilied the plan for the
dominance of rhetorical power over practical feasibility. More fundamentally, the
Big Society plan has reinvigorated the debate on the relationship between govern-
ment and society, or, more specically, between public spending and volunteering.
It is asserted that voluntary activity should, can, and will emerge as a perfect sub-
stitute for the welfare state. This hypothesis is based on the widely held belief
that high government expenditure will impair volunteering because of a crowding
out e¤ect: an increase (decrease) in public expenditure brings about a signicant
decrease (increase) in individualspropensity to volunteer. Surprisingly enough, this
belief is not backed up by solid theoretical foundations or empirical evidence. The
goal of this chapter is to examine the theoretical and practical consistency of the
perhaps too optimistic expectations of the Big Society plan.
For the rst time to our knowledge, we o¤er an interdisciplinary approach
merging economic and public administration points of view, to o¤er a complete
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vision on the Big Society program. In particular, we focus on the e¤ects of gov-
ernment expenditure on volunteering by employed individuals, a topic which, to
our knowledge, has never been fully analyzed before. We combine an analyt-
ical model about volunteering by employed individuals, econometric analysis, and
ground theory analysis on interviews, and reach to the path-breaking nding that
the premises of Big Society are not sustainable: if we consider only employed
individuals, there is actually no crowding out e¤ect of government expenditure on
volunteering, but, in fact a crowding in e¤ect.
We focus our analysis on the working part of the population, because this is
probably the most pivotal group of citizens when trying to stimulate volunteering.
Employed individuals have to make a decision between allocating their time to
working in the private market or to voluntary work, and are therefore not indi¤erent
about whether the public good is produced through government or volunteering.
Rather, their decision to volunteer is dependent on the level of government expen-
diture. Employed individuals are more likely to volunteer when public spending is
higher.
This conclusion is reached through econometric analysis of two survey
datasets (European Values Survey and British Household Panel Survey) and nar-
rative analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with local volunteers and public
professionals (between October and December 2009 in Glasgow). Our ndings
suggest that the decision of employed individuals to volunteer depends not only on
government expenditure, but also on their personal abilities and existing volunteering
capital. Lower public spending increases the probability of setbacks and frustra-
tions for volunteers and decreases the availability of adequate support structures
and professional skills. This lead us to conclude that less public spending reduces
the likelihood of (successful) volunteering, but also that more public spending will
not necessarily increase the voluntary activity. Rather, based on our model and
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ndings we recommend that exploration of government as a facilitator or enabler
or volunteering capital might be the best direction for developing the literature on
volunteering as well as the Big Society plan.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 motivates the analysis and dis-
cusses the existing related literature. Section 6.3 presents and analyses the theo-
retical model. Section 6.4 carries out the econometric analysis of the testable pre-
dictions of our model. Section 6.5 discusses interviews we have undertaken on this
issue. Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 The Big Society: Reinvigorating the Debate About Volun-
teering
During the 2010 British elections, the nancial crisis, and its impact on public
expenditure, drove the welfare state to the top of the political agenda. The debate
did not evolve around economic policy and the necessity of severe cutbacks per se,
but more fundamentally reected diverging ideologies about the relationship between
state and society for delivering public services (Smith, 2010). While Labour sought
to continue increasing public spending and taxation, the Conservatives proposed a
radical turn to a small government and a big society. The latter vision came out
on top, when the Conservatives formed a coalition government with the Liberal-
Democrats and put their plan for the Big Society in place. The main idea of the
Big Society is that rolling back big government will create a climate in which
communities take up the responsibility to run public services (Cabinet O¢ ce,
2010). By withdrawing public spending and agencies, it is claimed, local citizens
will feel more motivated to volunteer for improving their communities.
Since the launch of the Big Society in May 2010, it has received a fair
amount of scepticism and resentment. The Big Society was proposed to bring about
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a new era of people powerthrough policy measures such as providing volunteering
training to local citizens, and especially young people, giving nancial support to
mutuals, cooperatives, charities and social enterprises to take over and run public
services, and giving a general power of competence to local councils (Cabinet O¢ ce,
2010). However, initial concerns about whether it would actually provide anything
new and useful were conrmed when Liverpool Council withdrew as one of the four
pilot projects (BBC, 2011a). Criticism grew that the coalition government was
only meeting its a¤ectionate rhetoric with lukewarm initiatives and little concrete
promises (Alcock, 2010). Furthermore, the Big Society has been condemned for
being a symbolic device used to legitimize excessive cuts on public services and
voluntary sector funding and consequently destroying the basic texture of voluntary
programmes and activities (BBC, 2011b).
The crucial issue at stake here is whether less public spending will indeed
lead more people into volunteering. It is openly questioned whether voluntary work
would automatically emerge as a perfect substitute for government activity. In order
for the Big Society to be successful, there should be a strong crowding out e¤ect
to counter the cuts in public spending: an increase (decrease) in public expenditure
brings about a signicant decrease (increase) in individualspropensity to volunteer.
While academic and policy debates are divided between the conventional beliefs that
the relationship between government expenditure and volunteering is either a matter
of crowding out or crowding in, there is surprisingly little theoretical and empirical
support for either position. Therefore, our focus in this chapter is to nd out if
a change in public spending a¤ects individualslevel of volunteering, and, if so, in
which direction.
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6.2.1 Volunteering by Employed Individuals
The innovation of our approach is to concentrate on the e¤ect that the size of
the government expenditure has on the active working population only. Below,
we build a model in which active individuals have to decide how to allocate their
time between working and volunteering. Contrary to the work by Duncan (1999)
and Freeman (1997) we concentrate on time donation only, because we conceptualize
volunteering as a social activity in which citizens are actually engaged in the delivery
of public services. For example, the ambition of the Big Society is to give citizens,
communities and local government the power and information they need to come
together, solve the problems they face and build the Britain they want (Cabinet
O¢ ce, 2010, p. 1).
Time donation by employed individuals is not a matter of a complete crowding
out e¤ect. In theoretical models about money or time donation with pure altruism,
the crowding out e¤ect emerges directly because volunteering is a substitute for
government expenditure. What counts for individuals is that a public good exists
and they are indi¤erent about whether it is produced through government activity
or their own voluntary work. In an impure altruism framework, individuals receive
utility from volunteering and are therefore not indi¤erent about the source of the
public good. In this case, the crowding out e¤ect can no longer be complete
(Andreoni 2006). In our model, we consider how government expenditure and tax-
ation inuences the decision of employed individuals about their time allocation.
Agents receive utility from the total amount of volunteering in the society as a form
of public good as well as the result of their personal volunteering (rather than solely
the hours spent volunteering per se).
Whether an employed individual will be willing and able to donate time to volun-
teering will also depend on her abilities. Citizens with more skills and experience are
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more prone to volunteering as well as to being more e¤ective in it. One of the main
problems of voluntary work is getting other people than just the usual suspectsto
participate (Barnes et al., 2007; Skidmore et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2011). Lacking
the rightabilities to volunteer in the rightplace at the righttime can provide
an entry barrier to citizens who work and therefore only have a limited amount of
time available.
This e¤ect can be mediated by the size of volunteering capital; i.e. the vol-
unteering that is inherited from previous generations. We assume that the voluntary
activities of previous generations do not die away but that at least some parts of
it remain intact. For example, volunteering capital can take the form of a school
built, an organization founded, handbooks with practical knowledge and know-how,
or continuing volunteering programs. We note that volunteering capital is di¤erent
from social capital: whereas social capital refers to the presence of social relation-
ships that o¤er access to particular goods (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998; Edwards
and Foley, 1998), volunteering does not necessarily require the presence of any social
relationships to engage in the production of the public good. For example, if the res-
idents of a social housing scheme are expected to keep the hallway of their building
clean, they might decide to spend a certain amount of time each week on cleaning
without having any social relationships with their neighbors that a¤ects this decision
1.
The inuence of government expenditure on employed individuals has been insuf-
ciently explored. However, this relationship is fundamental to the widely held belief
that public expenditure will impair volunteering. Therefore, below we build a model
1Clearly social capital and volunteering capital can be mutually reinforcing. However,
for the purposes of this model it is crucial to distinguish between both concepts rather
than following this often prematurely made assumption.
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that conceptualizes this link and takes into consideration the mediating e¤ects of
abilities and voluntary capital.
6.3 The Economy
We assume successive generations t of individuals, with each individual is indexed
by i 2 [0; 1], and the total mass of individuals is normalized to 1. Population does
not change over time and there is only one active individual per family. Agents
live for one period and they are characterized by a certain degree of innate abilities
Ait > 0 and capital inherited from the parent kipt 1 > 0. Each individual allocates
her working hours Hit between voluntary work hivt and market work hipt.
The utility function depends on private end-of-life consumption cit and bequest
kipt volunteering Vit2; public good Gt and disutility of work Hit:
uit =
"
citk
1 
ipt
 (1  )1 
#e
+ V eit + G
e
t  
 H2it
2
(6.1)
where parameters satisfy 0 <  < 1, 0 < e < 1 , 0 <  < 1, and 0 <  <
1:Hence in this model we have both intragenerational altruism, expressed through
volunteering, and intergenerational altruism, expressed through leaving bequest.
The labour supplied in the market, the private capital, and the productive abil-
ities serve to produce the aggregate good in the economy:
Xit = Aith

ipt 1k
1 
ipt
2We consider volunteering only and not charitable contributions, as our intent is to focus
the analysis on the Big Society. A possible criticism is that we should also consider money
donations as they are substitutes. However, according the empirical study by Freeman
(1997), there is evidence that time donations and money donations are complements in
individuals preferences.
160
where 0 <  < 1: The after-tax end of life wealth is given by:
Wit = (1   t)Xit = (1   t)Aithiptk1 ipt 1
At the end of their life individuals allocate their after-tax-wealth between con-
sumption and bequest maximizing subutility:
citk
1 
ipt
(1 )1  , which implies:
cit = (1  )Wit kipt = Wit.
Since cit + kipt = Wit, the indirect utility function can be rewritten as:
uit = W
e
it + V
e
it + G
e
t  
 H2it
2
(6.2)
Analyzing employed individuals only, we rule out the possibility that the moti-
vation for volunteering is to invest in human capital in order to nd a job ( Day and
Devlin, 1998). We assume that volunteering is motivated by warm glow altruism.
Each persons volunteering impact depends on the hours spent volunteering, her
productive abilities3, and the aggregate volunteering capital kvt 1:
Vit = Aith

ivtk
1 
vt 1 (6.3)
The volunteering capital evolves according to:
3In this section we assume that private sector abilities and volunteering abilities are
perfectly correlated. In section 4.3.2, when considering non-active individuals, we will drop
this assumption.
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kvt = (1  )kvt 1 +
Z 1
0
hvjtAjtdj + 
 represents the natural decay rate of the volunteering capital lost across gen-
erations. A certain degree of volunteering capital  is independent from the volun-
teering as it is guaranteed from the market interactions. In fact, we think it realistic
to assume that even if initial volunteering capital were zero, the market would still
harbour a minimum possibility for voluntary activity to emerge. That is, even in the
extreme case in which any history of volunteering or social relationships was absent,
individuals could make volunteering arise from the very basic social contact that is
involved even in market activities.
The public good can be provided either using government revenues or volun-
teering:
Gt =  t
Z 1
0
Ajth

jptk
1 
jpt 1dj + k
1 
vt 1
Z 1
0
Ajth

jvtdj
Assuming that the abilities are stationary, in steady state each individuals cap-
ital would converge to:
kip = [(1  )Ai]
1
 hip.
6.3.1 Optimal time allocation
We want to study the optimal allocation of time between working and volunteering.
The rst order conditions are:
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@uit
@hip
= eW e 1p (1  )Aitk1 ipt 1h 1ipt    (hivt + hipt)
= e

(1   t)Aitk1 ipt 1
e
he 1ipt    (hivt + hipt)
= 0 (6.4)
and
@uit
@hivt
= eV e 1it Aitk
1 
vt 1h
 1
ipt    (hivt + hipt)
= e

Aitk
1 
vt 1
e
he 1ivt    (hivt + hipt)
= 0 (6.5)
from which we obtain:

hipt
hivt
e 1
=
 
k

vt 1
(1  )k1 ipt 1
!e
and therefore
hipt =
 
(1  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Substituting (6.6) in (6.5) we can write:
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The optimal amount of voluntary work:
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Substituting (6.7) in (6.6) we obtain the optimal market working hours:
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Higher innate ability Ajt makes individual j more willing to both work in the
market and volunteer. A change in the abilities changes each individuals optimal
time allocation in the same proportion no matter the personal ratio of private capital
to volunteering capital.
However a shock on the economy that cuts both the privately owned capital and
the volunteering capital in the same proportion will not be neutral. Imagine a shock
that a¤ect all the capital in a society, such as a stock market shock. The smaller the
ratio of private capital to volunteering capital for an individual the more a crisis that
cuts of capital in the society will a¤ect her volunteering. In other words, the poorer
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is an individual the more her volunteering is going to be a¤ected by an economic
crisis.
Also the taxation inuences the decisions of timing allocation between volun-
teering and working in the market. In particular:
Proposition 6.1 An increase (decrease) in  t brings about an increase
(decrease) in the optimal volunteering hours hivt and a decrease (increase) in
the optimal working hours for each individual i 2 [0; 1].
Proof Taking the rst derivative of hivt with respect to the taxation we obtain:
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The rst derivative of hipt with respect to  t is:
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Which is negative since:
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QED.
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Proposition 6.1 states that a contraction of the welfare state does not cause an
increase in the voluntary labour supply, but on the contrary it provokes a decrease
in it, at the same time an increase in the amount of hours worked in the market.
A decrease in the tax rate  reduces the disincentive on private work and therefore
individuals decide to spend more hours working in the market and less hours vol-
unteering. An increase in the tax rate works in the opposite way. The result that
a tax increase can enhance volunteering should be quite a general result, as long as
all goods are normal, as in any additively separable utility function.
Proposition 6.1 does not directly imply that an increase in taxation brings about
an increase in the public good tout court. The disincentive e¤ect of taxation on
private labour supply could be so strong that could cause the government revenues
to decrease. In this way the increase in public good caused by the increase in the
volunteering could be compensated and even o¤set by the decrease in the worked
hours. Proposition 6.2 provides the conditions that guarantees that an increase in
taxation generates an increase in the public good provision.
Proposition 6.2 If  t
1  t <
1 e
e
an increase in the taxation causes a net increase
in the public good provision in both the government component and the voluntary one.
Proof. It is necessary to prove that if conditions in the Proposition 6.2
holds, than the public good Gt increases in both factors  t
R 1
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jvtdj as  t increases. From Proposition 6.1 we know that an increase
in  t will cause an increase in hivt. We need to nd the condition under which an
increase in  t brings an increase in the optimal amount of government revenues.
The elasticity of the optimal work supply to the taxation is:
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if  t
1  t <
1 e
e
the elasticity is 0 < hp; < 1. Therefore, as long as
 t
1  t <
1 e
e
the work supply is inelastic. An increase (decrease) in  t translate in a net increase
of the public good supply also in the government part of the public good. QED.
In Figure 6.1 we illustrate a representative numerical example, showing how the
equilibrium amount of average working hours, volunteering, public good production,
and utility respond to changes in the tax rate:
Figure 6.1: Illustration of the Model
It is worthwhile remarking that this kind of diagram is extremely robust over a
wide range of possible parameter values, and it has been provided here just to give
the reader a visual illustration of the results we have already proved analytically.
6.3.2 Non-active Agents
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So far, we have analysed the response to taxation of employed individuals only.
What would the response of individuals who do not work be? Let us generalize this
framework by assuming that there are two di¤erent types of abilities in the model:
AitP for the production of the good Xit and AitV for the provision the volunteering.
Non-productive individual j can be viewed as characterized by a negative shock
on the productive abilities, so that Ajpt = 0, while AjtV > 0: Her indirect utility
function then becomes:
ujt = V
e
jt + G
e
t  
 H2jt
2
(6.9)
The optimal private work is hjpt = 0. The FOC relative to the hours spent
volunteering are:
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In this case the optimal amount of hours spent volunteering does not depend on
tax rates:
hivt =

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Therefore, assuming that there is a strong proportion of non-employed individuals
that volunteer, our model is consistent with the empirical results by Van Oorschot
and Arts (2005), who do not nd evidence on the hypothesis of crowding out or
crowding in.
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6.4 Government Expenditure, Abilities, and Volunteering: Econo-
metric Analysis
We used two di¤erent datasets to test the relationship between government expendi-
ture, abilities and volunteering for employed individuals. The rst dataset contains
the intersection of the OECD countries and the countries included in the European
Values Survey fourth wave (2008), for a total of 24,082 observations from 16 coun-
tries. The second dataset is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which
contains survey data about the UK from 1991 to 2007, for a total of 140,850 obser-
vations. In these datasets, we have analysed the e¤ect of the General Government
Expenditure and personal education on the binary variable of doing unpaid work4 for
any association concerned with, among others, environment, professional activities,
youth work, sports/recreation, women activities, peace, health. In both datasets we
have found a signicant positive relationship between employed individualsdecision
to volunteer and both the total government expenditure and individualsabilities.
In order to study how the size of the welfare state inuences the level of vol-
unteering, we needed to analyse how expansions or contractions of the Governments
Expenditure5 cause changes in the probability for each individual to volunteer.
In the rst dataset, we have reparametrized the answer about the volun-
teering, so that 0 means that the respondent does not do any voluntary work and 1
4Although it might be interesting to analyse the change in the hours dedicated to
volunteering, we are interested mainly in studying the participation rate to volunteering,
and therefore the best variable to use is the binary variable that describes if individuals
do some voluntary work or not.
5Hackl et al. (2009) argue that in order to analyze crowding in or crowing out it is
necessary to consider the Social Expenditure instead of the General Government Expen-
diture. To test the model, we nevertheless decided to focus on the latter, because Social
Expenditure data does not cover the phenomenon of volunteering in its entirety. Volun-
teering data also includes the decisions to participate in activities that are not (directly)
related to Social Expenditure. Data on Social Expenditure only take into account benets
such as pensions, disability pensions, family allowances etc., and do not cover services to
citizens (for example education, environment, or minority group rights).
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means that the respondent does voluntary work. The General Government Expen-
diture is taken from the OECD dataset and for each country is calculated as the
ratio between General Government Expenditure and GDP in 2008. Education is
measured by the number of years of education, which we have used as a proxy for
abilities. For each country, we consider only the decisions by employed individuals.
Since we are dealing with a binary dependent variable we report the results of our
Logit estimations, but using Probit would not change our qualitative results. The
connection between the government expenditure and volunteering among workers
seems really robust, whether education is introduced or not.
Table 6.1: Europe
The results of the model about the dependence of the volunteering on the size
of the welfare state and personal abilities are conrmed by the data about Europe.
From Table 6.1 we can see that General Government Expenditure and Education are
both strongly signicant. The coe¢ cient of Government Expenditure is positive and
bigger than one (1.513626), which supports the hypothesis that an increase in public
expenditure brings about an increase of volunteering in society. The coe¢ cient of
the education is positive (.230795), which conrms that an increase in the abilities
increases the probability of volunteering.
For the second dataset, the British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 2007,
we have repeated this analysis, with the di¤erence that this time personal income
was used as a substitute for abilities. The dependent variable is also slightly di¤erent
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from the one of the European Values Survey, as it responds to the question about the
respondent being active in one or more organizations such as political party, trade
union, environmental group, parents association, tenant association, religious group,
voluntary group, community group, sport club, in women institute, in women group
or in other group. Also in this case we have excludes the non-employed individuals,
obtaining the following results:
Table 6.2: UK a
While it could have been the case that British citizens react in a di¤erent way
from individuals living in Continental Europe, also from the BHPS dataset we found
strong evidence to conrm that the probability of volunteering, for employed indi-
viduals, is positively related to Government Expenditure and abilities. In the UK
case the Government Expenditure is signicant, positive, and bigger than 1, showing
a coe¢ cient remarkably similar to that obtained from the analysis of the European
dataset (1.642890). Also income, used as a proxy for abilities, is positive and signif-
icant. The fact that the coe¢ cient is small depends on the magnitude of the income
related to the dummy variable of doing voluntary work or not.
The BHPS also provides data to test the time allocation assumption, i.e. that
an increase in the hours worked in the market implies a decrease of the hours spent
volunteering. Therefore, in Table 6.3 we insert the data about the amount of hours
worked per week in the regression.
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Table 6.3: UK b
It appears that individuals indeed have to allocate their time between volun-
teering and working in the market. Table 6.3 shows that the variable Hours Worked
Per Week is signicant and negative, and that, at least for the UK, the main assump-
tion about time allocation is supported by the data.
In sum, we have proved that the data are consistent with the predictions of the
theoretical model about the dependence of volunteering on the size of the welfare
state and personal abilities. These ndings support the view that government expen-
diture has a positive e¤ect on volunteering: a decrease in public spending decreases
the probability that employed individuals decide to volunteer.
6.5 Volunteering Capital and Personal Motivations: Narrative
Analysis
While our econometric ndings indicate that abilities also inuence this volunteering
decision, in our datasets there were no data available to support the inuence of our
theoretical notion of volunteering capital, nor to understand the relationship between
these variables. However, the analysis of this section may help to cast more lights
on these qualitative relationships, by explicating how in practice the presence of
volunteering capital can a¤ect the decision of employed individuals to volunteer.
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The narrative data consists of 19 interviews conducted between October and
December 2009 in Glasgow (UK) part of a comparative project on community par-
ticipation in deprived neighbourhoods in several European countries. The interviews
were conducted with 7 active residents of the area Pollokshields Southside Central,
7 public professionals working for various agencies delivering public services in this
area, and 5 public professionals working in support of Glasgow City Council in this
and several other areas of the city. The respondents were asked about their prac-
tices, everyday ideas, choices and actions, with regards to community participation,
which were transcribed and systematically analysed by means of a set of rigorous
methods and techniques to inductively develop an analytical understanding of what
is going on in the empirical data (Charmaz, 2006).
The goal was to establish what these people were actually trying to com-
municate when they said or did something, and what communicative barriers pre-
vented them from constructive collaboration. For this purpose, the interviews were
approached as narratives: a range of storiesa person tells about real or imagined
situations that wittingly or unwittingly enables this person to pinpoint what hap-
pened, make sense of these happenings, and express his/her evaluation of them. By
reconstructing and confronting the narratives of di¤erent people, it becomes possible
to see the assumptions, beliefs, and emotions that underlie their daily experiences
and identify broader behavioral patterns and tensions. While the overall research
was much broader than voluntary activity alone, the narratives analysis revealed
two dominant narratives with regards to citizensmotivations to participate and the
importance of voluntary capital.
The rst narrative is work in progress, which signies that volunteering
is an ongoing, complex, and demanding process. The following quote of a public
professional working in support of the Council is illustrative:
.
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".. part of the process is ... taking the message ... to ... community councils, ...
area committees, youve got tenants and residents associations, youth groups, you
know .... Basically if you identify where they are, and who they are, then making
contact with them, going along and making a presentation.... And you might go to
ten of those, you know, and for every ten you might get one ... who is willing to
come along, and they might just come along to a meeting, decide its not for them
and then disappear again. But thats again what I say about the nature of it and
its about continuing to go out and spread the word and networking with partners to
make sure that ... theyre spreading the word .... So, but its just an ongoing piece
of work ... that doesnt stop .... So very much work in progress..." (Respondent 3)
The respondent indicates that the daily support for voluntary work is very time,
energy, and resource intensive, because there is no stopping rule to recruiting vol-
unteers. It is about continuing to go out to meet new people, making contact, con-
vincing them to come along, providing them with adequate training, and keeping
them on board. In order to secure a continuity of services with such a high turnover
of volunteers, there is a strong need for su¢ cient support structures and profes-
sional skills (see also Taylor et al., 2011, p. 9; Skidmore et al., 2006). Notice that
the respondent only talks here about going out to people who are already part of a
group that does voluntary work. The experience is that for new citizens to volunteer
the process is even much more a work in progress.
The second narrative is making a di¤erence, which denotes that citizens
start to volunteer because they are committed to solving particular problems, but
struggle with a lot of setbacks preventing actually making a di¤erence to their com-
munity.
". . . when I got involved with the Community Council . . . a particular person
would lead on a particular project and the rest would fall in line and support that.
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. . . It worked really well and it was mutually benecial . . . , and then you see the
e¤ects in peoples day-to-day lives. . . . I dont look for feedback through, you know,
strategic bodies who are going to make an assessment of something has been a success
or not, I get my feedback through my neighbors in my community and when I see
things happening. . . . I mean, . . . I had a big community event in the summer. . . , and
I had been asked at this event if I would do a survey for the Community Council. . . .
I said Of course, thats ne, Ill do it, even though I really didnt have time . . . . I
emailed every single member in my Community Council . . . and I said Were having
this big event, it would be really lovely if you would . . . come along and help me . . .
and have fun. Not one . . . Community Councillor came. . . . Thats when I knew
that . . . it wasnt really functioning." (Respondent 7)
The respondent explains that her main motivation for volunteering is seeing
problems being solved in her direct living environment. However, there are often
a lot of setbacks that cause deep frustration. Starting to volunteer, and keeping
on doing so, therefore requires a very strong commitment and well-developed skills.
This implies that citizens with higher abilities will be more likely to volunteer, as
having less skills and experience can either prevent a person from deciding to start
volunteering or to give up more quickly. The decision to volunteer is therefore
mediated by a persons abilities to make a di¤erence.
Taken together, these narratives clarify why the decision of an employed
individual to volunteer depends on their abilities and voluntary capital: she is less
likely to allocate time to volunteering when she lacks the abilities to get involved
in voluntary work and e¤ectively participate in it, and there is insu¢ cient volun-
tary capital to counter the inevitable setbacks and frustrations. At a deeper level,
these ndings suggest that government expenditure is a crucial variable for volun-
teering: less public spending increases the probability of setbacks and frustration
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and decreases the availability of adequate support structures and professional skills.
Thus, this narrative analysis has further conrmed the model and the results of the
econometric analysis, as well as provided some deeper insight into the relationships
between government expenditure, abilities, voluntary capital, and volunteering.
6.6 Conclusions
We have found that, in contrast to common beliefs, more government expenditure
actually increases the probability of volunteering for employed individuals: less
public spending reduces the likelihood of (successful) volunteering. This nding
should not be interpreted as (political) argument in favour of Big Governmentand
against Big Society. The point is not that increasing public spending will auto-
matically lead more citizens to volunteer. In fact, after a certain tipping point
(see gure 6.1) further increasing the government expenditure will lead the overall
public good to decrease. Therefore, based on our model and ndings we want to
suggest that government expenditure has to be su¢ cient to maintain volunteering
capital and facilitate volunteering.
From this perspective, the government fulls a di¤erent role in society than
merely providing public agencies and spending to directly or indirectly deliver ser-
vices. Rather, the government acts as facilitator, or enabler, that does not decide for,
but with volunteers what the level of public spending should be and how this could
maintain and improve volunteering capital. It is not simply a matter of a govern-
ment that is present or withdraws; it requires a government that places itself next
to voluntary workers and organizations to cooperatively make volunteering work.
This would be a government that is not steering but serving (Denhardt & Denhardt,
2000; King & Stivers, 1998). In e¤ect, this requires, for example for the Big Society
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plan, that the government should not be rolling back, nor simply rolling in, but
rather rolling out the red carpet.
Many factors were already known to a¤ect levels of voluntary activity, but to
our surprise the relationship between public spending and volunteering had great
lacunae, which were lled by the widely held belief in the existence of a crowding
out e¤ect. With this chapter we have sought to assess the validity of this popular
assumption by developing a theoretical model about the inuence of government
expenditure on the decision of employed individuals to allocate their time to vol-
untary work or not. Our model and ndings provide strong foundations for the
thesis that government expenditure leads to an increase of voluntary activity. In
the realistic data for the UK and for Europe, higher public spending increases the
probability that the working part of the population will decide to volunteer. What
we can safely learn from our analysis is not that the government expenditure should
be increased, but rather than stepping back, the government should position itself
as a facilitator, or enabler, of volunteering capital.
Admitted, this is a somewhat speculative conclusion for which our model and
ndings do not provide any concrete indications of how to put it into practice. We
provide only a preliminary analysis of the relationship between government expendi-
ture and volunteering and a prospective view on the e¤ects we might expect from the
Big Society plan. While it might be objected that no valid conclusions can be drawn
about the e¤ects of the Big Society plan without analysing data following its launch
in time, we concur that our test of the main belief underlying this policy provides
valuable insights into the likelihood of its success or failure as well as helpful rec-
ommendations about the direction in which it could be amended. Our ndings lead
us to believe that more specic recommendations could be formulated by further
research in the ways government expenditure interacts with the personal abilities of
individuals and inuences the volunteering capital. A main limitation of our model
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is that it does not allow for such interactions. However, in its current form it does
rmly establish that government expenditure has a positive e¤ect on the decision
to volunteer by employed individuals. Moreover, we have only considered public
expenditure as whole, while it might be rewarding to analyse how each specic com-
ponent inuences the relative segment of volunteering. This will likely be the focus
of a future research.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Empirical evidence1 has proved the existence of important relationships between
non-economic variables, direct and indirect redistribution, and economic growth.
However, the literature has not been able to properly explain this connection. The
aim of this thesis is to analyse the role of altruism and ideology, in particular refer-
ring to the ideas of fairness. We study how these non-economic variables a¤ect
individualspreferences for voting and their decisions regarding voluntary work. In
the four essays of this thesis the common feature is that individuals do care about
others as well as their personal gain. Each essay has explored di¤erent aspects of
altruism and ideology in order to support the overall conclusion that these factors
cannot be neglected in the analysis of political economic processes.
The rst essay focuses on the relation between the perception of individuals about
social justice and their preferences for redistribution. It shows that the evolution of
political ideology regarding the fairness of the constellation of income and wealth in
society can generate economic and political persistence in inequality, redistribution,
and growth. According to our model, ideology does not entail cognitive distortions
of reality, but shapes the moral judgement of what wealth distribution would be
fair, and, moreover, internalizes into peoples preferences the degree to which they
become unhappy from the distance between the current wealth distribution and the
wealth distribution they consider fair. It is important to remark that all individuals
1See Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
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are perfectly rational and can directly observe the achievement of each social group,
the level of e¤ort they have made, and the external factors ("luck" or government
taxes and transfers) that have determined their parents wealth. Since we adopt
an overlapping generations structure, it makes sense to model that over a relatively
long time an unbiased assessment can be made about how strongly people have
contributed to their familys enrichment through their life-time work commitment.
We show that di¤erences in the initial view of what is fair and unfair can a¤ect
otherwise identical economies for a potentially long sequence of generations. This
suggests that relatively short periods of unfair treatment of family wealth can shape
the subsequent economic performance of the economy quite strongly.
We also compare economies characterized by di¤erent cultures, in so far as we
can dene culture as a network of meanings that allows people to form a moral
judgement about their society. We show that in our model a poor country would grow
less than it could because the voters perceive a high relative importance of "luck"
in their economic success, thereby judging the end-of-life wealth distribution quite
unfair, and thus supporting high redistributive policies. This, in the expectations of
rational economic individuals, discourages e¤ort and discourages income and capital
accumulation. We also analyse the reaction to shocks to wealth with the result
that individuals react di¤erently according to how shocks a¤ect their perception of
fairness and recreate a hump-shaped e¤ect of the higher income. In sum, the rst
chapter shows how ideology and redistribution evolve over time and a¤ect economic
growth and equality.
The second essay continues the study of the role of ideologies, but introduces
endogenous abilities and public education to the analysis. This has two implications.
First, when fairness is considered as a part of individualspreferences, it inuences
their voting behavior. Voters are not simply selsh, but care about social justice.
Public education, secondly, diminishes income di¤erences for future generations.
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This second essay demonstrates that fairness and public education play a crucial role
in the determination of scal policy. Consistently with the rst essay we nd that the
more individuals believe that the willingness to work, rather than luck, determines
income, the less they will be willing to redistribute. On the contrary, a society
where poorer people are considered unlucky will be well-disposed to redistribute
more wealth.
Although we allow for an extension with transfers, we mainly investigate soci-
eties in which the government expenditure is allocated between the public good and
public education. We perform a numerical experiment to analyse the interaction
between ideology and public education. Di¤erent types of ideology inuence in dif-
ferent ways the government expenditure and therefore public education. If agents
believe public education to be fair, they will vote for a di¤erent level of redistrib-
ution, which in turn leads to higher public education, economic growth, and lower
inequality. Moreover, the more agents have strict ideas about fairness, the higher the
government expenditure is. A certain degree of taxation has a positive e¤ect on abil-
ities and therefore on the per capita income and equality. However, an excessively
high taxation can impair economic growth because of the disincentive e¤ect of taxes
on e¤ort. In this way, societies can be trapped in ideology traps and have subsistent
low public expenditure. We also analyse the e¤ect of di¤erent initial levels of public
schooling, showing that higher levels of public schooling are associated with higher
equality and income, leading to higher economic growth for several generations.
The third essay deals with interactions between ideology and wealth tax. We
introduce a new way of thinking about the wealth tax by analysing the possibility of
implementing a wealth tax and an income tax, where the latter is dened through a
tax di¤erential. In order to avoid double counting, in fact, we subtract the income
tax from the wealth tax; this allows individuals to vote for their preferred policy
distinguishing between the wealth that derives from their work and the wealth that
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derives from the capital they inherited from their parent, imposing two di¤erent tax
rates. This innovative welfare scheme is implemented in an environment in which
individuals also care about their ideal society and their concept of social justice.
The main result, that we nd both analytically and numerically, is opposite
to the classic result of the literature: taxing mainly bequest-related wealth and
avoiding heavy taxes on income can be growth enhancing and can reduce inequality.
Moreover, the origin of wealth itself matters: if the di¤erences in wealth derive from
various levels of e¤ort, individuals will decide to impose a lower taxation as they
believe the distribution of wealth to be fair. On the other side, if the di¤erences
in wealth come from an uneven distribution of luck, individuals will believe the
distribution of wealth to be unfair and vote for a higher level of redistribution. The
third essay thus adds an innovative point of view on the debate about the optimal
wealth and capital tax by studying the possibility of a tax di¤erential and linking it
to ideology and in particular the idea of fairness.
The fourth essay conceptualizes and tests the relationship between scal policy
and volunteering, based on the current British Governments ambitions for creating
the "Big Society". The "Big Society" policy is based on the idea that granting more
freedom to local communities and volunteers will compensate for a withdrawal of
public agencies and spending. This essay seeks to answer the question how public
spending a¤ects the individual decision to volunteer. In order to do this, our method-
ology consists of three steps. The rst step is to develop a simple theoretical model
that predicts this relationship by making two important innovations: focusing on
employed agents and "warm glow altruism". Up to now, the relationship between
public spending and volunteering has only been studied for the entire population or
specic groups such as retired people or young people. However, employed agents
do not face the same time allocation constraint between working, volunteering, and
leisure as retired or unemployed individuals. The main result of the model is that
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public spending a¤ects the decision to volunteer, but not in the way as is commonly
assumed. More specically, a decrease in the public expenditure brings about a
decrease in volunteering. Moreover, according to the results, the decision to volun-
teer is also positively inuenced by individual abilities.
The second step is to test the predictions of the model through an econometric
analysis of two survey data sets, nding a signicant positive relationship between
volunteering, government expenditure and abilities. The third and nal step is to
analyse the relationship between voting, abilities and volunteering qualitatively. A
narrative analysis reveals that volunteering is an ongoing work in progress in which it
is di¢ cult to make a di¤erence. Less public expenditure can increase the probabilities
of setbacks and decrease the funding available for the necessary support structures
and professionals. Moreover, low abilities increase the di¢ culties for an individual to
participate. In conclusion, our results suggest that volunteering, by individuals from
the active working population, declines when government intervention is decreased.
This implies that the crowding out hypothesis and the main assumption of the Big
Society policy are not sustainable.
In conclusion, the main insight from the thesis is that ideology and altruism inu-
ence individualsbehavior and should be taken into consideration when analysing
political processes and preferences for taxation. However, there are aspects that
should be further explored. It could be interesting to study optimal non-linear tax-
ation in a multidimensional environment, with preferences also dened for social
justice and fairness. Moreover the study of the e¤ect of nancial crises on eco-
nomic policies should be deepened. Shocks on wealth not only a¤ect the economy
directly, but also through individuals perception and ideas, and this can have a
strong impact on the economy. Finally, more aspects of altruism and volunteering
need to be explored. Up to now we have only considered public expenditure as a
whole, while it might be rewarding to analyse how each specic component inu-
183
ences the relative segment of volunteering. Moreover, more specic recommendations
regarding the Big Societycould be formulated by further research on the ways in
which government expenditure interacts with the personal abilities of agents and
inuences volunteering capital. These are but a few aspects which based on this
thesis seem to deserve further exploration in the future in order to further expand
the research agenda on the role of non-economic variables in political economy.
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